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Preface
It is both the authors’ and the editors’ wish that this volume be
read by a wider public so that not only experts in Indology and
Buddhist Studies, but also readers from various different back-
grounds may take an interest in the subjects discussed. This is
why we have taken an interdisciplinary approach when compil-
ing the contributions to this collection of articles, ensuring that
specialist knowledge of register and terminology is not required
in order to understand them. 
This  volume  is  the  outcome  of  international  and  even
transcontinental  cooperation  involving  expert  authors  from
Asia,  Australia,  Europe  and  the  U.S.A.  Its  editors  work  in
central Europe, printing and publishing took place in India, and
distribution of the book is worldwide. 
Generally, we have spelled Pli and Sanskrit words using dia-
critical marks, but wherever they have been used as loan words
by the authors as, for example, ‘nirvana’ or ‘sangha’, we have
dropped the diacritics. 
To conclude, we hope that our anthology will provide ma-
terials which might inspire the reader to look at some questions
of global concern from a new angle and that, in this context,
this will provide a stimulus for developing a freethinking atti-
tude.
The Editors.
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Introduction by the Editors
Can Buddhism be called a stronghold of free thinking? The
editors  were confronted with this  question when they  asked
themselves  what  relevance  Buddhism  might  have  for  social
developments  in  the  twenty-first  century  and where  it  will
position itself in these processes. This approach arose from the
fact that this collection of articles had initially been planned for
publication by  an interdisciplinary  journal  of  sociology.  The
development the volume took from this  starting point  to its
completion was dynamic  as well as challenging and,  as may
happen with any lively process, it had a tendency to develop a
momentum of its own. 
It is likely that posing this question is typical of editors with a
European background: this is a continent where, for centuries,
individual free thinking has been emphasized and celebrated as
an outstanding accomplishment of the human mind. This is es-
pecially so today, when free thinking is of particular importance
for human societies confronted with global challenges such as
the destruction of the environment, waves of refugees, armed
conflicts and the disintegration of traditional social structures,
making us search for solutions that are creative, original and
fundamentally new.1 Especially in Europe,  we find that  new
problems  cannot  be  solved  using  the  old  methods.  Con-
sequently, we search for innovative and inspiring ideas. When
seeking new paths we often find that we find support by return-
ing to original human qualities as a basis for developing free-
dom of mind. What contribution might Buddhism make here? 
1 See e.g., Globale Trends 2010. Frieden – Entwicklung – Umwelt. Ed.
by Tobias Debiel et al. (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden / Institut fr
Entwicklung  und  Frieden).  Frankfurt/M.:  S.  Fischer,  2010;  Peter
Meyns (ed.),  Handbuch Eine Welt. Entwicklung im globalen Wandel.
Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 2009; Claus Leggewie / Harald Welzer,
Das Ende der Welt,  wie  wir  sie  kannten.  Klima, Zukunft  und die
Chancen der Demokratie, Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2009.
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According  to  our  present-day  knowledge,  the  historical
Buddha initiated an emancipatory movement where philosoph-
ical thought, meditation techniques and ethical conduct were
combined with a pragmatic doctrine of self-salvation which, as
was to be expected, mainly attracted ‘religious virtuosi’ but did
not aim at bringing about mass conversions or social upheavals.
In  retrospect,  the  cultural  and  historical  conditions  of  the
Buddha’s teaching were conducive to developing an attitude of
freedom of mind and free thinking: The European philosoph-
ical dilemma of ‘freedom or determinism’,2 a problem to which
Benjamin Libet’s experiments have drawn renewed attention,3
was not posed by ancient Indian thinkers because of their view
of causality4 nor among Buddhist thinkers because of the concept
of  dependent  origination  (Pli:  paiccasamuppda,  Sanskrit:
prattyasamutpda).5
2 Cf. Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha taught. Reprint: Dehiwala, Sri
Lanka: Buddhist Cultural Center, 1996 [= 2nd and enl. ed. 1967; 1st
ed.: London / Bedford: Gordon Frazer, 1959], 54. For an overview
see Robert Kane (ed.),  The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford:
OUP, 2002.
3 Gerhard Roth, Homo neurobiologicus – ein neues Menschenbild? In:
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen (APuZ) 44-45/2008: Hirnforschung, p.
6-12; Franz M. Wuketits, Die Illusion des freien Willens. In: ibid., p.
3-5;  download:  http://www.bpb.de/publikationen. About  the  quasi-
religiouos ‘belief in free will’ cf. Daniel C. Dennett. Breaking the Spell.
Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. New York: Viking, 2006 (German
ed.: Frankfurt/M. / Leipzig: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2008), Chapter
8.1.
4 See Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought India. London: George Allen
& Unwin, 2nd ed. 1983, esp. Part II, Chapter 2.3 (German ed.: Bud-
dhistisches Denken. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 / Insel, 2007, 203-
225).
5 See Rahula, What the Buddha taught (see note 2), 53-55, cf. Bhikkhu
Psdika, Grundpositionen des Buddhismus zum Problem der mensch-
lichen  Willensfreiheit.  In:  Uwe an der Heiden /  Helmut Schneider
(eds.),  Hat der Mensch einen freien Willen? Die Antwort der groen
Philosophen,  Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007, 309-323, esp.  315 and 319-
320; Hans Wolfgang Schumann, The historical Buddha. Delhi: Motilal
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In Early Buddhism,  concepts such as theism,  ritualism and
clericalism were rejected,6 which was intellectually and existen-
tially liberating; in the same way, it avoided asceticism and he-
donism,7 leaving room for a way of life that, as a ‘middle way’,
is liberated from extremes. 
Early Buddhism’s pragmatic view of salvation and its inten-
tion to free speculative thought from constraints are illustrated
by famous similes, such as that of teaching as a raft8 and the
simile of the poisoned arrow9. Seemingly, it was alien to the
Buddha’s nature to make other men or women dependent on
him or  his  teaching,  as  is  pointed  out  by some traditions.10
Though he considered himself to be merely a ‘discoverer’ of a
supra-personal truth,11 he nevertheless regarded this salvational
knowledge as definitive, in contrast to the modern idea of a fal-
sifiable theory or research hypothesis as expounded for example
by Karl R. Popper. This should also be taken into account when
the  famous  Klma  Sutta,  which  is  very  popular  among
Banarsidass,  2004, 139  (New  German  ed.:  2004,  161).  As  an
introduction to  Dependent Origination, see Peter Harvey,  An Intro-
duction to Buddhism. Teachings, history, practices. Cambridge: CUP,
1990, 54-60.
6 See, e.g., Konrad Meisig, Klang der Stille. Der Buddhismus. Freiburg,
Basle, Vienna: Herder, 2nd ed. 1997, 23-68; Klaus Mylius, Der Bud-
dhismus, seine Lehre und seine Geschichte.  In: K. M. (ed., transl.):
Die vier edlen Wahrheiten. Texte des ursprnglichen Buddhismus. Stutt-
gart: Reclam, 1998, 34-40.
7 See, e.g., Meisig, Klang der Stille (see note 6), 68-74.
8MN 22, PTS I 135. On this, see the contribution by Sallie B. King.
9MN 63, PTS I 429.
10 Schumann, The historical Buddha (see note 5), 92 (new German ed.:
112), points out: ‘We hear several times of how Gotama instructed
new followers to continue to give alms to the monks of the school
they had left (e.g. Mv 6.31.10f.)’; cf. Uma Chakravarti, Social Dimen-
sions of  Early  Buddhism. Reprint:  New  Delhi:  Munshiram
Manoharlal, 1996, 60-61.
11 Cf. SN 12.65, PTS I 106. 
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Western Buddhists, is quoted.12 Yet even if this tradition could
not be traced back to the historical Buddha – an approach that
has  also  been  considered  already13 –,  it  would  still  be  in
accordance with its founder’s intention and the spirit of Early
Buddhism; furthermore, it may be presumed that the tradents
and text compilers realized how the Master’s recommendations
could  also  be  applied  to  the  teaching  itself,  especially  in
criticism of that teaching, as several passages of the Pli Canon
point out explicitly that self-contradiction is an argumentation
error.14 Even today, texts like the Klma Sutta or the famous
simile of the blind men and the elephant15 are illuminating both
in a historical context and for present-day world development
as they prove that already in ancient India there was not only a
religious  and  ideological  ‘market’  and  competition  among
various sects and systems of thought, but also a co-existence of
different sects that was mostly non-violent. Yet the ideal of non-
violence (ahis) and tolerance was by no means a character-
istic of Buddhism, but belonged to ‘the wonder that was India’
and stands in contrast to present-day developments in India and
elsewhere16. As the above-mentioned texts show, this tolerance
12 AN 3.65 [Thai: 3.66], PTS III 189. On this, see the contributions by
Guang Xing and Sallie B. King. On criticism of the Klma-Sutta and
of the reception of Walpola Rahula’s  What the Buddha taught, see
Colin Edwards, Rahula and the Liberal Buddha. In: Buddhist Studies
Review, Vol. 25 (2008), pp. 232-243. This article was available only
after the editorial deadline and could not be considered by the contri-
butors.
13 Not considered by Edwards, see previous note.
14 See e.g. MN 56, PTS 378.
15 Ud 6.4, PTS 66-69.
16 See  Claudia  Derichs  /  Andrea  Fleschenberg  (eds.),  Religious
Fundamentalisms  and  Their  Gendered  Impacts  in  Asia.  Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung: Berlin 2010 (download:  http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
iez/07061.pdf);  Mark  Juergensmeyer,  Global  Rebellion.  Religious
Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qaeda.
The  Regents  of  the  University  of  California,  2008  (German  ed.:
Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2009).
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also  included  phenomena  such  as  ‘patchwork  religiosity’  or
‘believing without belonging’ as described today by sociologists
of religion17: one could still be religious in a traditional way, but
there was the additional option of making one’s own choice.18
Buddhism’s inclusivist features supported such an attitude. 
Still, the approach of interpreting rebirth and the deed-result-
connection as quasi-natural  laws,  without  resorting  to gods,
spirits, demons or celestial bodies, may be regarded as demytho-
logization.19 The  same  applies  to  the  interpretation  of  the
destructive driving forces of humans: it is not angels or devils
that act on the stage of human consciousness, prompting us to
commit good or evil deeds, but the impersonal forces of greed,
aversion and delusion that determine human action. It is this
demythologized view which, for example through training in
mindfulness, may lead to profound changes in the behaviour of
the individual who, then, will not need to retreat into mental
defence mechanisms. 
This volume with its collection of eight contributions high-
lights  different  aspects of  the Hnayna and Mahyna trad-
itions, for example Early Buddhism20, Theravda Buddhism in
Southeast Asia,21 and Zen-Buddhism22. All these approaches share
a fundamental orientation towards rationality, the use of logical-
philosophical argumentation and the cultivation of logical dis-
course, though they cannot be reduced to this concept since,
17 Cf. Oliver Roy,  La Sainte Ignorance.  Le temps de la religion sans
culture, Paris: Äditions du Seuil, 2008 (German ed..: Munich: Siedler,
2010); Claus Leggewie, Religion und transnationale Weltgesellschaft.
In: Meyns (ed.),  Handbuch  (see note 1), 194-201;  Claus Leggewie,
Weltmacht Religion? In: Globale Trends 2010 (see note 1), 61-80.
18 Cf. Schumann, The historical Buddha (see note 5), 92 (new German
ed.: 112).
19 Cf. Hans Wolfgang Schumann, Siebzig Schlsselbegriffe des  Pli-
Buddhismus.Heidelberg: Werner Kristkeitz, 2006, 56 and 67.
20 See the contributions by Bhikkhu Anlayo und Guang Xing. 
21 See the contributions by Barbara Kameniar and Sallie B. King.
22 See the contributions by Ashby Butnor and Silja Graupe.
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besides its philosophy‚ ‘Buddhism’ also comprises a psychological,
a religious and, last but not least, a cultural system.23 Which of
these sub-systems will prevail depends on socio-economical and
political  tendencies,  movements  in  the  history  of  ideas,  and
intellectual trends. In contrast to systems labelled ‘world reli-
gions’, the system which European traditions understood ‘Bud-
dhism’ to be did not begin as a ‘religion’, if we conceive religion
to be a system of cults and rituals whose purpose is to dispose
gods, saviours or prophets favourably towards what their adepts
may wish for individually or collectively, but as a part of the
movement of non-Brahmanical travelling mendicants (Sanskrit:
ramaa, Pli:  samaa) of ancient India.24 Thus, a movement
that has its roots in asceticism is likely to be able to provide
solutions for global problems arising mainly from the waste of
resources  and  the  failed  ideology  of  ‘boundless  economic
growth’.
However, it is not the editors’ intention to support an ideali-
zation of Buddhism25 as, regrettably, in the course of its history
several of its advocates have propagated violence in words and
deeds.26 Nonetheless, neither the Buddha’s way of life (and that
23 ‘Evidently at no stage of its history was Buddhism a homogenous
movement’  (Perry Schmidt-Leukel,  Understanding  Buddhism. Edin-
burgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2006, 2).
24 Cf. K.R. Norman, A Philological Approach to Buddhism. Lancaster:
Pali Text Society, 2nd ed. 2006, 37-38; Richard Gombrich, Theravda
Buddhism. A Social history from ancient Benares to modern Colombo.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2nd ed. 2006, Chapter 2.
25 As is well known, Europeans have been searching for a peaceful and
reasonable religion since the Enlightenment, a quest during which pro-
jections occur, cf. the critical remarks by Michael von Brck,  Ein-
fhrung in den Buddhismus, Frankfurt/M. / Leipzig: Verlag der Weltre-
ligonen, 2007, 19.
26 See Mark Juergensmeyer /  Michael  K.  Jerryson (eds.),  Buddhist
Warfare, Oxford: OUP, 2010; Juergensmeyer,  Global Rebellion  (see
note 16), Chapter 3, section:  Buddhist Revolts in Southeast Asia. –
Prior introductions and presentations usually evade the phenomenon
of ‘violence in Buddhism’; for an exception and historical examples,
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of  his  first  disciples)  nor  the  canonical  scriptures  of  Early
Buddhism provide any legitimization for any kind of violence:
an attitude of committed pacifism was taught and practised in
these  groups.27 Buddhism’s  pacifism,  its  affinity  to  applied
psychology and its openness to scientific questions and social,
political, economic and ecological problems are reasons why,
among others, individuals and groups from Western cultures
are attracted  by  it.  This  attraction  takes  the  most  different
forms, for example as an ethos, a stimulus for social critique, or
a way of life.28 The articles in this volume address these and
see  Hans Jrgen Greschat,  Die Religion der  Buddhisten. Munich /
Basle: Reinhardt, 1980, 117-118, 185-186, 193-198, 200-201. 
Revealing insights  into Buddhism in real life  are  provided by two
Western Buddhist monks, Dhammika und Pajalo: Shravasti Dhammi-
ka, The Broken Buddha. Critical Reflections on Theravada and a Plea
for  a  New Buddhism,  2006 (download:  http://www.buddhistische-
gesellschaft-berlin.de/downloads/brokenbuddhanew.pdf);  Florian Pal-
zinsky (Samanera Pajalo),  Wie ein Fremder im Paradies, 3rd and rev.
German ed., Ranshofen, Austria: edition innsalz, 2009 (first, shorter
version: Like a Stranger in Paradise. Ratmalana, Sri Lanka: Savodaya
Vishva  Lekha  Publication,  2000);  download: http://www.simple-
wisdom.net/Image/file/Pdfs,%20Essays/Like_a_Stranger_in_Paradise_
7Essays_S_Pajalo.pdf). 
27 An often repeated phrase in the Pli Canon says: ‘Abandoning the
taking of life, he dwells refraining from taking life, without stick or
sword, scrupulous, compassionate, trembling for the welfare of all liv-
ing beings’ (cf. DN 1, PTS I 4; transl. following M. Walshe, 1996, p.
68). In the simile of the saw (MN 21, PTS I 129), the principle of
peaceableness is illustrated as follows: ‘Bhikkhus, even if bandits were
to sever you savagely limb by limb with a two-handled saw, he who
gave rise to a mind of hate towards them would not be carrying out
my teaching. Herein, bhikkhus, you should train thus: ‘Our minds will
remain unaffected, and we shall utter no evil words; we shall abide
compassionate  for  their  welfare,  with  a  mind  of  loving-kindness,
without inner hate. […].’ That is how you should train, bhikkhus.’
(transl. by amoli and Bodhi, 1995, p. 223).
28 As long as, in the West, sociologists and theologists hand down ste-
reotypes like those saying that Buddhism can be reduced to ‘Welt-
flucht‘ (Max Weber) and is ‘anti-social’ in general (Albert Schweitzer),
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other issues in various forms, presenting Buddhism as a true
stronghold  of  free thinking  in theory  and practice and thus
make an inspiring  contribution to intercultural  and interreli-
gious dialogue.29 At the very least, it is the editors’ wish that this
book will motivate and encourage all those who seek for new
answers to urgent questions that still need to be solved.
About the individual contributions:
Outcasts should not be regarded as victims, but rather as pion-
eers in quest of new ways of life: this suggestion is made by
Barbara Kameniar with her contribution based on field studies
she has made over the last twenty years. She discusses the situ-
ation of the so-called mae chis (female Buddhist lay practition-
ers) in Thailand and, taking their perspective, discusses the or-
dination of Buddhist nuns and the function women have in the
Sangha. A critical light is cast on the foundation of the order of
nuns by the Buddha  and on the role of  women in religion,
arguing that their comparatively low status is in no adequate
proportion to the importance of women in practice for  the
maintenance of Buddhism as a religion. From the conditions
experienced by the mae chis the author draws conclusions about
the general situation of persons  outside social structures, for
the socio-ethical, social-psychological and socio-political relevance of
Buddha’s teaching will not become visible; cf. Hans Julius Schneider,
Religion. Berlin / New York: de Gruyter, 2008, 110. On social relev-
ance, see here the contributions by Ashby Butnor, Barbara Kameniar,
and Sallie B. King; on implications of Buddhism concerning economy,
see the contributions by Karl-Heinz Brodbeck and Silja Graupe.
29 ‘Today there is  no culture, be it Asian or  European,  African or
Latin-American, which can move exclusively within the boundaries of
its  own tradition without becoming provincial’  (Ram Adhar Mall,
Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen. Darmstadt: WBG, 1995, 23;
our translation). For concrete examples of cross-cultural relevance, see
the contributions by Sallie B. King and Charles S. Prebish.
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example that of refugees excluded from power. Nevertheless,
the article opens a perspective of hope: ‘[…] rather than feel
pity for the mae chi, or continue to argue that their position is
untenable,  perhaps  we can begin  to examine their  lives  and
their  choices  for  what  insights  they  provide us  with for re-
imagining a ‘paradigm of a new historical consciousness […].’
Intense  body consciousness  strengthens  the  faculty  of  em-
pathy and the resulting readiness for compassionate action. This
is the core message of Ashby Butnor’s article. Taking an attitude
of free thinking and the practice of Zen as a basis, the author
develops  approaches  to  self-emancipation  from  uncritically
accepted conditions30. Buddhism is known for its cultivation of
the mind; Zen includes the body in the experience of awaken-
ing. The author expresses her wish for a more intense resonance
between individuals and their environment or rather the society
in which they live, meaning a compassionate, ethical way of
action. ‘Social values affect our moral perception. We may not
recognize certain forms of suffering as suffering if we have been
trained to be inattentive to their existence.’  A description is
provided of a strategy to free oneself from isolation and limited
perception  resulting  from an overemphasis  of  the  mind by,
among other things, harmonizing body and mind so that one’s
perception  and empathy  are intensified.  Such a process  will
have social consequences because interaction changes accord-
ingly. There are cross-references to current issues such as femi-
nism and problems  of  social  exclusion.  In  the  view of  the
editors, Butnor’s contribution shows clearly how, in practice,
compassion will counteract any forms of cruelty, a concept that
can also be found in the Abhidhamma literature31. 
30 For example, rejection of the body in some religious and philosoph-
ical systems. (Editors’ note). 
31 Cf. Bhikkhu Bodhi, A comprehensive manual of Abhidhamma – The
Abhidhammattha Sangaha of cariya Anuruddha. BPS: Kandy, 1993, 90.
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Sallie  B.  King  presents  free  thinking  within  the  Buddha’s
teaching as the foundation of Engaged Buddhism, in particular
by reference to three outstanding and internationally-recognised
figures from Asia and the U.S.A. She explains how underlying
principles of free thinking can already be found in the Buddha’s
teaching, how free thinking is encouraged there and how, in
Engaged Buddhism, it results in concrete action. Buddhadsa is
mentioned especially as a representative of a Buddhist modern-
ism which interprets Buddhism as a method of social and men-
tal liberation: from his perspective, Buddhism is not a religion
but the observation of nature. Taking Thich Nhat Hanh and
Bernard Glassman Roshi  as examples,  the author points  out
how Buddhist thinking faces social and political challenges and
the potential for creativity and capacity to change which this
involves. ‘After all, to create is to bring into being something
new,  something that  did not  before exist.  That is,  to create
requires one to have that beginner’s mind, the mind that does
not know, to spend time in not knowing with an alert, awake
mind.’ 
The situation of Buddhists at universities in the U.S.A. is the
subject of the article by Charles S. Prebish presenting the out-
come of more than thirty years of field research in an environ-
ment where he is at home. The circumstances described for his
target group, for whom he has coined the term ‘scholar practi-
tioners’, are typical for the U.S.A. and, at the same time, gener-
ally revealing from a religio-sociological perspective. In Bud-
dhism’s countries of origin, its followers are led by an elite of
monks, whereas in the U.S.A. Buddhists are mostly lay people.
Within this lay movement, Buddhist texts and philosophy find
themselves in contrast to a development which the author calls
‘Buddhism’s contextual relationship with culture’.32 Prebish asks
32 Editors’  note: Here, a  structural parallel  to the development of
Christian churches in the U.S.A. can be discovered. There is another
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whether  Buddhists  within  academia  in  the  U.S.A.  or  other
Western countries might take over the leadership role played by
monks  in  Asia:  ‘In  the  absence  of  the  traditional  “scholar
monks” so prevalent in Asia, it may well be that the “scholar
practitioners” of today’s American Buddhism will fulfil the role
of  “quasi-monastics,”  or  at  least  treasure-troves  of  Buddhist
literacy and information, functioning as guides through whom
one’s understanding of the Dharma may be sharpened.’ Given
that  academics  who  followed  the  Buddha’s  teaching  were
formerly ridiculed but nowadays find increasing acceptance and
appreciation  as  well  as  the  courage  to  openly  admit  to
Buddhism, it will certainly be interesting to pursue this question
further in the future. 
Money, the catalyst of global trade or the lubricant of  the
market economy on which we rely in our everyday life, has the
nature of an illusion devoid of any substance: this pioneering
thesis is posed by Karl-Heinz Brodbeck. He substantiates this
argument  by  applying  the  instrument  of  Madhyamaka  logic
according to Ngrjuna to the object of ‘money’: ‘If Buddhist
analysis is factually veridical, […] we ought to see this work out
in practice.’ As a first step, ignorance, hatred and greed which,
according to Buddhist tradition, are the three basic mental pois-
ons, are examined against the background of this theme and, as
a further step, the principles of Madhyamaka logic are eluci-
dated and contrasted with ‘economic explanations of money’.
When Madhyamaka logic is applied to these presuppositions it
follows that the nature of money is illusory as it lacks any sub-
stance of its own. Thus, the attribution of value to money is not
based  on  any  such  substance,  but  on  a  vicious  circle.
Consistently with this, the author proceeds from the discovery
parallel to the situation in Sri Lanka around 100 C.E. when Buddhism
divided into the ‘vocation of books’ and the ‘vocation of meditation’
(see contribution by Prebish).
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of a concrete form of the mental poison of ignorance to ‘the
monetary form of the three poisons’ and describes the severe
economic, ecological and, most of all, social problems and ‘the
suffering of the many’ as consequences with a global impact on
mankind. A positive outlook is offered by making detailed ref-
erence to ‘Engaged Buddhism’ and the challenges it has to face
in present times. A thread running throughout the article is the
suggested  replacement  of  ignorance  on which,  according  to
Brodbeck, economic activities are based, by non-violence and,
most of all, by compassion and the awareness of the interde-
pendence of all  phenomena as the foundation  for  economic
action. 
Errors within modern economics are also Silja Graupe’s con-
cern, but these are discussed from a perspective that criticizes
the static way of thinking inherent within the Western approach
to this  subject.  To this  end,  she refers  to the Kyto  School
where philosophy of substance and substance metaphysics are
rejected and the view of the world and man as unchanging
entities is criticized because of the lack of freedom of thought
and action so entailed: the thinker is excluded from his own
thinking and thus cannot call himself into question or change
himself.  Zen offers a completely  different  approach through
which the individual regains his or her freedom of innovative
thought  and action.  Graupe  applies  these  two different  ap-
proaches  to  economic  relations.  In  modern  economics,  the
valuation of all phenomena, even of humans by themselves, is
made from a perspective of utility and rationality with the ob-
jective of totally controlling all aspects of life according to these
categories; thus, regarding everything from an economic angle
is internalized to such a degree that it is beyond the reach of
conscious decision-making. It thus follows that it is impossible
to consciously derive change and emancipation from the utility
principle:  ‘We  perceive  the  economy  as  a  second  nature,
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existing in and for itself, completely independent of our ways of
knowing it.’  By way of contrast,  the advantages of Zen as a
transforming power are highlighted:  ‘Moving us beyond the
boundaries of a given system of knowledge, it opens up further
horizons of possibilities so that gradually new ways of knowing
begin to be identified and defined.’ 
The aspect of rationality within Buddhism is emphasised by
Guang Xing with his statement that Early Buddhism is indeed
rational as it is based on the Buddha’s own experience and not
on revelations or the teacher’s omniscience. This is illustrated
by numerous references to sources such as the Pli Nik€yas and
the Chinese •gamas. The rational methods of Buddhism are
opposed to popular irrational assumptions, for example by ref-
erence to the term ‘faith’ which, in Buddhism, stands for basic
trust but not for blind faith; this is demonstrated by reference
to the famous  Klma Sutta.  In contrast to popular religious
assumptions,  the  Sutta  states  that  the  Buddha’s  omniscience
does not refer to the physical world but, in the Buddha’s own
words, to the real nature of the world of experiences and of
phenomena. In the same way, the author does not relate the
attainment of nibbna to the physical world, but to the world
of experience. ‘After an analysis of the seemingly mystical and
metaphysical concepts in Buddhism we may come to the con-
clusion  that  Early  Buddhism  is  rational  because  it  places
emphasis on knowing and seeing rather than belief.’ However,
if  the  author  lays  emphasis  on  the  rational  aspect  of  Early
Buddhism this does not imply that Buddhism is a rationalistic
system comparable, for example, to those of Leibniz or Spinoza.
The editors feel free to interpret this highlighting of the rational
as an encouragement that we should, in Kantian terms, think
freely and dare to use our own understanding. 
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The subject of Anlayos’ contribution is ‘the importance of
living in seclusion and facing fear as essential ingredients of the
path to awakening’ and what the Buddha had to say about this
as a teacher. What is more, the article contains a first transla-
tion from the Chinese €gamas into a Western language of a dis-
course which deals  with this  subject and is  compared to its
counterpart, the Bhayabherava Sutta from the Pli canon. The
author concerns himself with the difficulties of everyday clerical
life and fear as a fundamental constant, a part of the reality
humans have to face in life. 
Thus, from the editors’ perspective, this article is not only
interesting  from a subject-specific point  of  view as might  be
assumed at a first glance at the linguistic challenges it poses;
those who do not know much Pli or Chinese will also gain by
reading it, as fear and solitude are subjects of general interest,
for three reasons. Firstly, the situation of a monk living in the
jungle may well be compared with the position of an isolated
individual living in a multi-storey building in a city. It is no
coincidence that ‘jungle’ is used as a metaphor for the social
reality of  the metropolis  that existentially threatens the indi-
vidual.33 Secondly, fear and the overcoming of fear is a recur-
ring motif within European philosophy (Epicurus, Montaigne,
Sren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger and others); this article
might therefore inspire consideration of the subject of fear in
the context of intercultural philosophy. Last but not least, an
insight is gained into current historical and critical research into
Buddhism and its methodology. Freedom of research is con-
sidered to be axiomatic by ordained Buddhists and lay follow-
ers; as such, this article is also a practical example of free think-
ing within Buddhism.
33 Cf., for example, Upton Sinclair’s novel  Jungle, 1906, and Bertolt
Brecht’s  play  Im  Dickicht  der  Stdte  [In  the  Jungle  of  Cities],
1921/1927.
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AN Aguttara-nikya
Be Burmese edition
BPS Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy
CBETA Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association
Ce Ceylonese edition
Cv Cullavagga (Cavagga)
ĀD Drgha-gama (T 1)
Dhp Dhammapada
DN Dgha-nikya
E Ekottarika-gama (T 125)
Ee PTS edition
M Madhyama-gama (T 26)
MN Majjhima-nikya
Mv Mahvagga
Ps Papacasdan
PTS Pali Text Society
S Sayukta-gama (T 99)
ĀS 2 ‘other’ Sayukta-gama (T 100)
Se Siamese edition
SHT Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden
SN Sayutta-nikya
Sn Sutta-nipta
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PART I
BUDDHIST APPROACHES IN EASTERN AND
WESTERN SOCIETIES
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‘WOMEN IN BETWEEN’: BHIKKHUN ORDINATION DEBATES,
‘BARE LIFE’, AND THE MAE CHI IN THAILAND
Barbara Kameniar
Abstract
The  mae chi  represent a peculiarly Thai response to what it
means  to  be  a  Buddhist  woman in  Thai  society.  They  fall
outside of the traditional Buddhist categories of ordained or lay
persons and are excluded by both Religious and State law. In
effect, they are ‘women in between’ (Lindberg Falk 2007) who
have been  refused,  and who  have  refused,  assimilation  and
submission to a biopolitical state and the official  sagha.  This
chapter  is  an examination  of  how debates  around women’s
ordination in Buddhism, the low status of women in Thailand
and Thai mae chi can illuminate other possibilities for person-
hood  and  collective  lives.  It  is  the  aim in  this  chapter  to
illustrate how the ambiguous position of the mae chi opens up
what it means to walk and live ‘in between’. Like the figure of
the refugee, the mae chi provide an example of how it might be
possible to sever the  connection between personhood and a
territorializing nation-state to provide a space in which protean
notions of ‘self’ and ‘community’ might be negotiated. 
Introduction
Feminist  Buddhist  scholar  Rita  Gross  has  argued  that  ‘the
dharma [Pli:  dhamma]  is neither male nor  female’ and that
‘[w]ithout exception, Buddhist teachings and teachers are insist-
ent and consistent that at the ultimate level, gender is irrelevant’
(Gross 2008, 294). Through careful reference to the notion of
an ‘ultimate level’  Gross  articulates a form of transcendental
and originary ‘presence’ (Derrida 1976) that acts as an organ-
ising  principle  for  her  appeal  to  an  idealised  and  ‘pure’
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Buddhism – one that is devoid of the impurities of categories of
social difference such as race, class and gender. This form of
argumentation is common amongst  Buddhist  scholars writing
about the position of women within Buddhism. The inference is
that if only the male sagha would return to the intentions of
the historical Buddha it would come to understand the insub-
stantiality of  all  categories of social difference and liberation
would follow. However, this call to return to an imaginary and
idealised intentionality of the Buddha is problematic on a num-
ber of levels. The most obvious problem is the impossibility of
ever grasping an essential and originary purpose, will or inten-
tion. Another is the problem of not re-examining the material
and spiritual practices of the present in ways that may open up
new ways of re-imagining the Buddhist sagha in more socially
just and ‘enlightened’ ways. 
This  chapter  takes  up the  case of  the  Thai  mae chi  and
examines how debates around women’s ordination in Buddh-
ism, the low status of women in Thailand and Thai mae chi can
illuminate  other  possibilities  for  personhood  and  collective
lives. It is the aim in this chapter to illustrate how the ambi-
guous position of the mae chi opens up what it means to walk
and live ‘in between’. 
I will commence this discussion by providing a description of
the  entry of women into the Buddhist order or  sagha as this
provides a foundational motif for many current practices and
debates regarding women’s role in the sagha. I will then pro-
ceed to outline who the mae chi are before discussing interviews
with a small number of mae chi in which they comment on con-
temporary debates surrounding the ordination of women within
Buddhism. These interviews were carried out 18 years apart
and in two different regions in Thailand. They highlight the
general reluctance of the  mae chi  both then and now, to be
assimilated into existing regimes of power. The discussion will
then move to an outline of Giorgio Agamben’s notion of homo
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sacer and,  following  Hannah  Arendt,  his  framing  of  ‘the
refugee’ as a ‘central figure’ (Agamben 2000, 22) who, along
with the mae chi, may help us re-imagine a ‘paradigm of a new
historical consciousness’ (Agamben 2000, 14).
Entry of Women into the Order1
Some five years after the Buddha’s first sermon in the Deer Park
at Isipatana and the establishment of the male Buddhist order, a
deputation led by his aunt and foster mother, Mahpajpat the
Gotam, approached the Buddha and asked him for admission
into the saÄgha. Three times Mahpajpat is said to have asked
the Buddha and three times  he replied ‘no’.  Mahpajpat is
said to have been saddened by the refusal and to have gone
away weeping.
However, the story tells us that the Buddha’s refusal did not
satisfy her so she ‘cut off her hair, and put on orange robes, and
set out, with a number of women of the Sakya clan, towards
Vesl’ where the Buddha had gone (Cv X, 1, 2). Mahpajpat
is remembered as a woman of determination who must have
believed in her heart that the Buddha would eventually allow
the entry of women into the order.
According to the Cullavagga,
… Mahpajpat the Gotam, with swollen feet and covered with
dust, sad and sorrowful, weeping and in tears, took her stand out-
side under the entrance porch. (Cv X, 1, 2)
There she was seen by the Buddha’s friend and disciple, the
kind and gentle nanda who is said to have been shocked by
the way she looked. After all, Mahpajpat and many of the
women who were following her were members of the rich and
powerful Sakya clan and their dishevelled appearance would
1 I give the most popular version here.
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have been quite disturbing to those who knew them otherwise.
nanda asked Mahpajpat why she looked this way and she
explained her requests to the Buddha and his subsequent refus-
als. nanda is said to have taken it upon himself to plead the
women’s  case.  He  approached the  Buddha  three  times  and
asked him ‘if women were to have permission granted to them’
to enter the homeless state (Cv X, 1, 3). Once again the Buddha
replied in the negative each time the request was made. The
Cullavagga then tells us that nanda was still not satisfied with
the  response  and  resolved  to  ask  the  Buddha  ‘on  another
ground’. He asked if women were capable of ‘realizing the fruit
of conversion, or the second Path, or of the third Path, or of
Arahantship?’ (Cv X, 1, 3). That is, were women capable of liv-
ing the saintly life. The Buddha agreed that they were capable.
Winning this point  nanda then reminded him that his aunt
had cared for him when his mother had died and acted as his
wetnurse.
nanda’s  plea  (firstly  to  reason and then to  emotion and
memory) was effective and the Buddha is said to have finally
agreed to allow women to enter the  saÄgha. He did so, how-
ever, on the condition that Mahpajpat accepted for herself
the aÅÅha garudhammÇ, the Eight Chief Rules for bhikkhunÉs or
nuns, that effectively subordinated the bhikkhunÉs  to the male
bhikkhus.  nanda took these rules to her and the Cullavagga
records Mahpajpat accepting them joyfully.
After  Mahpajpat’s acceptance of the  aÅÅha garudhammÇ,
which also marked her  upasampadÇ or full initiation, nanda
returned to the Buddha to report this to him. Upon hearing
what had transpired, the Buddha is said to have launched into a
discourse on the effects of women’s entry into the saÄgha. This
is perhaps one of the most damaging pronouncements recorded
on women’s  entry into the  saÄgha. In  short it  says that had
women not received permission to join the  saÄgha the ‘pure
religion’ and the ‘good law’ would have lasted for a thousand
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years but because they were allowed to enter it would now last
for only five hundred years. However, in foreseeing the danger
the Buddha laid down Eight Chief Rules for the bhikkhuns. 
Cornelia Church (1975) and others have noted the ambival-
ence  evident  in  first  allowing  women  to  enter  the  sagha
because they are ‘capable’ of arahantship, and then stating that
the sagha’s lifespan will be halved because of women’s entry.
Numerous scholars and Buddhist teachers have queried what it
is the text is actually stating. While there remains debate about
whether  the  ‘hand  of  some  ancient  misogynist  editor(s)’
(Church 1975,  54)  might  have been at work in the text  or
whether  the  Buddha meant what  he  appears  to be meaning
about the impending doom to the sagha because of women’s
entry  into  it,  the fact remains  that  this  story  has  resonated
throughout history and across different cultures to structure the
lives of  Buddhist women in general and Buddhist renunciant
women in particular. 
The  story  of  Mahpajpat  and the eight  rules  provides  a
powerful backdrop to contemporary gender relations and gen-
dered practices in Buddhism. It is a story with which the mae
chi and laity I interviewed 18 years ago were familiar and it is
almost always the first story mae chi and the laity tell me today
when asked about the position of women in Thai Buddhism. It
is also a story that haunts all contemporary debates surrounding
the  ordination  of  women in Buddhism.  The story  simultan-
eously signals a place for women within the Buddhist  sagha
and the  danger,  impropriety,  and additional  burden,  of  that
place.
The eight chief rules accepted by Mahpajpat, as descriptors
of  those  burdens,  circumscribed  gender  relations  within  the
sagha and did so on terms that subordinated even the most
senior  bhikkhun  to the most junior  bhikkhu.  In doing so the
rules  broke with the established ‘monastic norm of geronto-
cracy and conform[ed] instead to the social norm of female
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inferiority’ (Leslie 1983, 95). Evidence of this can be found in
the seventh and eighth rules that effectively silence the bhikkhu-
ns when it comes to speaking against the bhikkhus even though
the eighth rule provides for the official admonition of bhikkhuns
by bhikkhus. 
However, it has not been the rules requiring subordination of
the  bhikkhuns  that  have  caused  the  most  consternation  in
recent times, but rather the sixth rule of the aha garudhamm
that requires a bhikkhun, as novice, who has been trained for
two years to seek upasampad, or full initiation from both the
bhikkhu-sagha and the  bhikkhun-sagha. This  differs  from
ordination of bhikkhus where the requirement is that ordination
be performed only by a group of bhikkhus.
According  to  Buddhist  history,  the  Buddha  instituted  four
groups that make up the collective  sagha or community of
Buddhists  –  the  bhikkhus  (ordained  monks),  the  bhikkhuns
(ordained nuns), the upsiks (devote laywomen) and the up-
sakas  (devote laymen). Each of these groups is  said to have
flourished as Buddhism spread across India and beyond, into
most of Asia. Of particular interest to this paper is the move-
ment of  bhikkhuns  from India into Sri Lanka, a Theravdin
country where the bhikkhuns are said to have died out around
the twelfth century CE (Gombrich 1988, 168). It is this form of
Buddhism that is practised in Thailand and the Thai manifest-
ation of Theravda Buddhism that gave rise to the mae chi.
Who are the mae chi?
The mae chi  are Thai Buddhist women renunciants who wear
white, shave their heads and eyebrows as do the  bhikkhus  or
ordained monks in Thailand.  They generally keep eight pre-
cepts as opposed to the 227 kept by the monks, the 311 kept by
Theravdin  bhikkhuns, and  the  five,  eight  or  ten  kept  by
devout laypeople. Precise numbers of  mae chi  are not known
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because no centralised or official records are kept outside of a
register at the Thai Nun’s Institute at Wat Bowonniwet Vihara
in  Bangkok.  Current  numbers  are  estimated  to  be  around
12 000. 
The mae chi live in or around some wat where they perform
a variety of roles related to the upkeep of the monks including
cooking and cleaning. In some wat with progressive abbots and
large numbers of mae chi they might also be found assisting in
the teaching of meditation practices to the laity and providing
support in basic dhamma [Sanskrit:  dharma] teaching.  Increas-
ingly mae chi  can also be found in independent ‘nunneries’ or
samnak chi where they undertake domestic duties, grow crops,
practice  meditation  and  undertake  studies  in  the  dhamma.
There are also a small number of high profile mae chi such as
Mae Chii Sansanee who, because of their personal wealth, live
independent lives in relative luxury, undertake acts of charity,
engage in teaching and provide social commentary. In recent
times a number of mae chi have completed higher degrees and I
know of at least two who lecture at each of the Buddhist Uni-
versities in Bangkok – one having a Masters degree in Pli and
the other a PhD in Buddhist philosophy.
The mae chi  are not ordained and therefore cannot be con-
sidered to be bhikkhuns or Buddhist nuns. In spite of this they
are often referred to as Thai ‘nuns’. Becoming a  mae chi  is a
peculiarly Thai  response to what  it  means to be a Buddhist
woman given that the official sagha position on bhikkhuns is
that they have never existed in Thailand, cannot be found in
Theravda Buddhism (having died out many centuries ago), and
will never exist in Thailand because of the rule that a bhikkhun
needs to be ordained by both  bhikkhus  and  bhikkhuns. This
position persists in spite of a community of  bhikkhuns  in Sri
Lanka in 1998, another Theravda country, where a number of
40 Barbara Kameniar
dasasilmattawas2 sought ordination from a group of bhikkhuns
whose lineage could be traced back to a Sri Lankan mission
centuries earlier.
The position of the mae chi has varyingly been described as
‘ambiguous’ (Cook 1981), ‘marginalised’ (Lindberg Falk 2007,
254) and ‘underprivileged’  (Lindberg  Falk 2007,  251).  They
have often been represented, in colonial and patriarchal terms
as always and everywhere poor, uneducated and submissive. In
1982 Penny Van Esterik stated that the ‘mae chi may be viewed
as failures, outcasts, or eccentrics’ (Van Esterik 1982, 74). 
The mae chi have been represented as women for whom life
as a mae chi is their last resort (Keyes 1984). Indeed they have
been described as women who have quit life because life, first,
quit them. Representations of this kind tend to construct the
mae chi as somewhat pathetic women who lack agency and who
are unable  to  comprehend  their  position  (Kabilsingh 1991).
Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, the first Thai woman to be ordained as
a bhikkhun  in Sri Lanka in 2001 said that prior to ordination
‘she did not consider  mae chis to be “the right soil” because
they  were  scared’  (Lindberg  Falk  2007,  241).  At  the  Inter-
national  Congress  on  Buddhist  Women’s  Role  in  the Sangha
Bhikshuni Vinaya and Ordination Lineages in Hamburg in July
2007 a number of speakers spoke about the plight of the mae
chi in Thailand. In a number of papers the mae chi were repre-
sented as always and everywhere victims of Thai patriarchy, and
as women without voice waiting on the liberation that the re-es-
tablishment of the bhikkhun-sagha would bring them.3 While
this rendering of the mae chi as afraid and powerless has been
pervasive, it has not been absolute.
2 Also known as dasa-silmt, das-sil mǟniy, meaning literally: ‘the
mother(s) keeping the ten precepts’.
3 For  information  about  developments  after  the  congress  see:
http://www.congress-on-buddhist-women.org.
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The mae chi have also been translated by a number of writers,
that is, their actions have been understood as a form of commu-
nication and construed on terms defined by them through their
actions (Maggio 2007, 421). When scholars have done this the
mae chi tend to be written about as active and knowing agents
who have chosen this particular path for spiritual, social and
educational reasons. They also tend to be described as women
for whom life as a mae chi is an active choice made amongst a
range of alternatives (Cook 1981; Muecke 2004). This is not to
say that the social and material conditions of many mae chi are
not poor. In their own terms, they have issues. However, it is to
suggest that the experiences of  the  mae chi  have often been
used instrumentally by others in ways that produce them as sub-
alterns who cannot speak (Spivak 1992) when they might just as
easily be understood as subjects who cannot ‘be heard’ (Maggio
2007). One of the things many of the mae chi have been saying
for a number of years is that they do not perceive themselves as
always  and everywhere  victims  and that  for  many  of  them
bhikkhun ordination is not a concern.
BhikkhunÄ Ordination
In  a  microethnographic  study  undertaken  during  December
1990 and January 1991 at a wat outside of Hua Hin I inter-
viewed fourteen mae chi and two chi phraam about a range of
issues affecting their lives including their ideas about bhikkhun
ordination (Kameniar 1993).4 While such a small number of
mae chi cannot be seen as representative, their views and ideas
can be understood as illustrative of those present amongst other
groups of  mae chi.  Certainly other studies have found similar
views expressed (see for example Lindberg Falk 2000, 2007). In
4 Other than a mae chi, a chi phraam (cf. ji brahmin) is a woman who
takes the vows to ordain for a short time only, for example for a medi-
tation retreat, and does not shave her head.
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the earlier study I found there was a marked difference between
the mae chi regarding bhikkhun ordination. All but one of the
mae chi were familiar with the story from the Cullavagga that
outlined the introduction of the bhikkhun-sagha at the time of
the Buddha. They were also familiar with the stories about the
‘dying out’ of the  bhikkhun-sagha.  Most of the women saw
the establishment of a bhikkhun-sagha in Thailand as impos-
sible and therefore ruled out discussion of it.  What was also
evident  was that  most  of  the women indicated they  had no
interest in  bhikkhun  ordination for themselves even if it did
become available. One mae chi said she did not want to lose the
religious autonomy that being a mae chi gave her and she feared
the  imposition  of  a  bhikkhun-sagha would  take  away her
capacity to pursue her own spiritual interests. One of the mixed
blessings of the low status of the mae chi has been that they are
often  left  to  pursue  a  religious  path  as  they  see  fit,  thus
providing opportunity for ‘novel religious autonomy’ (Lindberg
Falk,  2000,  56).  The  wat  where  the  earlier  research  was
undertaken had loosely defined internal structures  governing
daily life and many of the women had elected to reside there
because  of  this.  A  number  of  the  mae  chi feared  outside
interference and the imposition of rigid rules. During the inter-
views some of the mae chi also stated that they saw the pursuit
of bhikkhun ordination to be the desire of an educated urban
elite  with little connection to their lives and raised concerns
about what might happen to their status (which was already
low) if full bhikkhun ordination was permitted. 
In April 2007 I interviewed 16 mae chi at five different wat
in and around Ayutthya (Kameniar 2007). All of the  mae chi
were familiar with the historical debates surrounding the intro-
duction of the bhikkhun-sagha and many of the contemporary
debates  surrounding  its  reintroduction  in  various  Buddhist
countries including Sri Lanka. All but three of them expressed a
belief that although the bhikkhun-sagha may have a place in
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other Buddhist countries it did not have a place in Thailand.
Thailand had never had a  bhikkhun-sagha and it would be
against Thai custom to introduce one now. However, all but
two of the mae chi expressed great interest in the contemporary
debates and said they were familiar with the Venerable Dham-
mananda5 and her fight for  bhikkhun  ordination in Thailand.
Some said they had met her in person, others said they had
heard  her  in the  media  but  all  said they  found her  a very
impressive and inspiring woman. However, they then went on
to say that she was highly educated and it was this that had led
her down the path to ordination. Most Thai women are not like
her, they said (see also Tomalin 2006, 393). The majority of
mae chi  also referred to her as a Thai Mahyna  bhikkhun
whose choices were outside their tradition – ‘Thai people are
Theravda, she is Mahyna’. According to Shizuka (2004) this
problem also arose for the Sri Lankan bhikkhuns. Three of the
mae chi  said they would be interested in pursuing  bhikkhun
ordination if it became available in the Thai tradition. One of
these  mae chi  said it is only right that Thai women have full
ordination rights available to them because many mae chi know
the dhamma and have more advanced practice than many of the
monks. However, regardless of how they live their material and
spiritual lives, the mae chi  remain in the borderlands between
what it means to be a lay Buddhist and one who is ordained.
Women in Between
The mae chi have an ambiguous religious and legal status within
Thailand, and State policies relevant to them,  when they do
exist, are inconsistent (Muecke 2004, 225).  For example, the
Interior Ministry bars them from voting because they are cat-
5 Chatsumarn Kabilsingh’s name after ordination.
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egorised as clerics for that purpose. But other State agencies le-
gally regard them as lay women.
Monica Lindberg Falk describes their situation well:
The government gives support to the monks with free education,
free medical care, and free or reduced fares for buses and trains.
Nuns do not receive such support from the government because of
their official status as laity. However, the same government denies
mae chis the right to vote in public elections, citing their ascetic
status and renunciation of worldly matters. (Lindberg Falk 2000,
42)
Ideas for a number of different Bills that relate to the legal and
religious status of the mae chi have been proposed over the last
twelve years. The late Mae Chii Khunying Kanitha lobbied for
‘a  Mae Chii’s  Bill,  which would give them legal  status  and
entitle them to financial assistance from the government’ (Lind-
berg Falk 2007, 228). However, this Bill failed for a number of
reasons which included resistance to change amongst members
of the official saÄgha and amongst some high profile mae chi, as
well as problems in communicating the Bill to mae chi through-
out the country (Lindberg Falk 2007, 231). The latest move to
incorporate the  mae chi  into the broader  saÄgha is the 2008
‘Support and Protection for Buddhism’ draft Bill wherein the
mae chi are mentioned in only one of the 43 articles. Satisuda
Ekachai, notes that that one article defines them as
… practising Buddhist laywomen or upasika who wear white robes,
shave their heads, observe eight precepts and live a homeless life.
And although the draft bill will not recognise the mae chee [sic!] as
monastic members, it orders mae chee to be under the clergy’s con-
trol. (Ekachai 2008, without pagination)
According to Ekachai, there has been considerable opposition
to the Bill by various  mae chi  who, while acknowledging they
are not bhikkhunÅs also do not see themselves as laity or wish to
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submit themselves to the authority of the sagha. That is, they
wish to claim a place within the sagha on terms that are nego-
tiated  by them rather  than dictated to them by the  sagha.
Indeed,  many  mae chi would  rather  retain their  ambiguous
position than submit in ways that erase their identity or erode
their agency.
In spite of the various proposals the mae chi continue to func-
tion as women who are simultaneously inside and outside the
sagha as well as inside and outside lay life. They remain what
Monica Lindberg  Falk called ‘women in  between’  (Lindberg
Falk 2000, 37). It is this between-ness, this ambiguity in reli-
gious  and state  law that  first  lead  me  to  consider  whether
Agamben’s reading of  homo sacer, the state of exception and
the refugee, might provide a new lens through which to inter-
pret the position of the  mae chi in Thai Buddhism and how
they might bare witness to the position of women more broadly
in Thai society. I also began to consider whether the position of
the mae chi and their refusal to be assimilated into the existing
sagha on terms that would lead to their subordination or obli-
vion while simultaneously not refusing or rejecting the sagha
altogether, might be seen as a middle way forward for Buddhist
renewal more generally. That is, rather than feel pity or rage for
the mae chi, or continue to argue that their position is unten-
able, perhaps  we can begin to examine their  lives and their
choices for what insights they provide us with for re-imagining
a ‘paradigm of a new historical consciousness’ (Agamben 2000,
14). 
Problematics of Employing a Western, Masculine
Framing
Before moving into a discussion of Agamben’s notion of homo
sacer it might be prudent to take a moment to consider the ap-
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propriateness of engaging the theory of a European man to an
analysis  of  a discernable  group of  Thai  women,  particularly
when  his  insensitivity  to  gender  has  been  described  as
‘perplexing and limiting’ (Pratt 2005, 1068) and his analysis has
always been a critique of European polity. In considering the
question I returned to the work of bell hooks ([sic!] 1994) who
defended her commitment to the critical work of Paulo Freire
at  a  time  when  a  number  of  white  feminist  scholars  had
abandoned it because of Freire’s refusal to engage with women
as  a  discreet  category  and  his  incessant  use  of  masculine
pronouns. In response, bell hooks argued that white feminists
who refused to engage with Freire’s work on these terms were
like the middle class students who walk around US campuses
with bottled water in their arms when they have access to ‘free’,
clean water  out  of  the  campus taps.  She  argued that  black
women and poor women do not have the luxury to be precious
about whether language is inclusive or not, in much the same
way as most  of  the world doesn’t  have the luxury of to be
precious about the taste of accessible, clean and free water. If a
theory helps us understand oppression and provides us with the
possibility for a more just future, then, according to bell hooks,
we should engage with it, albeit with considerable caution. It
may also be prudent to signal the limits of Agamben’s analysis
that have been noted by high profile Foucauldians such as Paul
Rabinow and Nicholas Rose (2006) who argue that he simpli-
fies and reduces the complexity of the exercise of biopower in
contemporary liberal societies. However, in spite of its limits,
Agamben’s work has assisted me in thinking through the mae
chi  as a category of women who occupy ‘zones of exclusion’
that provide spaces for them to re-imagine notions of ‘self’ and
‘community’ even  as it limits them.
Women in Between                             47
Homo Sacer and Bare Life
Agamben commences  Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare
Life by distinguishing between two terms used to express what
the Greeks meant by the word ‘life’: zoe, which expresses ‘the
simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, man,
or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living
proper to an individual or a group’ (Agamben 1998, 1). That is,
not a ‘simple natural life but rather a qualified life’ (Agamben
1998, 1). He then discusses Foucault’s theorisation of the mod-
ern nation-state as a ‘state of population’ that uses a series of
technologies to monitor and control the nation’s biological life
which becomes a problem of sovereign power. 
Beyond Foucault’s life (bios) becoming the principal object of the
calculations of state power (biopower), Agamben posits ‘bare life’
(zoe) as coinciding with the political realm, as signifying the state of
exception. (Lentin 2006, 464)
Bare life, which Agamben names homo sacer or ‘sacred man’, is
human life reduced to matter and placed under a sovereign ban,
‘excluded by and from judicial law’ (Pratt 2005, 1054). Homo
sacer is the opposite of sovereign power, standing at the point
of indistinction between violence and the law (Agamben 1998,
10). For Agamben, homo sacer is the ideal-type of the excluded
being, whose life is so devoid of value that he can be killed with
impunity. However, while he might be killed, homo sacer can-
not be used in religious sacrifice.
Agamben’s theorisation of bare life is becoming increasingly
useful in thinking about statelessness in the current age of popu-
lation movements and Judith Butler’s (2004) use of his theory
to  discuss  the  suspension  of  laws  for  certain  categories  of
human beings by the United States after the events in September
48 Barbara Kameniar
2001 illustrates the interpretive power of the idea when ex-
amining sovereign acts of violence in the name of ‘protection’.
Ronit Lentin also argues that Agamben’s 
theorisation of the (concentration) camp as the paradigm of mod-
ernity is instructive in thinking about the hidden nomos of the polit-
ical  sphere in  which we are all  still  living.  … In the camp the
temporary state of exception becomes a permanent and normal spa-
tial arrangement. Whoever enters the camp moves in a zone of indis-
tinction between inside and outside, exception and rule, licit and
illicit, a space in which subjective right and legal protection make no
sense (Lentin 2006, 464-465).
If  we  return  to  the  tradition  of  entry  of  women  into  the
Buddhist order or  sagha with which I commenced this paper
and  begin  to  examine  it  through  the  lens  of  ‘bare  life’  it
becomes apparent that the story does more than merely signal a
place for women within the sagha and the danger, impropri-
ety, and additional burden, of that place. The story also pro-
duces a state of exception where established laws such as those
of gerontocracy are suspended. So while the bhikkhuns are per-
mitted within the sagha they are simultaneously made subor-
dinate to it. They are at once included and excluded through
what Agamben might  call  an ‘inclusive exclusion’  (Agamben
1998, 8). Once this state of exception has been made, the sover-
eign power of the bhikkhus is increased rather than diminished. 
According to Pratt, ‘the one who is abandoned remains in a
relationship with sovereign power: included through exclusion.
It is thus “impossible to say clearly whether that which has been
banned is inside or outside the juridical order” (Mills 2004, 44)’
(Pratt 2005, 1054). That is, it is possible to have the appearance
of being included even while one is banned or abandoned. To
some extent  this  appears  to  be the  case with the  mae chi.
Through the maintenance of their ambiguous religious and legal
position,  the  mae chi  are  not  altogether  excluded from the
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sagha but rather they are abandoned, and abandonment is not
the same as exclusion, because abandonment is a relational and
active term (Agamben 1998). 
The mae chi, homo sacer and the Hope of the Refugee
This is materially and spatially evident through the presence of
the  mae chi  within various  wat  where their exclusion is pro-
duced through their very inclusion in the wat complex. Locat-
ing where the  mae chi  reside in different  wat  is not difficult
when one understands the inclusive exclusion the mae chi live
under. While mae chi reside in wat their residences are usually
located in the least public and least desirable part of it.  The
block where the majority of the mae chi lived at the wat, which
was the site of my research in 1990/1991, was separated from
the  wat  proper by what could only be described as a garbage
dump.  It  was  the  area  into  which all  the  wat’s  refuse  was
thrown and then burned. The dump served as a barrier, mark-
ing a boundary that separated the central part of the  wat and
the area where the bhikkhus lived, from the area in which the
mae chi  lived. While the geography of inclusive exclusion of
most of the wat I have visited more recently have not been as
stark, the mae chi  are almost always located in places of sym-
bolic and material abandonment. The one exception was a wat
outside Ayutthya in which the mae chi played an active role in
teaching meditation.  However, this was also the only  wat  in
which  the  residence  of  the  bhikkhus  was  accessed  through
splendidly  carved gates and their  living quarters were highly
elaborate. So while the geographies of inclusion and exclusion
appeared different as far as the mae chi  were concerned, they
were still in operation. According to Geraldine Pratt, ‘geograph-
ies do more than contain or localize bare life. Geographies are
part of the process by which certain individuals and groups are
reduced to bare life’ (Pratt 2005, 1055). The geographies of the
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wat  produce the  mae chi  as  homo sacer  and abandon them
through an inclusive exclusion.
The mae chi’s ambiguous relationship to religious and social
law and the various recent attempts to find a place in law for
them also signal something  of their  category as  homo sacer.
Monica Lindberg  Falk who,  to date,  has  provided the most
comprehensive overview of the  mae chi’s  struggles  for legal
recognition argues that from a doctrinal perspective, it would 
be easier for the Department of Religious Affairs to legitimate the
bhikkhunis than the mae chiis who have created a new category that
falls outside the traditional Buddhist categories of the four groups of
lay and ordained person, bhikkhuni, bhikkhu, upasaka and upasika.
(Lindberg Falk 2007, 236)
For Lindberg Falk, provision of a legitimate place for the mae
chi  in  the  sagha would  equate  to  the  ‘laicisation  of  Bud-
dhism… [thereby blurring] the boundaries between the lay and
the ordained realms’. This would ultimately result in the weaken-
ing of ‘the  sangha’s  exclusive authority’ (Lindberg Falk 2007,
236).
Can the  mae chi’s status as  homo sacer, ‘bare life’ in Thai
Buddhism help us re-imagine Thai Buddhist community? If one
follows  Geraldine  Pratt’s  discussion  of  ‘Vancouver’s  Missing
Women’  as  a  means  for  re-imagining  political  community
through two limit  concepts  used by Agamben – that is,  ‘the
human so degraded as to exist beyond conventional humanist
ethics of respect, dignity and responsibility’ and the ‘one and
only figure of the refugee’ (Pratt 2005, 1069) – then it might be
possible  to  do  so.  Pratt’s  discussion  focuses  mainly  on  the
refugee. She notes,
The  importance  of  this  figure  is  that  it  severs  the  connection
between personhood and the nation-state, a link that is forged in lib-
eral societies through the concept of the citizen and territorialisation
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of individual rights within the nation-state. The figure of the refugee
who refuses assimilation is of one who refuses to submit their per-
sonhood to the territorializing biopolitical state. (Pratt 2005, 1069)
If the way forward for the mae chi is through the figure of the
refugee who refuses assimilation then what might that figure
look like? According to Agamben,  Hannah Arendt, herself  a
refugee, turned the condition of the countryless refugee on its
head. She argued that
Refugees who have lost all rights and who, however, no longer
want to be assimilated at all costs in a new national identity, but
want  instead  to  contemplate  lucidly  their  condition,  receive  in
exchange for assured unpopularity a priceless advantage: ‘History is
no longer a closed book to them and politics [full participation in
the saintly life as defined by Buddhism] is no longer the privilege of
the Gentiles [bhikkhu-sagha] … Refugees driven from country to
country represent the vanguard of their peoples’. (Agamben 2000,
14-15)
The mae chi, like the refugee, represents a ‘disquieting element’
(Agamben 2000, 21) because she breaks the identity between
masculinity and Buddhist renunciation / Buddhism asceticism /
Knowledge of the  dhamma.  In doing so she brings the estab-
lished order into crisis and opens it up to dare to re-imagine
other ways.
In putting forward this argument I am not suggesting that the
position of the mae chi is ideal, that they are not subordinated
or  that  their  material  circumstances  do  not  need  to  be
improved. Rather, I am suggesting that the refusal of many of
them (for it is certainly not all mae chi) to submit their person-
hood to the territorializing biopolitical Thai State and the offi-
cial sagha provides a space ‘for a renewal of categories’ (Agam-
ben 2000, 23) that can no longer be unquestioningly supported.
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According to Pratt, ‘Agamben asks us to think about political
strategy  in other  terms  because seeking  inclusion as  citizens
does nothing to disrupt a political community based on a pro-
cess of abandonment. Agamben urges the need to imagine fully
political  subjects  outside  of  and  beyond  specifically  liberal
notions of citizenship’ (Pratt 2005, 1069-1070). For the  mae
chi  this might mean a continual struggle of resistance to draft
Bills  that  curb  their  autonomy  while  they  also  work  to
strengthen their  networks  with one another  to create a lose
form of  solidarity  when advocating  for  rights  to  education,
health and better living conditions.
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CULTIVATING SELF, TRANSFORMING SOCIETY: 
EMBODIED ETHICAL PRACTICE IN
FEMINISM AND ZEN BUDDHISM
Ashby Butnor
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the cultivation of moral perception is
necessary to increase our performance as moral agents. Often-
times, our moral shortcomings are the result of prior failures to
see features of particular situations as morally salient. However,
moral perception involves more than simply opening our eyes.
It is developed through heightened attention to our embodied
and situated existence. I demonstrate this in two interrelated
ways – from the inside out. First, I turn to the Zen Buddhist trad-
ition (especially the work of Dgen) and its emphasis on em-
bodied meditation practice – a somatic activity wherein one’s
perceptual capacities are enhanced in and through the body.
Second, I turn to a contemporary feminist analysis to show how
embeddedness within particular social contexts affects our em-
bodied capacities. By more carefully examining these facets of
embodied, situated existence, we can enhance our perceptual
capabilities and be more attentive to the suffering and oppres-
sion that exist all around us.
Introduction
The cultivation of moral perception – the ability to see, recog-
nize, and attend to the morally salient features of the world
around us – is a necessary precondition for morally appropriate
action. In order to respond ethically, we must be able to per-
ceive particular situations as containing moral features that call
for our direct attention. Moral perception is that which enables
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the acknowledgment of a situation as a moral one in the first
place – via attention to the ‘weal and woe’ of  others. Many
failures to respond in an ethically appropriate manner are not
the result of intentional choice and the deliberate withholding
of aid. Rather, they are often the result of moral obliviousness –
a lack of moral attentiveness to situations that demand an ethic-
al response. Lawrence Blum describes the problem: ‘[The moral
agent’s] failure to act stems from his failure to see (with the
appropriate salience), not from callousness about other people’s
discomfort.  His  deficiency is  a  situational  self-absorption  or
attentional laziness’ (Blum 1991, 704). However, moral oblivi-
ousness does not excuse one from moral responsibility.
It is important to investigate the causes of moral inattention
and  the  disconnect  between  moral  commitments  and  their
implementation in our daily lives. Examples of such shortcom-
ings include the failure to recognize the needs of an elderly man
in the shop, the lost child looking for her father in the mall, or
the shy student attempting to articulate his thoughts in ethics
class. These are simple day-to-day examples. We can easily think
of dozens more examples of moral inattention that are more
complex – such as the failure to recognize sexism, racism, and
heterosexism in  our  institutions,  the  failure  to  do  anything
proactive concerning the needs of those afflicted by poverty or
environmental conditions, and the failure to protest and change
the policies of  our own government. However,  the basis  for
moral attention  to these larger problems surely rests on our
ability to cultivate the skills  to recognize moral  need that  is
right in front of us. 
To cultivate our ability to notice both big and small ethical
problems,  I  believe it  best  to start  where we are –  with an
investigation into our embodied situation. This begins with our
own particular physical, psychological, mental,  and emotional
constitution and the habits of perception that frame our current
capacities for moral attention. Next, comes the ability to recog-
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nize other embodied beings and their unique situatedness in the
world. Finally, we need to recognize the larger social, political,
and cultural matrix that surrounds us and comes to shape us all
in particular ways. If moral perception is something that can be
heightened,  this  improvement  must  occur  in  the  relation
between moral subjects and their  environments. We need to
learn to see both what is around us and how we are complicit in
shaping this situation. In this spirit, I examine the situations of
embodied moral subjects as well as the social values that inform
the development of moral perception. I am most interested in
two features of moral perception: (1) how our perceptual sensi-
tivity can be cultivated and inattentiveness overcome, and (2)
how increased moral perception lends itself to some progress in
social transformation. 
First, to address the cultivation of moral perception, I turn to
the Buddhist tradition. It may be fair to say that Buddhism has
provided us the most sophisticated phenomenological inquiry
into the issues of moral perception and action. Hence, a look at
Buddhist practice is relevant to this study for two reasons: (1)
Buddhism is especially attuned to the problem of suffering and
its alleviation, and (2) one goal of Buddhist meditative practice
is a heightened attention and focus on the present  moment.
Therefore, looking at the mechanisms of Buddhist practice will
demonstrate one vehicle for the cultivation of moral perception.
Second, to address the issue of social transformation, I turn to
feminist theory and its analysis of oppression and, specifically,
how oppression is inscribed on the body. While Buddhism high-
lights perceptual insight, the interpersonal dimension of prac-
tice, and the need to alleviate suffering, a more sophisticated
political analysis is needed to recognize more complex forms of
oppression.
However, in both the cultivation of moral perception and its
directedness toward social and political forms of oppression, I
examine the role of  the body and bodily practices.  Through
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attention  to embodiment  (physical,  emotional,  psychological,
social,  and  political),  we  can  open  the  door  to  both  self-
cultivation and social transformation.
Buddhist Practice: Expanding Moral Perception
To highlight the cultivation of moral perception, I focus spe-
cifically on Zen Buddhism and the teachings and writings of
Japanese philosopher  Dgen (1200-1253). Dgen emphasizes
the role of the body in zazen (seated meditation) as well as the
interpersonal nature of such practice. By looking to the teach-
ings of Dgen, we can see how Zen Buddhist practice emphas-
izes  corporeal awareness  and promotes  perceptual  expansion
and clarity. However, in order to do this, a commonly held mis-
conception regarding the purpose of Buddhist practice must be
reconsidered. Specifically, I explore two interpretations of Bud-
dhist enlightenment: enlightenment as an epistemological shift
in our perceptive awareness (or simply, as seeing) and enlighten-
ment as an engaged activity (or doing). I argue that the latter,
understanding enlightenment (including enlightened perception
and action) as a fully embodied activity, is a more nuanced and
robust  way  to understand the dynamic relationship between
selves and worlds. 
The central metaphor of Buddhist enlightenment that I will
challenge here is one of seeing – e.g., ‘seeing into one’s own
nature’, ‘seeing one’s original face’, and ‘seeing the suchness of
things’. The employment of visual terminology to describe Zen
enlightenment  experience is  pervasive in  contemporary  Bud-
dhist literature.1 Here, the metaphor of sight or perception is
commonly used to communicate understanding, either intuitive
1 For some examples, see Heinrich Dumoulin’s  Zen Enlightenment:
Origins and Meaning (1979), Robert Carter’s Encounter with Enlight-
enment: A Study of Japanese Ethics (2001), and Hakuun Yasutani’s
Flowers Fall: A Commentary on Dgen’s Genjkan (1996).
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or experiential, or an awakening to a once hidden truth. That
is, to see the ‘presence of things as they are’ represents an epi-
stemological  breakthrough  –  i.e.,  the  bridge  from ordinary,
samsaric delusion to enlightened perception or knowledge. In
Dumoulin’s words: 
The knowledge of the universal unity and identity of reality derives
from enlightenment. It is perhaps best explained as a seeing … When
one sees mountains and rivers or whatever exists, he sees Buddha-
nature. And when one sees Buddha-nature he sees everything, every
‘this’  in  its  concrete  existence.  (Dumoulin  1979,  107,  emphasis
added)
As a result, subjectivity is eliminated, the mind becomes trans-
parent, the self emptied, and the world is allowed to present
itself in its own ‘pristine condition’ without conceptual overlay
or subjective intervention. Hence, self-centered, everyday aware-
ness of the world gives way to the awareness of things as they
truly  are.  This  experience  is  akin  to  pure  objectivity.  This
epistemological breakthrough is the supposed basis from which
enlightened moral perception and action will arise. 
This  interpretation  of  enlightenment  entails  a  distinction
between appearances and ultimate reality and between delusion
and enlightenment.  However, this interpretation cannot hold
within a metaphysics of dependent origination and imperman-
ence. Dgen, for example, rejects the possibility of such dualit-
ies as well as the belief that the ‘truth’ is hidden and must be
uncovered. The following is from Zazenshin:
[The essential activity of all the Buddhas and the active essence of all
the ancestors] illumines without facing objects. This ‘illumination’
means neither illumining the outer world nor illumining the inner
world; ‘without facing objects’ is, as such, ‘illumination.’ Illumina-
tion is not transformed into objects, because the objects are the illu-
mination. ‘Without facing’ means: ‘Nothing in the whole world is
ever concealed,’  or ‘Nothing issues  forth when you uncover the
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world.’ Its meaning is subtle and mysterious, at once interrelated
and not interrelated. (Kim 2007, 14)
For Dgen, nothing is ever concealed or hidden and then revealed
when one becomes enlightened.  Rather,  there is an intimate
connection that has always existed between the ‘outer world’
and the ‘inner world.’  Hee-Jin Kim writes extensively on the
theme  of  intimacy  (mitsu,  shimmitsu)  in  Dgen’s  writings.
According to Kim, so-called opposites never exist as metaphys-
ical dualities for Dgen. Rather, they should be seen as ‘orienta-
tional and perspectival foci within the structure and dynamics
of realization (genj)’ (Kim 2007, 4). These foci are always pro-
visional and temporal and are without fixed boundaries. There-
fore,  they  do not  become erased when they encounter  their
‘opposite’, but must exist co-extensively. 
While a shift from delusion to pure seeing may appear neces-
sary for accurate moral perception via the elimination of ignor-
ance and delusion, the basis of this model is untenable within
Buddhist metaphysics. Enlightenment as ‘radiant light’ does not
destroy delusion in order to awaken us to the hidden truth of
all  things.  Rather,  enlightenment  and  delusion  are  forever
intimately connected and revealing of one another. The idea of
moral perception, or ‘seeing’, must then be clarified to recog-
nize this dynamic sense of interdependence – between selves
and worlds, delusion and enlightenment, and mind and body.
Therefore, enlightenment (or enlightening activity)  should be
thought of as a whole-body event – a transformation of our
embodiment (including our perceptual capabilities and actions)
in and through the world. The second model, thinking about
enlightenment as a kind of engaged  practice,  offers an inter-
pretation of enlightenment that demonstrates how mind, body,
and world constitute one another. Hence, enhanced perception
happens not  only  at  the cognitive level,  but  also,  and very
significantly,  at  the  somatic  level.  Perception,  especially  of
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others and their weal and woe, is experienced with the whole
body. 
The activity metaphor highlights enlightenment as a form of
practice and stresses  the practitioner’s  active participation in
enacting the Way. Dgen emphasizes the actualization of Bud-
dhist practice rather than the ultimate disclosure of reality in a
single satori experience. By comparison, the seeing metaphor of
enlightenment appears static and stale. For Dgen, active exer-
tion in each and every moment is a requirement of enlightened
existence. Practice and enlightenment are co-constitutive. Dgen
identifies practice most typically with seated meditation (zazen),
though  other  activities  may qualify.  Zazen  is  considered  a
whole-body event in which attachments to self and views are
relinquished and body and mind come into harmony with one
another. ‘Seeing’ is no longer prescribed by one’s dispositions to
perceive  in  narrow ways.  On the  contrary,  by  harmonizing
body-and-mind, the capacity to experience one’s environment is
distributed throughout the body. 
The role of the body in Dgen’s Zen should not be underes-
timated. As Kim explains, ‘Dgen claimed that we search with
the body, practice with the body, attain enlightenment with the
body, and understand with the body. This was epitomized in his
statement ‘The Way is  surely attained with the body”’ (Kim
2004, 101). In  Shinjin Gakud,  Dgen writes, ‘To study the
way with the body means to study the way with your own
body. It is the study of the way using this lump of red flesh’
(Tanahashi 1985, 91). But why is this ‘lump of red flesh’ so
important? In Zazengi, Dgen goes to great lengths to detail the
proper positioning of the body in  zazen practice – from the
proper half lotus and full lotus positions, the correct place for
the cushion ‘only under the buttocks’, the location of the right
and left hands, the right and left thumbs ‘lightly touching at the
navel’, leaning not to the left nor to the right, robes loose but
orderly, ears in line with shoulders, nose in line with navel, lips
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and teeth closed, eyes open ‘neither too wide nor too narrow’,
sitting erect and breathing fully (Tanahashi 2004, 7-8). Finally,
Dgen reminds us to ‘think not-thinking’ through nonthinking.
Note the order in which these instructions are given: the body,
then  the  breath,  and then  the  mind.  To  lose  sight  of  the
significant  role  of  the  body  in  the  practice of  ‘just  sitting’
meditation is to lose sight of Dgen’s philosophy. 
In  the  following  passage  from the  Shbgenz Zuimonki,
Dgen places primary importance on the role of the body in
practice:
Dgen also said: 
Do you attain the way with the mind or the body? 
Those in the house of the scriptural schools say, ‘You attain the
way with the body, because body and mind are one.’ But they are
not clear about how the body directly attains the way. Now in our
house [of Zen practice], body and mind together attain the way. As
long as you try to figure out buddha-dharma with mind, you can
never attain it even for myriad eons or thousands of lifetimes. It is
attained by letting go of the mind and abandoning views and inter-
pretations.  To see form and clarify the mind,  to hear sound and
come to realization is attainment of the way with the body. 
Thus, when you practice just sitting and continuously give up all
thoughts and views, the way becomes more and more intimate. So,
attaining  the way means  attaining  it  completely with the whole
body. With this awareness you should sit wholeheartedly. (Tana-
hashi 2004, 10, emphasis added)
Here, we are reminded both of the importance of the body and
the intimate connection of mind and body, or ‘the whole body.’
When enlightenment is conceived of as ‘seeing things as they
really are’ it may be easy to forget that Buddhist practice is an
embodied practice. ‘Just sitting’ is a practice that must be ac-
complished in and through the body. 
Given that the body plays a primary role in the practice of
just sitting, it is necessary to discuss what in fact is happening to
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the body during meditation. More specifically, we must exam-
ine the somatic transformation of seated meditation that lends
itself  to a thoroughgoing reorientation  with  the  world.  Shi-
genori Nagatomo, in  Attunement Through the Body,  perhaps
gives the most comprehensive account of the phenomenology
of just sitting. To summarize Nagatomo’s findings, the trans-
formed somatic modality of the self occurs through these three
interrelated processes:  (1)  the breakdown of desire and self-
centeredness, (2) an increase in our perceptive capabilities, and
(3) an increase in our ‘intimacy’ with our environment – experi-
enced as a ‘felt inter-resonance’ (Nagatomo 1992). 
This perceptual revolution is significant because the limits of
individual boundaries are cast off. This sensory expansion – a
seeing, hearing, and feeling with the eyes, ears, and entire body
– coupled with the overturning of negative affectivity greatly
increases our ability to perceive myriad dharmas (or phenom-
ena, the ‘ten thousand things’) and thus enhances our objectiv-
ity – our ability to see situations clearly. The emptying of a nar-
row subject-centered frame of reference in addition to this new
power of acuity results in a more pure and unadulterated form
of intimate seeing and feeling. That is, moral perception is not
limited to an epistemological shift.  Rather, through a bodily
reorientation and transformation achieved through meditation,
perception is recognized as a fully active, embodied practice. In
Buddhism, knowledge production is bound to the interconnec-
tedness of perception, cognition, and action. The integration of
the eyes (representing affectivity, insight, and wisdom) and the
hands  (representing  action,  mobility,  and  participation)  in
enlightened performance is what allows for the attunement to
situation  and to  right  action.  Attunement  to  one’s  situation
entails heightened ability to sense, to literally feel, the suffering
of others as well as the motivation to ethically respond. 
Nagatomo’s sense of ‘felt inter-resonance’ as a shared somatic
experience resembles  the emotional  bond described by Arne
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Johan Vetlesen in Perception, Empathy, and Judgment. Vetlesen
argues that moral perception relies upon a sensitivity to others
by  means  of  a  basic  emotional  resonance.  While  cognitive
faculties play a role in moral perception, it is this basic emo-
tional participation – via empathy – that establishes an interest
and a concern for others’ well being. Vetlesen argues that, ‘to
“see” suffering  as  suffering is  already to have established an
emotional  bond between myself  and the person I “see” suf-
fering’ (Vetlesen 1994, 159). Here, the ability to view situations
as moral situations (involving the weal and woe of others) does
not involve a distanced, or objective, stance toward the world.
Rather,  the  moral  subject  may be understood as  playing  an
active, participatory role in constituting the world around her.
The ability to feel and express this simple emotional connection
is a reflection of the maturity, or cultivation, of the moral self –
including basic emotional responses. To lack this development,
and therefore to fail to perceive properly, is a moral failing on
the part of the subject. 
The  moral  subject  originally  constitutes  the  moral  object,
according to Vetlesen. Vetlesen is looking ‘from the subject to
the object, inquiring how the subject is active in disclosing the
object’  and, therefore, ‘we are referred,  as it were, from the
object back to the subject arriving – or failing to arrive – at it’
(Vetlesen 1994, 158-162). While the main issue of discussion is
how the object comes to affect the subject in such a way as to
move him to attention,  the onus is  not  on the object  itself.
Rather, the subject must be disposed to receptivity: 
[M]oral perception has its source in human receptivity, in the prim-
ordial capacity of human beings to be attentive to, to be alert to. It is
thanks to this underlying active receptivity, this sensuous-cognitive-
emotional openness to the world, that moral perception is provided
with a direction, is ‘tuned in’ to deal with specific features of specific
situations. (Vetlesen 1994, 162). 
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Here, Vetlesen stresses the cognitive-emotional  activity of the
moral subject. This investigation of moral perception then is not
so much concerned with the realities of the world as given and
fixed, but rather the moral constitution of the subject – insofar
as features of the subject are operative in disclosing the world in
a particular way. 
The receptivity that Vetlesen claims is the source of moral
perception is what is cultivated through Buddhist practice. By
focusing on embodied practice, not only can Buddhist practi-
tioners de-emphasize their particular views and attachment to
ideas that may limit moral perception, but they can work on
developing  the  abilities  of  the body to resonate,  or  become
receptive to, other embodied subjects as well. This demonstrates
the ability of Buddhist practice to break down our self-centered
perceptions  and work to cultivate a felt  attentiveness  to the
experiences of others, what Vetlesen likens to empathy. Given
the Buddhist ideal to alleviate the suffering of all beings, this
increased perceptual sensitivity allows for a greater attunement
and attentiveness to the embodied situation of others. 
Feminist Analysis: The Social Context of Moral
Perception
It is important to recognize that moral perception is not simply
a process between the moral subject and the moral object – even
if this process involves a complex relationship of interaction.
Rather, social context and influence play a role in delineating
how we see the world and how we participate in its making.
Vetlesen describes this influence as follows:
Hence, individuals are not free to pick just any moral objects they
would like.  Perception does not start  from scratch; it is  guided,
channeled, given a specific horizon, direction, and target by society.
Society, not the single individual, selects the appropriate objects of
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moral concern and the like, other objects it rules out, conceals from
view, demanding that the individual do so as well. (Vetlesen 1994,
194)
Social values affect our moral perception. We may not recog-
nize certain forms of suffering as suffering  if  we have been
trained to be inattentive to their existence. Aside from consider-
ing obvious forms of negative social influence on our moral per-
ception  (such as  outright  disregard for certain groups,  as in
racism or anti-Semitism), I want to focus on how oppressive
social contexts become inscribed upon the body and our bodily
practices. Harmful social practices become marked on our bod-
ies – in the way we look, the way we act, and the way we inter-
act with others. Not only does this affect some groups’ ability to
cultivate their own embodied practices  in healthy directions,
but it also affects our ability to perceive this kind of suffering if
we lack a more robust political analysis and understanding.
Looking at social contexts, especially oppressive social con-
texts, adds a new dimension to moral perception and its cultiva-
tion that I find absent in the Buddhist tradition. In some sense,
a broader examination of the way in which society, or culture,
plays  itself  out  on  different  kinds  of  bodies  is  lacking.  For
example, inter-resonance occurs at a very basic level – our bod-
ily existence. The other’s body is a body like mine – similarly
structured, commonly experiencing the world, and, at this level,
interchangeable in its corporeality. This conception of the uni-
fying experience of a shared bodily experience is not meant to
erase difference, but to posit a core similarity underlying differ-
ences. This shared embodiment provides the basis for commu-
nication – including communication across difference. Because
of our shared embodiment, we have something that connects us
and makes dialogue possible. We need not necessarily rely on
the intellect, or language, or reason. There is a felt inter-reson-
ance  by  virtue  of  living  within  these  human bodies.  While
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realizing the depth  of shared human embodiment in a thor-
oughgoing way is necessary, it  is important to recognize the
variety of social influences that come to affect bodies in particu-
lar ways. Without an understanding of these differences, moral
perception may be stunted. 
I believe that thinking about moral perception at the level of
basic embodiment will only get us so far and may not enable us
to skillfully perceive or respond to all situations. In Zen, we see
discussion of the most basic human actions – e.g., sitting, walk-
ing, and eating rice. Attunement to our embodiment in these
situations does open the door to a better understanding of all
our interdependent, perception-guided activities and does give
us a basis through which to relate to other embodied persons.
However,  situations  that  involve complex forms of suffering
and oppression may require more than immediate seeing or
feeling in their diagnosis and response. In addition to our basic
corporeal connection, there is also a significant social and cul-
tural context that frames our embodied practices. The world
itself is ambiguous – i.e., open to various interpretations. How-
ever, these interpretations take on definitive shape and meaning
within a cultural context  with its  own particular  norms and
expectations. In Drew Leder’s words: 
Ultimately,  the  very  notion of  a  pure  phenomenological  vector
somehow  independent  of  its  cultural  manifestations  is  but  an
abstraction. The body’s practices and self-interpretations are always
already shaped by culture. Conversely, culture is always shaped out
of the stuff of bodies. (Leder 1990, 151). 
We are always already in a situation, in a world of meaning that
is beyond our making. Understanding how social and cultural
matrixes are incorporated into our embodied activities is neces-
sary to heighten our moral perception. 
We literally  in-corporate  social  values  into  our  flesh  and
inscribe cultural practices onto our bodies. This applies not only
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to the embodied skills that we develop,  but also in how we
incorporate the practices of those around us – such as gestures,
mannerisms,  and gaits.  As  Joan Mason-Grant  explains,  ‘The
lived body is, from the start of life, in an intimate dynamic with
corporeal others’ (Mason-Grant 2004, 97). Inter-corporeality is
a basic condition of human existence, as is our development of
social  know-how  within,  between,  and  among  our  various
social  groups.  This  inter-subjective  incorporation  applies  to
freely  chosen  groups  (such as  clubs,  cliques,  or  political  or
religious  associations)  and  also  to  unchosen  sociopolitical
groups – such as those based on gender,  race, class,  ability,
sexuality, and so on. When we are around others, we simply
incorporate, or graft, them onto our own bodies. This explains
the picking up of an accent when staying in a different country,
the annoying habits children pick up in preschool, and the silly
gestures or facial expressions we adopt from colleagues in the
next  cubicle or office.  These social ‘performances’  are often
tacit and do not often appear as objects of reflection. However,
after a lifetime of cues, our bodies carry some record of our
associations.  These  group  or  association-based  embodied
practices are part of our social know-how. 
Social practices and values become inscribed upon the flesh
through our  repetitive,  and often unreflective,  enactment  of
particular habits. It is necessary to make a critical turn toward
our embodiment of what may seem to be harmless, yet habitual,
daily activities.  Mason-Grant  provides  questions  for such an
analysis: 
How do the practices in which we participate normalize us as social
actors in ways that operate below the level of consciousness? How
do practices come to inhabit our very understanding of who we are
and what we can do? How are our practices implicated in larger
social structures? (Mason-Grant 2004, 97). 
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Our daily activities are infused with social meanings. Such crit-
ical reflection on what we take to be ‘natural’ things to do or
given parts of a daily routine is a daunting task. The perform-
ativity of gender norms provides ready examples of such incorp-
oration. Feminine gendered practices range from manners of
movement and posture (demure and constricted behavior), the
disciplinary practices of daily beauty regimens (shaving, cosmet-
ics, etc.), continuous dieting (sometimes taking the form of eat-
ing  disorders)  to more extreme forms  of body modification
(such as plastic surgery and Botox injections).2 Because we have
incorporated these habits and sedimented them into our very
bodily subjectivity, we become heavily invested in them and, in
turn, in the social norms and expectations that give them mean-
ing. These incorporated practices (in addition to many others)
can be examined to reveal the tacit embodiment of values that
run counter to our moral and political commitments. 
The problem with social know-how is that the cultural stand-
ard for the appropriate expression of a given practice or iden-
tity is infused with power. As such, social norms and expecta-
tions  will  (a) exclude or  marginalize individuals  who cannot
properly perform their assigned roles well, and (b) work to fur-
ther  cement oppressive and subordinating  practices  into  our
very bodily subjectivity. The cause of exclusion and margin-
alization is the naturalization of a particular subset of accepted
behaviors  and  practices.  Those  who  perform  the  accepted
behaviors well are socially comfortable and at ease with their
embodied subjectivities and social know-how. In Mason-Grant’s
words, ‘Privilege enables persons to live their lives as socially
unproblematic – as morally neutral, normal, average, unremark-
able – and to experience their agency as a “natural” attribute
2 Two excellent resources on the incorporation of gendered practices
include:  Body and  Flesh:  A  Philosophical  Reader edited  by  Donn
Welton  (1998)  and  Gender  in  the  Mirror:  Cultural  Imagery  &
Women’s Agency by Diana Tietjens Meyers (2002). 
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rather than produced’ (Mason-Grant 2004, 112). The lives of
those who fail to live up to the social norms and expectations
or never even come close to mastering the necessary social skills
are much more difficult. This inferior self is ill at ease, uncom-
fortable in its own skin, continuously self-conscious, and self-
deprecating. The one benefit, as meager as it may sound, is the
capacity of such an excluded or marginalized person to criti-
cally examine the practices that contribute to his or her own
subordination.  The  problematization  of  one’s  social  dis-ease
(sic!) can awaken ‘a politicized consciousness of what otherwise
remains tacit, namely, unjust structures that produce personal
and social  know-how’  (Mason-Grant  2004,  112).  With  the
critical insight and epistemic privilege that comes from margin-
alized positions, feminist theorists find promise in reforming the
practices  that  produce  oppression  and,  thereby,  healing  the
subordinated subjectivities that result from them.3
Attentiveness to these influences allows for a greater percep-
tion of harm and suffering created and sustained by our institu-
tional systems. It is my argument here that the cultivation of
embodied, enlightened perception in the world is a necessary,
though not sufficient, step on the path to both personal and
social transformation. In addition to increasing our embodied
perception  and connectedness,  a  keen  political  analysis  (via
feminism,  critical  race  theory,  class  analysis,  and so  on)  is
needed to perceive suffering – specifically as it is manifested in
different forms of oppression. However, this analysis need not
take place only at the level of social structures, institutions, and
policies.  The effects of both privilege and oppression can be
seen and felt as inscribed upon the body – both physically and
3 Also see Diana Meyers on the role of ‘outlaw emotions’ for acquiring
insightful  and revealing  perspectives  on oppressive  social  systems.
Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life. 2004. See
Chapter 7: ‘Emotion and Heterodox Moral Perceptions: An Essay in
Moral Social Psychology.’
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manifested in our incorporated norms and practices. So, again,
attention to embodied practice can open the door to increased
moral perception and the betterment of our capacities as moral
agents. 
It is my claim that moral inattention is the cause of many of
our  ethical  failures.  In  Moral  Mindfulness,  Peggy  DesAutels
investigates the causes of moral inattentiveness. DesAutels iden-
tifies both psychological factors and social influences as explan-
atory tools to understand moral failure.4 As DesAutels argues,
we are best able to overcome these moral failures by making
transparent  those habits  of  perception and action that  often
obscure different moral perspectives. By attuning ourselves to
our own moral psychology (as highlighted in the Buddhist tradi-
tion) and the social context in which our choices are framed (as
emphasized in feminist discourse), we will be more capable of
refining  our  moral  attention,  and,  consequently,  our  moral
responsiveness. DesAutels’ argument supports a radical revision
of our embodied situation in the world:  ‘moral attentiveness
requires  active structuring of our social environments, habits,
and practices in ways that facilitate seeing and responding to
the  moral  features  to  which  we  are  committed’  (DesAutels
2004, 72). Thus, moral perception requires a three-fold process
to aid in the development of our own moral personhood and
the communities in which we live: (1) a thoroughgoing process
of self-examination, including our embodied practices, habits,
values and commitments, (2) a recognition of the resonance of
shared embodiment and the cultivation of empathy therein, and
4 DesAutels identifies mindless routines, goal-directed foci, contextual
cues, conceptual rigidity, and emotional filters as a few of the contrib-
uting psychological factors to moral oblivion. She also identifies three
ways that moral responsiveness is affected by the situation and the
social influence of others: ‘inhibition of bystander intervention’, situ-
ational ambiguity and a reliance on others’ interpretation and action,
and social pressure to conform. See DesAutels, Moral Mindfulness,
73-78.
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(3) a keen insight into the ways that oppression and injustice are
inscribed upon variously positioned social bodies. It is through
this process of accentuating our way of seeing the world that
suffering – in all its forms – can be addressed most effectively. 
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THE BUDDHA AND THE ENGAGED BUDDHISTS ON FREE
THINKING:
IT’S NOT WHAT YOU THINK
Sallie B. King
Abstract 
Buddhism contains an important thread of teaching and prac-
tice supportive  of  free thinking.  Teachings  encouraging  free
thinking are examined in the work of the Buddha as well as
some contemporary  Engaged Buddhists,  namely,  Buddhadsa
Bhikkhu, Thich Nhat Hanh and Roshi Bernie Glassman. A dis-
tinctive Buddhist understanding of free thinking is examined.
Introduction
The topic of the present volume, ‘Buddhism as a stronghold of
free thinking?’ simultaneously points  to the reputation which
Buddhism enjoys as a stronghold of free thinking and raises a
question as to whether that reputation is deserved. Of course,
like any major religion that has been in existence for two and a
half  millennia  and  spread  around  the  world,  one  can  find
among Buddhist teachers a wide spectrum of expressed teach-
ings and practices on virtually any important religious subject.
There is, however, in Buddhism an important thread of teach-
ings and practices relevant to free thinking that is quite distinct-
ive of its approach, rooted in the teachings of the Buddha and
very much alive in the teaching and practice of contemporary
socially and politically activist  ‘Engaged Buddhists’.  It is this
thread encouraging of free thinking that the present essay will
examine.
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Free Thinking in the Buddha’s Teaching
To begin with the teachings of the Buddha that are encouraging
of free thinking we may consider the famous advice that he
gave to a people called the Klmas. When the Buddha came
upon the village of the Klmas, they related to him that they
had previously been visited by other wandering religious teach-
ers and that each of them had, in turn, explained their own
doctrines and then disparaged the teachings of the others. The
Klmas told the Buddha that they were quite perplexed about
whom they should believe! The Buddha’s reply was this: ‘It is
fitting for you to be perplexed, O Klmas, it is fitting for you
to be in doubt. Doubt has arisen in you about a perplexing mat-
ter. Come, Klmas. Do not go by oral tradition, by lineage of
teaching, by hearsay, by a collection of texts, by logic, by infer-
ential reasoning, by reasoned cogitation, by the acceptance of a
view after pondering it, by the seeming competence of a speak-
er, or because you think, “The ascetic is our teacher.” But when
you know for yourselves, “These things are unwholesome; these
things are blamable; these things are censured by the wise; these
things, if undertaken and practiced, lead to harm and suffering,’
then you should abandon them.”’ Similarly, he said, they should
engage in those practices that lead to welfare and happiness
(Bodhi 2005, 89 = AN 3.65 [Thai: 3.66], PTS III 189). 
One may wonder about some of the advice given here. If this
quotation is supposed to show Buddhist encouragement of free
thinking,  wouldn’t  it  be  more  appropriate for  reason to  be
recommended? Why not rely upon logic and reason? The Bud-
dha evidently was concerned that not everyone is very good at
using reason, not to mention trained in the use of more formal
reasoning skills. One can make mistakes, one can be misled by
what seems to be true. This would be particularly the case in
those who have little familiarity with the workings of their own
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minds. Clearly, though, the Buddha is encouraging his hearers to
decide for themselves what to do and not to do, on the basis of
their own unmistakable life experience, without depending in any
way upon the authority of a speaker, one’s relationship with the
speaker, or upon the authority of a text or oral tradition. In the
end, the only thing upon which one can really rely is one’s own
direct experience of suffering and freedom from suffering. That is
what one knows with certainty.
Another teaching from the Buddha that it is important to men-
tion here is the Simile of the Raft. In this simile, the Buddha says
that the Dharma, his teaching, is like a raft that one uses to cross
over a body of water to reach the other shore. When one reaches
the other shore one shouldn’t carry the raft around with one but
put it down and go on one’s way. The Buddha concludes, ‘the
Dhamma [Pli spelling of Dharma] is similar to a raft, being for
the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping’
(amoli / Bodhi 1995, 228 = MN 22, PTS I 135).
The important thing to note here is that the raft, the teaching of
the Buddha, is a tool used to achieve a goal; the raft is not the
goal. The goal is to ‘cross over’ from ‘this shore’, samsara (Sans-
krit / Pli:  sasra), to the ‘other shore’, nirvana (Sanskrit:  nir-
va, Pli:  nibbna), or experiential knowledge of Truth. Thus,
the Buddha himself declares that his teachings do not contain the
Truth; they are a tool to be actively used by seekers of Truth in
order to gain their own direct, experiential knowledge of Truth.
The teachings are highly valuable,  certainly,  and should be
actively used, but they are not for grasping or holding on to. Ulti-
mately, when one gains experiential knowledge, the teachings are
to be left behind. 
This understanding that Truth is experiential and not verbal or
propositional is one of the keys to Buddhist encouragement of
free thinking. There is  no direct  correspondence between any
verbal formulation and ultimate Truth in Buddhism. Therefore,
one cannot in Buddhism make belief in a proposition the key to
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attaining what Buddhism as a religion promises: ultimate libera-
tion.  It  simply  does  not  work  that  way.  In  this  thread  of
Buddhism, liberation is experiential knowledge of Truth, which
one realizes oneself through one’s own efforts,  albeit with the
Buddha pointing out the way to that realization, i.e., by way of
the form of practice that he recommends. One also cannot force
another to practice, or to practice well. These are matters that are
in one’s own hands. 
Furthermore, the experience of realization is like the experience
of viewing a beautiful sky: one can neither adequately express the
content of  such experience nor fully understand what another
says about such experience if one lacks the experience oneself –
that is, one cannot describe a beautiful sky to a blind person and
even the Buddha refused to say much about nirvana. The Buddha
famously used negative language in speaking about nirvana, even
in his most effusive moments, calling it the ‘unborn, ungrown and
uncreated’. This refusal to describe nirvana or to encapsulate it in
words leaves the mind open, in a state of unknowing as to what
nirvana is. This may be contrasted with the treatment to which
the concept of God has been subjected in Europe. The ancient
prohibition on making images of God served many purposes, one
of which was to prevent the mind from thinking that it knows in
some relatively concrete way what  the  nature of God is,  for
example, what God ‘looks’ like. With the advent of icons, how-
ever, this prohibition began to break down, and with the painting
of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, we came to have God por-
trayed as an old man in the sky. Most adults realize that God, if
such a being exists, is not an old man in the sky. However, that
image, reinforced as it is by our use of the pronoun ‘He’ for God,
is very difficult to shake from one’s mind! One doesn’t really
think God is an old man in the sky, but that image will not leave
one’s mind, becoming an active barrier to realization of the true
nature of God, if such a being exists. Now Buddhism does not
have God; the point here is simply to make clear the way in
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which the Buddha’s refusal to talk about nirvana, a refusal that
has held in the Buddhist tradition, encourages an open mind, a
state  of  unknowing,  with  respect  to  the  ultimate  goal  of
Buddhism.  This  state  of  unknowing  is  spiritually  necessary.
Whatever  nirvana  is,  it  has  almost  nothing  in  common with
samsara,  the  realm of  ordinary  experience.  Anything  that  we
thought  we  knew about  nirvana  would  be  an  expression  of
samsaric experience and thoughts; such ideas could not lead us
towards nirvana. An open mind, a state of unknowing, is essential.
The Buddha outlined the basic components of Buddhist prac-
tice in his teachings on the Noble Eightfold Path. These eight
kinds of practice fall into three categories of training, namely, the
cultivations  of  wisdom,  morality  and mental  discipline.  Free
thinking can be found in all three of these forms of practice.
Let us begin with the cultivation of wisdom. The Buddha taught
that the development of Right Understanding, a component of
wisdom, consists in two factors, one external and one internal. He
said, ‘For bhikkhus [monks], those in the process of learning.... I
see no other external factor more beneficial than having a spiritu-
al friend (kalyamitta [a teacher]). […] For bhikkhus, those in
the process of learning ... I see no other internal factor more bene-
ficial than critical reflection (yonisomanasikra)’ (Payutto 1995,
223-224). Having a spiritual friend means having a teacher, to
whom one should listen. The great contemporary scholar-monk
Phra Payutto explains critical reflection as, ‘Engaging the mind,
considering matters thoroughly in an orderly and logical manner
through the application of critical or systematic reflection’ (Pay-
utto 1995, 223). 
Having a teacher and using critical reflection are to a certain
extent interdependent; that is, one must use critical reflection in
deciding upon a teacher and one must allow the teacher to correct
some of one’s own erroneous thoughts. However, listening to a
teacher is considered to be a large part of the practice only for
beginners, who lack sufficient knowledge and insight to rely upon
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their  own  understanding;  the  beginner  needs  guidance  from
others. The practitioner must learn to stand upon his or her own
two feet and should progressively move more and more to greater
reliance upon his or her own critical reflection. As Payutto puts it,
‘Most people with undeveloped wisdom must still depend on the
suggestions and encouragement of others and gradually follow
these  people  until  they  achieve  their  own  intelligence.  But
eventually these undeveloped people must practice until they are
able to think correctly for themselves and can then proceed to the
final goal on their own’ (Payutto 1995, 223-224). One can see
here why the Buddha did not simply recommend reason to the
Klmas.
Turning to the Buddha’s teaching on morality, we may con-
veniently examine this teaching as it is found in the five lay pre-
cepts, which are perhaps the most basic moral teachings of the
Buddha. These state that one undertakes to observe the precepts
(1) not to kill; (2) not to steal; (3) not to engage in sexual miscon-
duct; (4) not to lie; (5) not to ingest intoxicants. A moral code
saying that one should not do certain things may seem to be an
unlikely place to look for elements  of free thinking; however,
when one understands the nature of the precepts – what kind of
thing a moral precept is in Buddhism, how it functions –  then
how it is that the precepts promote free thinking will become
clear.
First, note that the precepts are something that one undertakes
to observe. They are not commandments from a higher being –
there is no God in Buddhism, and the Buddha does not issue com-
mandments. The Buddha is a teacher and a spiritual guide; he is
not in any position to give commandments. In fact, the Buddhist
precepts rest upon a natural law foundation. The Buddha points
out what is the case, what is true about the world, and advises
people that given what is true about the world, certain behaviors
will be unskillful and will cause suffering for oneself and others,
while other behaviors will be skillful, will not produce such suffer-
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ing and can serve as a foundation for freeing oneself from the
entire realm of such suffering, samsara. For example, if I were to
kill or steal, that would, of course, cause direct suffering to anoth-
er, but due to the law of karma it would also cause suffering for
me. The natural law of karma is a law of cause and effect; the
consequences of a person’s actions bear fruit in the form of some-
thing that happens to that person, either immediately, later in this
life, or in a future life. An act of violence plants a karmic ‘seed’
that will bear ‘fruit’ in the form of some violence that strikes that
person in the future, whether in this life or in a future life; steal-
ing will result in one’s being in want. These are laws of nature
which the Buddha knows and teaches others. He points out that it
is skillful to act in such a way that one will  not suffer in the
future; it is up to others to choose whether they will act upon that
guidance  and  advice.  Thus  there  is  no  external  compulsion
involved in observing precepts, just the sharing of information
and an act of choice. The five lay precepts, then, are self-chosen
principles of training. 
In  addition,  the  precepts  are  fundamentally  developmental.
They function as external guides only for those in the very earliest
stage of moral development, those who need someone else to tell
them these things,  who have not  yet  seen for themselves  the
necessity  of  protecting  themselves  by  exercising  this  kind  of
restraint. The second most elementary stage of development is
found in those persons who have understood for themselves the
link between their actions and the consequences that follow from
their actions but who are so self-centered that the only motivation
guiding their behavior is the effort to gain pleasure and avoid
pain. More advanced than them are those who are motivated by
the intention to avoid causing pain not only to themselves but also
to others. There is, then, a continuum of attitudes and motiva-
tions involved in working with the precepts that is based upon the
development of each individual’s moral insight. This continuum
also can be seen in the fact that each precept conceived in the
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negative is paired with a moral ideal stated in positive language.
Thus the precept not to kill is paired with the ideal of mett, or
loving-kindness. Not to kill a human being is the moral minimum
requirement, presented as an external rule for people who need
that kind of support, but the ethical challenge embodied in the
precept  and its  positive counterpart  is  open-ended.  One pro-
gresses from not killing a human being to not killing other living
beings, to not causing other forms of harm to living beings, to
occasionally helping others, to continually nurturing others’ well-
being, to saintly universal benevolence. The moral possibilities
grow with the moral and spiritual development of the person. 
Thus morality in Buddhism is based in self-discipline, but it is a
self-discipline that is chosen. Ultimately what begins as a con-
straining self-discipline develops into an open-ended process of
growth towards an ideal. That ideal has a certain shape –  it is
benevolent, nonviolent, compassionate – and is embodied in the
paradigm example of the Buddha, but each person discovers for
himself or herself the particular way in which he or she will live
out that ideal. Thus free thinking in the context of Buddhist mor-
ality is by no means absolute – there are limits, a minimum stand-
ard below which one should not fall. There is a moral continuum
in which it is clear that more self-centered behavior is less skillful
and less desirable than more selfless behavior. However, morality
is fundamentally not a matter of rule-following. It is a matter of
self-development towards a set of virtues held as an ideal. In this
way there is a certain freedom and openness about Buddhist mor-
ality of which we will see more later.
The third category of Buddhist practice is mental discipline-
and-development, inclusive of meditation. In the teachings of the
Buddha, the most important kind of meditation is called ‘mindful-
ness’ (sati). Like morality, mindfulness meditation involves a cer-
tain amount of discipline and a certain amount of freedom and
openness. It is a discipline to learn to focus the mind, to concen-
trate on the present moment and on a certain field of awareness.
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However, the hallmark of mindfulness practice is its nonjudg-
mental quality. In mindfulness practice, the first step is to be
aware of what is, in the present moment in the field of awareness.
Simply to be aware of the contents of the present moment (i.e.,
without  the  mind running off  somewhere  else,  such as  to  a
memory) is the first step. The second step is to accept it – if there
is a painful sensation, to accept that there is pain, not to recoil
from it but to calmly be with it, accepting that it is there; if there
is a pleasant sensation, not to cling to it, but to be aware of it as it
comes and accepting without resistance its going when it fades.
The third step is to investigate it,  to become as fully aware as
possible of all its details and nuances. Throughout this process,
the  trainee  is  cultivating  a  nonjudgmental  state  of  mind –
accepting whatever is as it is, not fighting it, denying it, clinging to
it, exaggerating it, minimizing it – or if one is fighting, denying,
clinging, exaggerating, or minimizing,  being aware that one is
doing  that and accepting that  that is going on. This training in
nonjudgmental awareness yields a kind of free thinking that may
be different from the kind usually imagined. With mindfulness
training, one becomes a person who, when thinking a particular
thought, knows that  they are thinking  that  thought,  nonjudg-
mentally accepts that they are thinking that thought, is aware of
any emotions or physical sensations that arise when thinking that
thought,  is  aware of  the  gestation  and passing  away of  that
thought, lets the thought come, lets the thought go, and is not
captured or carried away by the thought – that is, the thought is
not in control of the mind. In this there is not only free thinking –
think whatever you think, no one is judging you, not even you
yourself – but also freedom (in the Buddhist sense of liberation) in
and while thinking.
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Free Thinking in the Work of Engaged Buddhists
Let us turn now to the Engaged Buddhists. Engaged Buddhism is
a 20th and 21st century movement found throughout Buddhist
Asia and among Western Buddhists in which Buddhists respond
to social, political, economic, environmental and other practical
concerns by applying traditional Buddhist values, practices and
ideas in new ways. It is not a centralized movement but sprang up
in different forms in the various Buddhist countries in response to
the crises and needs present in those countries. It has no particular
relation to any Buddhist sect(s); Buddhists of any sect may be
Engaged  Buddhists.  The  best  known  example  of  Engaged
Buddhism is the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Liberation Move-
ment,  which struggles nonviolently for Tibetan self-determina-
tion. Other examples include: Thich Nhat Hanh and the Viet-
namese ‘Struggle Movement’, which attempted to use nonviolent
means to end the war in Vietnam; Aung San Suu Kyi and the
Burmese monks who dared to march in the streets of Burma and
call for democracy and human rights; A.T. Ariyaratne and the
Sarvodaya Shramadana, a large development and peacemaking
movement in Sri Lanka; the ‘ecology monks’ of Thailand who try
to simultaneously help impoverished Thai farmers and protect the
seriously ailing Thai ecosystem; Venerable Mah Ghosnanda of
Cambodia, who led peace walks in an effort to heal the wounds
of that country; Venerable Cheng Yen and the Tzu Chi movement
of Taiwan, providing free medical care and disaster relief; Zen
Master  Bernie  Glassman  of  New Jersey,  pioneering  self-help
employment and housing for the homeless in the heart of the cap-
italist world; and laywoman Joanna Macy, creating ‘despair and
empowerment’ workshops to help people overwhelmed by the
dangers that our planet is facing. These are just a few examples of
a large movement in which millions of people – monks, nuns and
laypersons –  are involved. Obviously, all  of  these leaders and
movements do not think and act in exactly the same way; the
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problems they address and the conditions of life in which they
exist differ dramatically. However, they share a basic orientation,
way of thinking and set of values.
What do Engaged Buddhists have to tell us about free thinking
in Buddhism? Even a tradition like Buddhism that in its origins
and ideals strongly emphasizes the importance of individual critic-
al thinking is liable, as the centuries and millennia roll by, to have
both teachers and disciples who are content to parrot what their
forebears said, resulting in a tradition that becomes intellectually
lazy and stuck in intellectual ruts.  The late scholar-monk and
Engaged Buddhist Buddhadsa Bhikkhu was appalled by the ossi-
fied state of Buddhist thought in Thailand in the 20th century. He
sought to breathe new life into the tradition by asking new ques-
tions, making provocative interpretations of the Buddha’s teach-
ings, and above all encouraging people to think. He wrote, ‘After
learning  meditation and gaining  a workable mastery  over  the
mind, one should tread the path of developing insight. That is to
say, one has to maintain the freedom of mind by not harboring
attachment or clinging to any sectarian view or philosophy. To
attain Buddhadhamma [the Truth of which the Buddha spoke]
demands utter openness and purity of heart. Nonattachment to
sectarian views implies nonattachment to individuals as well. Even
if the person for whom you have attachment is an arahant, or
perfected one, it is false, since you cannot recognize an arahant
until you yourself become perfected. ... Rather than seeking to
emulate one whom you take to be perfected, you would do far
better to develop insight into the real nature of arahant-ship. ...
We should not even think that the Buddha can help us or can lead
the way, because he says that we must search for the Truth by
ourselves. When we know that the Buddha is the embodiment of
the light that lightens our way, then we ourselves, embodying that
light, become the Buddha – enlightened ones’ (Buddhadsa 1989,
66).
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Many of the Engaged Buddhists,  including  Buddhadsa, are
important reformers of the Buddhist tradition, as is evidenced in
this  quotation.  Here  Buddhadsa  picks  up the  thread of  the
Buddha’s teaching that says that Right Understanding is based
upon learning from a teacher and developing one’s own critical
reasoning. Clearly feeling that people are overdoing the former
and not doing enough of the latter, Buddhadsa attempts to goad
people into realizing the uselessness of practicing a kind of Bud-
dhism by rote. He makes it clear that a spirit of inquiry, not of
learning what one is told, is at the heart of Buddhist practice. In
the spirit of the Buddha’s advice to the Klmas, he warns people
against attachment to sectarian views (what the Buddha spoke of
as oral tradition, lineage of tradition, the thought that ‘this man is
my teacher’). To simply accept a teaching because it comes, for
example, from a senior monk represents the death of Buddhism,
as far as Buddhadsa is concerned.  One cannot just  passively
receive wisdom; wisdom is an active achievement. It is a personal
realization that opens in one’s own heart/mind on the basis of
one’s own sincere and unrelenting practice of inquiry and investi-
gation. For Buddhadsa, intellectual laziness and passivity, as well
as  the misguided loyalty to one’s  teachers  that  causes  one to
simply accept whatever they say are anathema to the Buddhist
path. 
In  fact,  Buddhadsa  himself  was  quite  a  rebel  against  the
Buddhist status quo in Thailand, refusing to submit his mind to
the form of education then mandated by the Buddhist leadership,
turning his back on the ladder of success within the Buddhist hier-
archy and educating  himself  by directly reading  the Buddha’s
words as preserved in the Pli canon (instead of studying them
indirectly through commentaries as mandated by the educational
system), while living in isolation from the Buddhist community.
Buddhadsa made many important contributions to Buddhism in
20th century Thailand and beyond, but among them, many people
feel that the most important was his work to awaken Buddhists
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from their intellectual slumbers and to provoke them with his
relentless challenges into a new readiness for inquiry. Buddhadsa
is, in fact, the Buddhist free thinker par excellence.
It is useful at this point to introduce a caveat about free think-
ing from a Buddhist point of view and Buddhadsa is the one to
do it for us. He writes, ‘Liberal democracy ... upholds the ideal of
freedom. ... But the freedom it upholds is so ambiguous that it
seems always to be controlled by the power of human defilements
(kilesa). ... The liberal philosophy or ideology of freedom does
not have the power to resist the strength of human defilements.
The ambiguity of the meaning of liberal democracy promotes the
idea that anything one wants to do is all right. The thug as well as
the wise man claims freedom for himself. ... We must accept the
fact that we all have defilements’ (Buddhadsa 1989, 184-185).
It is striking that these remarks questioning the value of free-
dom as understood in Western liberal democracies come from
Buddhadsa Bhikkhu, whose name is synonymous in Thailand
with liberal thinking and who was in his own life a magnificent
practitioner of free thinking. While his focus in this quotation is
on political freedom, his thoughts on freedom as such apply in a
significant way to free thinking as well.  Buddhadsa’s concern
about freedom is based in his view of human nature, a view that
he shares with other Buddhists. In that view, human beings have
two sets of qualities. On the one hand, we have good qualities
that make us want to seek truth and enlightenment. On the other
hand, our hearts and minds are infected to one degree or another
with ‘defilements’, the most basic list of which is greed (or grasp-
ing), hatred (or aversion) and delusion. His concern about liberal-
ism and the unqualified societal embracing of freedom is that
people can and will use such freedom in ways that either promote
greed, selfishness, conflict, suffering, etc. or in ways that promote
ending suffering, overcoming conflict,  and taking care of our-
selves,  our  communities  and our  planet.  Persons  with  minds
dominated by the defilements are in the first category; persons
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with minds relatively free of the defilements are in the second cat-
egory. It is critical to realize that from a Buddhist perspective
those whose minds are in the thrall of the defilements think that
they are free, but they are not free. They are the very opposite of
free; they are puppets dancing to the whim of the puppetmaster.
The puppetmaster is the defilements; they are the ones who are
pulling on the puppets’ strings. From this Buddhist perspective,
thinking or acting over and over on the basis of the ego and its
wants is not freedom; it is compulsion. Thinking always of how I
can maximize my pleasure without worrying about others, think-
ing always of my rights and never of my responsibilities – these
are not examples of free thinking; they are examples of thinking
driven by the defilements. Buddhism is all about freedom, but it is
not  this  kind of  freedom.  Free thinking,  as  we have seen,  is
essential in the living of a life lived towards the realization of
freedom, but it is not this kind of thinking. So free thinking is
essential but we need further investigation in order to become
clearer as to what free thinking is, as understood from a Buddhist
perspective.
A second Engaged Buddhist who has strongly promoted a spirit
of inquiry and free thinking is Thich Nhat Hanh. During the war
in Vietnam, Thich Nhat Hanh formed a new Buddhist practice
community made up of both monastics and laypeople called the
Tiep Hien (loosely translated as ‘Interbeing’)  Order. He com-
posed new precepts (in addition to the already existing precepts,
not instead of them) to guide order members. These precepts rep-
resent ideals that the group wanted to live up to. The first three
are quite pertinent to the subject of free thinking. Let us examine
them one at a time.
The first Tiep Hien precept states: ‘First: Do not be idolatrous
about  or  bound  to  any  doctrine,  theory,  or  ideology,  even
Buddhist ones. All systems of thought are guiding means; they are
not absolute truth.’ It is of course significant that the very first pre-
cept emphasizes the importance of free thinking. The rootedness
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of this precept in the Simile of the Raft is readily apparent and in
fact Nhat Hanh directly states that this is so. He writes, ‘This
precept is the roar of the lion [wisdom’s self-declaration]. Its spirit
is characteristic of Buddhism. It is often said that the Buddha’s
teaching is only a raft to help you cross the river, a finger pointing
to the moon. Don’t mistake the finger for the moon. The raft is
not the shore. If we cling to the raft, if we cling to the finger, we
miss  everything’  (Nhat  Hanh  1987,  89).  Thus  Nhat  Hanh
reiterates the Buddha’s teaching that even the teachings of the
Buddha are tools to be used, not absolute truth. All teachings, all
religions, all ideologies are so. Cling to nothing, he says. If we
cling to Buddhist teachings, we miss the liberating potential of
Buddhism itself. Like Buddhadsa, Nhat Hanh sees free thinking
and inquiry as the very heart of Buddhism.
It should be noted that Nhat Hanh wrote this precept during
the war in Vietnam which he saw as fundamentally a war between
ideologies.  He  was  deeply  impressed  by  the  realization  that
attachment to ideologies kills: ‘If you have a gun, you can shoot
one, two, three, five people; but if you have an ideology and stick
to it, thinking it is the absolute truth, you can kill millions’ (Nhat
Hanh 1987, 89).
‘Second: Do not think that the knowledge you presently possess
is changeless,  absolute  truth.  Avoid being narrow-minded and
bound to present views. Learn and practice non-attachment from
views in order to be open to receive others’ viewpoints. Truth is
found in life and not merely in conceptual knowledge. Be ready
to learn throughout your entire life and to observe reality in your-
self and in the world at all times’ (Nhat Hanh 1987, 90). This
precept has roots in mindfulness practice, finding truth in reality
as it is in the present moment. It also helps us to see what is meant
in a Buddhist context by free thinking or open-mindedness. Bud-
dhist  free  thinking  or  open-mindedness  refers,  first,  to  non-
attachment to views and, second, to the practice of inquiry, what
Nhat Hanh calls deep looking and deep listening. Since reality is
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new in every moment, whatever views one holds (on the basis of
past experience) may get in the way of seeing reality as it is in the
present moment. Tenacious clinging to views, on the one hand,
and mindfulness – deep looking and deep listening to the present
moment – on the other, are opposites. Mindfulness is to be as
aware, as awake, as alert and curious, and as alive as possible to
the  contents  of  the  present  moment  in the present  moment,
where life is lived, where reality is found. That is free thinking, as
understood in Buddhism.
‘Third: Do not force others, including children, by any means
whatsoever, to adopt your views, whether by authority, threat,
money, propaganda, or even education. However, through com-
passionate dialogue, help others renounce fanaticism and narrow-
ness’ (Nhat Hanh 1987, 91). One can see a certain rootedness of
this precept,  again, in the advice given by the Buddha to the
Klmas, as well as in the previous two Tiep Hien precepts. In his
commentary, Nhat Hanh says that this precept ‘is the spirit of free
inquiry’. Just as one should not blindly accept the views or teach-
ings even of revered or authoritative others, the other side of that
same coin is that one should not be the kind of teacher, parent or
authority figure who tries to mold disciples, students or children
into people whose views reproduce one’s own. What one teaches,
in fact, should be open-mindedness, that is, no particular content,
but a spirit of inquiry. Seeking to make others agree with ‘me’ is
just another of the ego’s many wants, a form of grasping and self-
aggrandizement. Therefore, being open-minded is, in itself, both
an expression of freedom from ego-domination and a practice
helping to engender freedom from ego-domination. This is why
free thinking, or open-mindedness, is so strongly emphasized by
many great Buddhist teachers.
A final Engaged Buddhist whose work we should consider is
American Zen Master Roshi Bernie Glassman. In 1994 Glassman
founded the Zen Peacemaker Order as a training community for
spiritual social activists. It is founded upon three principles: ‘(1)
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not-knowing, thereby giving up fixed ideas about ourselves and
the universe; (2) bearing witness to the joy and suffering of the
world;  and (3)  loving  actions  towards  ourselves  and  others’
(www.zenpeacemakers.org/zpo/zpo_rule.htm).
Not-knowing,  also  called  unknowing,  is  the  Buddhist  free
thinking or open-mindedness that we have been discussing. In the
prologue to his book,  Bearing Witness, Glassman introduces the
Zen Peacemaker Order and raises the question as to what peace-
making is.  He responds with words  about not-knowing: ‘You
won’t find the answer in this book. This is not a book of answers,
for there is little energy in answers. This is a book of questions.
More precisely, it’s about living a questioning life, a life of un-
knowing. If we’re ready to live such a life, without fixed ideas or
answers, then we are ready to bear witness to every situation, no
matter how difficult, offensive, or painful it is. Out of that process
of bearing witness the right action of making peace, of healing,
arises’ (Glassman 1998, xiv). 
Glassman acknowledges that  his principle of not-knowing is
rooted in his Zen training: ‘I trained for many years in Zen prac-
tice’, he writes, ‘which deals directly with the practice of unknow-
ing’ (Glassman 1998, 68). His words are reminiscent of the Zen
master Shunryu Suzuki, whose book, Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind,
is a modern Zen classic. The book begins with the words, ‘In the
beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert’s
there are few’ (Suzuki 1973, 21). Suzuki also says, ‘when you
study Buddhism you should have a general house cleaning of your
mind’ (Suzuki 1973, 111). It is like cleaning out an attic in which
is stored a great deal of dusty, old stuff. Everything must go so
that the room can be cleaned. Once the room is clean, we may
want to bring many things back in, if they prove useful, but for a
time everything must go. With the mind cleared out, we may be
able to see things in a fresh and alive way.
Glassman provides a good example of what he means by practi-
cing unknowing. He tells a story from when he was a relatively
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new teacher and activist and met with a group of Catholic nuns.
These nuns had many years experience working with the poor
and also had engaged in personal meditation practices for many
years. As they sat talking together, the nuns talked about God.
Glassman says,  ‘as  I  listened to  them talk I  shook my head,
thinking to myself, ‘They’ve been meditating for so long, and they
still believe in God!”’ Immediately, he says, he caught himself.
‘Here I was, Bernie Glassman, and I  knew that meditation had
nothing to do with God. I was a young, relatively inexperienced
Zen teacher, and already I knew that these nuns, who had prac-
ticed their rich vocation for so many years, were wrong to talk
about God’ (Glassman 1998, 69). What is particularly striking
about this statement is that Glassman is not just saying that he
should be more open-minded; he seems to be actively open to
learning what he can from people whose meditation practice is a
practice of experiencing God, that is, whose spirituality – at least
in the way it is expressed – is diametrically opposed to his own.
This  has  its  risks  –  to  do  this  is  to  consciously  open  one’s
spirituality to development in an unpredictable direction, possibly
one that would require one to stop being a Buddhist. But that risk
is smaller than the risk involved in staying in the mind that knew
that the nuns were wrong to talk about God. That kind of mind
puts a full stop to the spiritual life, which is based upon open-
ended inquiry into the unknown, with no ability to predict or
control where the inquiry will take one.  That is Buddhist not-
knowing, Buddhist free thinking.
That is why, though there is no God in Zen, one often sees Zen
masters talking about God when speaking to Western audiences.
For example, Shunryu Suzuki writes, ‘Usually everyone forgets
about zazen. Everyone forgets about God’ (Suzuki 1973, 67). As
part of an undergraduate educational experience, this writer once
attended a weekend Zen retreat with a Japanese Zen master who
assigned the entire group of students a koan to meditate on that
he had invented: ‘When the plane flies overhead, where is God?’
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This does not mean that either of these Zen masters ‘believed in
God’. After his wake-up call with the Catholic nuns, Glassman
began having occasional Passover seders, Sabbath celebrations and
Catholic masses celebrated in his Zen center, and he has happily
sent his own Zen students down the road to the local mosque to
do zikr. That is Buddhist free thinking, Buddhist open-minded-
ness.
Glassman’s  second  principle,  bearing  witness,  is  essentially
mindfulness, being as fully as possible present and alert in the
present moment. Not-knowing and bearing witness mutually rein-
force each other because we cannot be aware and present to the
present moment in the present moment if our mind is already full
of what it knows. The practice of bearing witness has led Glass-
man to develop some innovative and challenging practices for his
students. One of these is ‘street retreats’. Challenged by homeless-
ness in New York City and its New Jersey suburbs, Glassman
developed a program that took students into the streets of the
Bowery, where they live as the homeless do for several days. They
walk the streets all  day without money, panhandling, growing
progressively dirtier, receiving looks of uneasiness and aversion
from passers-by. At night, without a roof over their heads, they
look for a way to stay warm and catch a little sleep. Glassman
readily acknowledges that this practice does not yield the same
experience as that of the truly homeless. Nevertheless, it plunges
those who do it into not-knowing and bearing witness. Many par-
ticipants say it is the most profound experience of their lives.
Thich Nhat Hanh advocates much the same thing as Glassman’s
combination  of  not-knowing  and  bearing  witness  leading  to
actions  of  peacemaking.  When  asked  by  students  what  they
should do about one problem or another, Nhat Hanh replies that
there is no blueprint. You should simply go to where there is suf-
fering, he says, and be with that suffering; don’t turn away from
it. Out of that experience, he says, something will occur to you to
do and you should do that thing. In this way, Glassman’s third
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principle – the Engaged Buddhist principle of taking some action
to help, to heal, to make peace – emerges from the matrix of the
first two principles, not-knowing and bearing witness.
In closing, we should note that Buddhadsa Bhikkhu, Thich
Nhat Hanh, and Glassman Roshi all were and are tremendously
creative people. Buddhadsa inspired free thinking in an entire
generation of Thai people. He founded schools, helped the public
schools rethink their curriculum, supported female Buddhist mo-
nastics,  engaged in dialogue with Christianity,  and challenged
Thai society in their  political thinking. Thich Nhat Hanh has
taught spiritual social activists around the world that in order to
make peace, it is necessary first to ‘be peace’. He has created
forms of Buddhist practice for children, and led retreats (which he
calls  ‘treats’)  for  Vietnam veterans,  psychologists,  artists  and
families. Bernie Glassman has founded programs that have helped
homeless  people  maintain steady employment  and keep roofs
over  their  heads  and  led  ‘bearing  witness’  retreats  within
Auschwitz with the children of Nazi guards, Holocaust survivors,
children of German soldiers and children of refugees. 
Where does Buddhist Free Thinking lead in Practice?
There is little doubt in my mind that this impressive creativity is
deeply related to the free thinking, the open-mindedness that each
one of these teachers has advocated and practiced. After all, to
create is to bring into being something new, something that did
not before exist. That is, to create requires one to have that begin-
ner’s mind, the mind that does not know, to spend time in not
knowing with an alert, awake mind. When awake and alert with
the unknown, there will be surprises; some of them may be of
interest to others or have some practical use. In this way some-
thing new is created. This kind of creativity is where Buddhist free
thinking, when properly done and at its best and most authentic,
leads.
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This is not to say that Buddhism is always free thinking and cre-
ative. Buddhist institutions, like all human institutions, experience
the constant pull towards preserving the status quo, as the Thai
example shows. Fortunately, there is in Buddhism a strong thread
of teaching and practice based upon free thinking that is able,
from time to time, to subvert this pull.
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THE SILENT SANGHA: SCHOLAR PRACTITIONERS
IN AMERICAN BUDDHISM
Charles S. Prebish
Abstract
Today it  is rather ordinary for individuals teaching Buddhist
Studies in universities throughout the world to be ‘scholar-prac-
titioners’, involved in the practice and training associated with
various Buddhist traditions and sects.  Nonetheless,  it has not
always been easy for these academics to reveal their religious
orientation in an environment that is not uniformly supportive
of such choices. Thus this paper will serve the dual purpose of
describing not only the development of the academic study of
Buddhism in America, but also some of the ways in which that
development has affected the personal lives of those scholars
who have made formal religious commitments to the Buddhist
tradition.
Introduction
There can be little  doubt  that both the practice and study of
Buddhism in the Western world have grown enormously in the
last quarter-century. Fueled by a dramatic increase in ethnic Asian
Buddhist communities in Western countries since 1965, and the
continued expansion of various convert Buddhist communities,
many million Buddhist practitioners now reside in the Western
world. Although the expansion of the Western Buddhist move-
ment is likely not surprising to observers of the modern religious
landscape, the surge of scholarly interest in Buddhism in general
was  surely  unexpected.  In the years between 1900 and 1971
(when I received my Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin), there were just under 100 Ph.D./Th.D degrees
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awarded in North American colleges and universities with disser-
tation topics related to Buddhism. In the next quarter-century,
nearly 1,000 doctoral degrees – with Buddhist-related dissertation
topics – were awarded in those same institutions. In the sixty year
period between 1937 and 1997, 75 dissertations and theses on
American  Buddhism  were  completed  in  North  American
Universities.1 Moreover, at the Twelfth Congress of the Interna-
tional Association of Buddhist Studies – the flagship professional
organization for the discipline of Buddhist Studies, founded in
1976 – held in Lausanne in August 1999, there were more than
200 papers presented, with the overall conference being attended
by over 300 individuals.  Yet, one of the most highly attended
panels at that congress was devoted to the topic of ‘Buddhism in
the West’, and recent panels on American Buddhism presented at
the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion have
clearly been the most highly attended of all panels sponsored by
the  ‘Buddhism Section’.  Moreover  the  American Academy  of
Religion  has  recently  authorized  a  yearly  ‘consultation’  unit
devoted to the study of Western Buddhism.
Virtually everyone who begins an academic career in Buddhist
Studies  eventually  pours  through  Ätienne Lamotte’s  exciting
volume Histoire de Bouddhisme Indien des origines   l’re Äaka,
either in the original French or in Sara Webb-Boin’s admirable
English translation.2 That Lamotte was a Catholic priest seems not
to have influenced either his understanding of, or respect for, the
Buddhist tradition, although he did worry a bit from time to time
about the reaction of the Vatican to his work. Edward Conze,
arguably one of the most colorful Buddhist scholars of this cen-
tury, once remarked: ‘When I last saw him, he had risen to the
rank of Monseigneur and worried about how his “Histoire” had
1 See Williams 1999a, Williams 1999b.
2 Both the original volume and the translation were published by the
Institut Orientaliste of the UniversitÅ de Louvain, see Lamotte 1958
and 1988.
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been received at the Vatican. “Mon professeur, do you think they
will regard the book as hrtique?” They obviously did not. His
religious views showed the delightful mixture of absurdity and
rationality which is one of the hallmarks of a true believer’ (Conze
1979, 43). Although there have been only a few scholarly studies
chronicling the academic investigation of Buddhism by Western
researchers, and fewer still of the academic discipline known as
Buddhist Studies, until quite recently, the issue of the religious
affiliation of the researcher has not been part of the mix. Almost
exclusively, the founding mothers and founding fathers of Bud-
dhist Studies in the West have had personal religious commit-
ments entirely separate from Buddhism.
As a novice graduate student in the prestigious ‘Buddhist Stud-
ies Program’ at the University of Wisconsin in the Fall of 1967,
the very first ‘in-group’ story I heard from the senior students was
about the recent visit  of Edward Conze, conclusively acknow-
ledged as the world’s foremost scholar of that complicated form
of Mahyna literature known as prajpramit. The narrative,
however, had nothing whatsoever to do with Professor Conze’s
great scholarly passion. Instead, it concerned a question, playfully
put to the rather blunt and outspoken scholar during a seminar
session: ‘Dr. Conze, do  you actually meditate?’ Conze’s simple
reply: ‘Yes.’ But the student pressed on: ‘Ever get anywhere?’ The
brusque response: ‘First trance state.’ The dialogue abruptly ceased
and the issue was never broached again. Upon hearing that story
as a nave fledgling Buddhologist,  I was utterly and absolutely
astounded to learn that  any scholar of Buddhism actually  did
anything  Buddhist.  Now,  barely  a  quarter-century  later,  it  is
rather ordinary for individuals teaching Buddhist Studies in uni-
versities throughout the world to be ‘scholar-practitioners’,  in-
volved in the practice of trainings associated with various Bud-
dhist traditions and sects. The back cover of Georges Dreyfus’s
new book Recognizing Reality: Dharmakrti’s Philosophy and Its
Tibetan  Interpretations,  for  example,  mentions  his  academic
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affiliation and the fact that he earned the monastic Geshe degree
following fifteen years of study in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries
in India.3 Robert A. F. Thurman, holder of the Jey Tsong Khapa
Chair of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies at Columbia University, is
routinely cited at the first Westerner ordained as a Buddhist monk
by the Dalai Lama. Adorning the entire back page of the book-
jacket of Robert Buswell’s volume The Zen Monastic Experience is
a picture of Buswell as a monk in a Korean Zen temple in 1975.
Peter Gregory has been a longtime student of Taizan Maezumi
Rshi, as well as director of the Kuroda Institute, associated with
the Zen Center  of  Los  Angeles.  Christopher  Queen, Dean of
Students in Continuing Education at Harvard University, and Lec-
turer in Buddhist Studies, has for many years been a practitioner
of  Vipassan. And numerous other  citations  could be posted.
Nonetheless, it has not always been easy for these academics to
reveal their religious orientation in an environment that is not
uniformly supportive of such choices. Thus this paper will serve
the dual purpose of describing not only the development of the
academic study of Buddhism in America, but also some of the
ways in which that development has affected the personal lives of
those scholars who have made formal religious commitments to
the Buddhist tradition.
Current Buddhist Studies
More than fifteen years ago, I titled a review article on recent
Buddhist literature ‘Buddhist Studies American Style: A Shot in
the Dark’, explaining at the outset that the conjured image of
Inspector Clouseau ‘falling through banisters, walking into walls,
crashing out of windows, and somehow miraculously getting the
3 See Dreyfus 1997. It is interesting to note that Dreyfus lists his Geshe
Lharampa degree (earned in 1985) on his curriculum vitae along with
his M.A. (1987) and Ph.D. (1991) from the University of Virginia.
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job done with the assistance of his loyal Oriental servant’,4 was
not an accidental choice on my part; that Buddhist  Studies in
America was just as erratic as poor Clouseau.
Lately, as noted above, Buddhist Studies in America has begun
to engage in the useful process of self-reflection, and the results of
that inquiry are fruitful and inspiring. Following David Seyfort
Ruegg’s insightful ‘Some Observations on the Present and Future
of Buddhist Studies’,5 the Journal of the International Association
of Buddhist Studies devoted an entire issue (Winter 1995) to the
topic entitled ‘On Method’, providing the occasion for scholars to
reflect on various aspects of the discipline. One must be aware
that there is a vast chasm between Buddhist Studies and other dis-
ciplinary studies in religion, such as Christian Studies. Luis Gmez
notes,
The difference between Christian and Buddhist Studies is perhaps in
part explained by the fact that Buddhist Studies continues to be a
Western enterprise about a non-Western cultural product, a discourse
about Buddhism taking place in a non-Buddhist context for a non-
Buddhist audience of super-specialists, whose intellectual work persists
in isolation from the mainstream of Western literature, art, and philo-
sophy, and occasionally even from the mainstream of contemporary
Buddhist doctrinal reflection. The audience to which Christian Studies
speaks shares with the Judeo-Christian tradition a more or less com-
mon language. It is possible, if not natural, for members of the audi-
ence to accept the conceit that they belong to the tradition and the
tradition belongs to them  ... Furthermore, whereas Christianity and
Christian Studies as we know them are the fruit of a continuous inter-
action with Western secularism, rationalism, and the modern and post-
modern Western self, most of our Buddhist materials and many of our
Asian informants belong to a very different cultural tradition. The
methods and expectations of our scholarship and our audiences have
been shaped by a cultural history very different from that of Buddhist
traditions. (Gmez 1995, 190)
4 See Prebish 1983, 323-330.
5 See Ruegg 1992.
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The homogeneity that a ‘common pattern of institutional sup-
port provides’ is simply lacking in Buddhist studies, as Buddholo-
gists invariably find their academic homes in Religious Studies
departments, Area Studies Centers, language institutes, and even
schools  of  theology,  as  Jos Cabezn straightforwardly points
out.6 Thus, when he goes on to identify Buddhist Studies as a
‘hodge-podge’, signalling its heterogeneity, this is no surprise. Nor
should it be when he proclaims, ‘Now that the cat is out of the
bag, what will guarantee the stability and longevity of the discip-
line is not the insistence on homogeneity, which in any case can
now only be achieved through force, but instead by  embracing
heterogeneity’ (Cabezn 1995, 236, 240).
To this point, what has also been ostensibly lacking in the dis-
cussion is a consideration of that portion of the community of
North American Buddhologists which falls into a category that is
most properly labelled ‘scholar-practitioner’. Of the 106 respond-
ents to the survey whose results were reported in my recent book
Luminous Passage: The Practice and Study of Buddhism in Amer-
ica,  at least 25 percent are openly Buddhist (although religious
affiliation was not one of the items queried). It is my best estimate
that at least another 25 percent remain silent about their Buddhist
practice,  for  reasons  which  will  become  apparent.  In  many
respects, these ‘silent Buddhists’ are known to each other, but not
to  the  larger  community.  During  my  early  years  at  the
Pennsylvania State University, my Buddhist Studies predecessor,
Garma Chen-chi  Chang,  often  invited  me  into  his  home for
morning discussion. On these days he frequently met me in com-
pletely informal attire (and sometimes in his pajamas), and made
green tea for us to share as we sat on the floor of his living room
and talked for hours. Never did this discussion ever address my
progress in my new position in the Religious Studies Department.
Never did this discussion ever address my research progress or
6 See Cabezn 1995, 236-238. The quoted phrase is Cabezn’s as well.
102 Charles S. Prebish
predicaments.  Instead,  it  always  concerned my own Buddhist
practice, and the utterly compassionate advice of an older, and
wiser, longstanding practitioner. My colleague worried not at all
about my professional growth, which he assumed would develop
properly, but about my spiritual health in a new and challenging
environment. It was a discussion we shared with each other and
never with non-Buddhists. Later, I learned why. In 1972, after a
short research trip to Riverside, California to work briefly with
Professor Francis (Dojun) Cook, a fine scholar and a serious Zen
practitioner  who  was  contributing  several  chapters  to  my
forthcoming book Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, and who was
more at ease with his personal commitment to Buddhism than any
Westerner I had ever met, I finally summoned the strength to
declare to one of my Penn State colleagues that I was indeed
Buddhist. His immediate response, knowing my Jewish heritage,
was  to  say,  ‘Oh,  now  you’ve  become  Buddhish.’  Although
preceding Roder Kamenetz’s fanciful use of the phrase JUBU to
denote a Jewish Buddhist,  this nickname wasn’t a joke, wasn’t
intended to be amusing, and I always wondered if it colored his
future estimates of my scholarship. Later, in 1977, my Religious
Studies  Department  head  summarily  rejected  my  very  first
sabbatical  proposal  to  study  American  Buddhism in  the  San
Francisco Bay Area, amidst the largest concentration of scholar-
practitioners, and most lively Buddhist communtity I could locate,
because  he  claimed  ‘there  is  no  such  thing  as  American
Buddhism’,  and that  ‘the  notion  of  such  a  thing  as  scholar-
practitioners in Buddhism is not only contrary to the mission of
American public education, but also stupid.’ When I taught my
first academic course on American Buddhism in 1975, it was the
only course of its kind on the North American continent. Now
there are many dozens of courses on aspects of North American
Buddhism, an entire sub-discipline of Buddhist Studies to examine
Western forms of Buddhism, and perhaps as many as six million
Buddhists  in  the  United  States.  Unfortunately,  my  Japanese
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American department head did not live long enough to see the
development of what he considered a non-entity. 
In an interesting article entitled ‘The Ghost at the Table: On
the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion’, Malcolm
David Eckel writes in his conclusion:
It is not just students who are attracted to religious studies because they
“want to know what it is to be human and humane, and intuit that reli-
gion deals with such things.” There are at least a few scholars of
Buddhism who feel the same way. For me the biggest unsettled ques-
tion in the study of Buddhism is not whether Buddhism is religious or
even whether the study of Buddhism is religious; it is whether scholars
in this field can find a voice that does justice to their own religious
concerns and can demonstrate to the academy why their kind of know-
ledge is worth having. (Eckel 1994, 1107-1108)
In  a  recent  issue  of  Tricycle:  The  Buddhist  Review,  Duncan
RykenWilliams, an ordained St Zen priest and Ph.D. candid-
ate at Harvard University, compiled a short list  of institutions
which offer graduate study in Buddhism. Although Williams’ list-
ing includes the expected sorts of categories (‘Most Comprehens-
ive  Programs’,  ‘Institutions  with  Strength  in  Indo-Tibetan
Buddhist Studies’, and so forth), he also includes a category called
‘Practitioner-Friendly Institutions’. About these he says,
Nevertheless, there are a number of degree programs that encourage
or support Buddhist practice and scholarship among students. These
“practitioner-friendly” programs generally offer one of three things:
the ability to pursue a degree in the context of Buddhist priestly
training, courses in the practice of Buddhism that complement aca-
demic study, or an emphasis on Buddhism from a normative point
of view. (Williams 1997, 68)
And he lists  them too: California Institute of  Integral Studies,
Graduate Theological Union, Hsi Lai University (now renamed
University of the West), Institute of Buddhist Studies, and Naropa
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University. He probably could have added Nyingma Institute, the
Barre Center for Buddhist Studies, and Ska University as well.
Williams comes right to the edge of the scholar-practitioner pond
when he notes, ‘At most universities, faculty members in Buddhist
studies tend to be far fewer in number than their Christian or
Jewish counterparts’ (Williams 1997, 68), but he chooses not to
jump into the issue. Cabezn and Gmez elect to take the leap,
both dramatically and insightfully. In advancing his comprehens-
ive discussion of the discipline of Buddhist Studies, Cabezn sug-
gests:
One of the best entries into the identification of the variant kinds of
scholarship is not through their sympathetic depiction, but through
their caricature in stereotypes. These stereotypes are associated with
specific racial/ethnic, national, religious and gender characteristics. Like
all stereotypes, they are falsehoods: racist, sexist, and generally exhibit-
ing the type of intolerance to which we as human beings are unfortu-
nately heir. But exist they do. (Cabezn 1995, 243)
While Cabezn lists nine specific stereotypes, each of which is
interesting in its own right, it is the first of those that informs this
enterprise:
Critical distance from the object of intellectual analysis is necessary.
Buddhists, by virtue of their religious commitment, lack such critical
distance from Buddhism. Hence, Buddhists are never good buddholo-
gists. Or, alternatively, those who take any aspect of Buddhist doctrine
seriously (whether pro or con) are scientifically suspect by virtue of
allowing their individual beliefs to affect their scholarship. Good schol-
arship is neutral as regards questions of truth. Hence, evaluative/norm-
ative  scholarship  falls  outside  the  purview  of  Buddhist  Studies.
(Cabezn 1995, 243)7
7 To his  credit,  Cabezn  cites  Jacques  May’s  alternative  view in
“tudes Bouddhiques: Domaine, Disciplines, Perspectives”, tudes de
Lettres (Lausanne), Serie III. Tome 6, no. 4 (1973), p. 18.
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Without undervaluing the critical goals implicit in all Buddholo-
gical scholarship, Gmez adds yet another dimension to the con-
versation, arguably the most critical. He says,
Contemporary Buddhists, wherever they might be, are also an audi-
ence for our scholarship ... They can be a source (however maligned
and deprived of authority they may sometimes appear) because, inevit-
ably, they speak to us and make demands on us ... But in our field the
object is also a voice that speaks to us and hears us. It is present not
only as object but as a set of voices that demands something from us. In
fact our “object” has had a biographic presence in all of our lives –
especially on those of us who can remember moments in our life narrat-
ives in which we have “felt Buddhists” or “have been Buddhists” or
have “practiced,” as  the  contemporary  English expression has  it.  I
would venture more, even for those who at one time or another have
seen in some fragment of Buddhist tradition a particle of inspiration or
an atom of insight, Buddhism is an object that makes claims on their
lives. For those who have failed even to experience this last form of
interaction with the object, there must have been at least moments of
minimal encounters with seeking students or, after a dry and erudite
lecture, one of those emotional questions from the audience that makes
all scholars nervous. (Gmez 1995, 214-215. The italics are mine.)
Of  course  the  above  places  the  contemporary  Buddhologist
squarely  between the proverbial  rock and hard place.  If  one
acknowledges a personal commitment to the tradition being stud-
ied, the suspicion Cabezn cites so clearly is immediately voiced;
but if one remains silent, how can the demands Gmez outlines
be  fairly confronted? These  are issues  not  confronted  by  the
American scholar  of  Judaism or  Christianity,  and they  are a
powerful impetus for the silence among Buddhologists alluded to
in the chapter title.
106 Charles S. Prebish
Conclusions
In the years between 1972 and 1978, while I was doing fieldwork
for my book American Buddhism, I visited more American Bud-
dhist groups than I can now remember, and although such educa-
tional enterprises  as Nyingma Institute (founded in 1973) and
Naropa Institute (now Naropa University, founded in 1974) were
still young and sparse on the American Buddhist landscape, there
was scarcely a group I visited that didn’t aggressively emphasize
the relationship between, and need for, both study and practice.
In an experiential age, with religious antinomianism of virtually
all kinds rampant, this insistence on study along with practice
startled me.
Stories reflecting the study/practice dichotomy are abundant in
both the primary and secondary literature on the subject. Walpola
Rahula’s  History of Buddhism in Ceylon provides a good sum-
mary of the issue.8 During the first century BCE, in the midst of
potential foreign invasion and a severe famine, Sri Lankan monks
feared that the Buddhist  Tripiaka, preserved only in oral trad-
ition,  might  be  lost.  Thus  the  scriptures  were  committed  to
writing for the first time. Nonetheless,  in the aftermath of the
entire dilemma, a new question arose: What is the basis of the
‘Teaching’ (i.e.,  Ssana), learning or practice? A clear difference
of  opinion  resulted  in  the  development  of  two  groups:  the
Dhammakathikas, who claimed that learning was the basis of the
Ssana,  and the Pasuklikas, who argued for practice as the
basis. The Dhammakathikas apparently won out, as attested to by
several commentarial statements quoted by Rahula.9
8 See Rahula 1966, 157-163.
9 Rahula 1966, 158-159: “Even if there be a hundred thousand bhik-
khus practicing vipassan (meditation), there will be no realization of
the Noble Path if there is no learning (doctrine, pariyatti)” (from the
Commentary on the Aguttara Nikya). Commentaries from the Dgha
Nikya, Majjhima Nikya, and Vibhaga echo the same sentiment.
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The  two  vocations  described  above  came  to  be  known  as
gantha-dhura, or the ‘vocation of books’, and vipassan-dhura, or
the vocation of meditation, with the former being regarded as the
superior training (because surely meditation would not be possible
if the teachings were lost). Rahula points out that  gantha-dhura
originally  referred  only to  the  learning  and teaching  of  the
Tri ṭpi aka, but in time, came to refer also to ‘languages, grammar,
history, logic, medicine, and other fields of study’ (Rahula 1966,
161). Moreover, not the least characteristic of these two divisions
was that the vipassan-dhura monks began to live in the forest,
where they could best pursue their vocation undisturbed, while
the gantha-dhura monks began to dwell in villages and towns. As
such, the gantha-dhura monks began to play a significant role in
Buddhist education. Peter Harvey, for example, notes,
The Sangha has also been active in education. In the lands of Southern
and Northern Buddhism, monasteries were the major, or sole, source
of education until modern times. This is reflected in the fact that the
most  common  Burmese  term  for  a  monastery,  kyaung,  means
“school.” (Harvey 1990, 242)
Rahula says as much, quoting R.K. Mookerji’s  Ancient Indian
Education,
The history of the Buddhist system of education is practically that of
the Buddhist Order or Sangha ... The Buddhist world did not offer
any educational  opportunities apart from or independently of its
monasteries. All  education,  sacred as well  as  secular,  was in the
hands of the monks. (Rahula 1966, 287)
In view of the above, it would probably not be going too far in
referring to the gantha-dhuramonks as ‘scholar-monks’. It is these
so-called ‘scholar-monks’  that  would largely fulfill  the role of
‘settled monastic renunciant’,  in Reginald Ray’s creative three-
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tiered  model  for  Buddhist  practitioners  (contrasted  with  the
‘forest renunciant’ and ‘layperson’).10
Why is this distinction so important? It is significant for at least
two reasons. First, and most obviously, it reveals why the trad-
ition of study in Buddhism, so long minimized in popular and
scholarly investigations of the American Buddhist tradition, has
such an impact on that same tradition, and has resulted in the rap-
id development of American Buddhist schools and institutes of
higher learning in the latter quarter of this century. Furthermore,
it explains why the American Buddhist movement has encouraged
a high level of ‘Buddhist literacy’ among its practitioners. How-
ever, it also highlights the fact that the American Buddhist move-
ment has been almost exclusively a lay movement. While many
leaders of various American Buddhist groups may have had form-
al monastic training (irrespective of whether they continue to lead
monastic lifestyles), the vast majority of their disciples have not.
Thus the educational model on which American Buddhists pattern
their behavior is contrary to the traditional Asian Buddhist arche-
type. It is, in fact, the converse of the traditional model. As such,
at least with regard to Buddhist study and education, there is a
leadership gap in the American Buddhist community, one largely
not filled by an American sangha of ‘scholar-monks’.
What has been the response to the educational leadership gap
on the part of American Buddhist communities? Again, I think the
explanation is twofold. On the one hand, there is a movement in
some American Buddhist communities to identify those individu-
als  within the community itself who are best suited,  and best
trained, to serve the educational needs of the community, and
confer appropriate authority in these individuals in a formal way.
Recently,  the  Sakyong  Mipham Rinpoche,  son  of  Chgyam
Trungpa  and now head of the  Shambhala International  com-
munity, declared nine community members ‘Acharyas’, an Indian
Buddhist designation for a respected teacher. These nine individ-
10 See Ray 1994, 433-447.
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uals, one of whom holds the Ph.D. degree from the University of
Chicago with specialization in Buddhism, were authorized to take
on enhanced teaching and leadership roles in their community
and beyond. In the words of one of the nine:
We all felt a commitment to deepen the understanding in the West
of Kagyu, Nyingma, and Shambhala traditions.  There was also a
common feeling that we could take a lead in looking outward be-
yond  our  community  to  engage  in  creative  and  open-minded
dialogue with other spiritual traditions, and to explore the many
forms of contemporary and traditional wisdom. (Hayward 1997, 1)
While there are a few communities where monks or nuns are in
residence and the traditional Asian model is maintained, such as
Hsi Lai Temple, most American Buddhist communities are bound
by necessity to follow the procedure utilized by Shambhala Inter-
national.  Unlike many Asian countries where ‘Buddhist Studies
finds  consistent  institutional  support  from  religious  circles’
(Cabezn 1995, 237), American scholars are not likely to benefit
from enterprises which enhance the opportunities of their Asian
counterparts, such as Ska University in Japan.11 There is, how-
ever,  another  alternative,  where  the  American  Buddhological
scholar-practitioner is vital in the ongoing development of the
American Buddhist tradition.
Above, it was noted that in Asia the monastic renunciants were
almost exclusively responsible for the religious education of the
lay-sangha. On the other hand, virtually everyone who writes on
American Buddhism sees it almost exclusively as a lay movement,
devoid of a significant monastic component. Emma Layman, one
of the earliest researchers in the field, says as much: ‘In general,
American Buddhists are expected to lead their lives within the lay
community rather than in a monastic setting ...’ (Layman 1976,
18). Later, Rick Fields echoes the same sentiment: ‘Generalization
11 See, for example, Metraux 1988, 126-128.
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of any kind seems to dissolve in the face of such cultural and reli-
gious diversity. And yet it does seem safe to suggest that lay prac-
tice is the real heart and koan of American Buddhism’ (Fields
1992, 371). In the absence of the traditional ‘scholar-monks’ so
prevalent in Asia, it may well be that the ‘scholar-practitioners’ of
today’s American Buddhism will fulfill the role of ‘quasi-monast-
ics’, or at least treasure-troves of Buddhist literacy and informa-
tion, functioning as guides through whom one’s understanding of
the Dharma may be sharpened. In this way, individual practice
might  once  again  be  balanced with  individual  study  so  that
Buddhist study deepens one’s practice, while Buddhist practice
informs one’s study. Obviously, such a suggestion spawns two fur-
ther questions: (1) Are there sufficient scholar-practitioners cur-
rently active in American Buddhism to make such an impact? and
(2) Are they actually making that impact?
With regard to the former question, much of the information
reported above is necessarily anecdotal. By simply making mental
notes at the various conferences attended by American Buddholo-
gists, based on discussions of individual practice, one can develop
a roster of scholar-practitioners who are openly Buddhist;  and
while such a roster is not publishable in a survey which guarantees
anonymity, the number is quite clearly at least 25 percent. I first
became aware of ways in which personal study and practice inter-
penetrated during my initial summer at Naropa Institute in 1974,
when at least one individual showed me the arrangement of his
academic study and personal shrine,  side by side in the same
room. And it was not unusual for Buddhologists to teach their
academic classes immediately preceding or following a shared ses-
sion of meditation practice. When the American Academy of Reli-
gion last held its annual meeting in Kansas City, I attended a din-
ner with seven other academic Buddhologists, all of whom were
Buddhists. One of my favorite memories of Calgary, where I held
the Numata Chair of  Buddhist  Studies  in Fall  1993,  revolves
around my first visit to the home of Professor A.W. Barber. Not
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only was his hospitality superb, but his Buddhist shrine was ele-
gant, and it was the first thing he showed me in his home. To be
sure, the descriptions that might be offered are very plentiful. My
best estimate is that another factor of at least 25 percent is almost
certainly Buddhist, but very careful not to make public expressions
of its religiosity, for fear of professional reprisal, keenly felt or
perceived.
The second question is perhaps not so difficult to assess as the
first. As one surveys the vast corpus of literature that surrounds
the  academic  programs  sponsored  by  numerous  American
Buddhist groups, the names of academic scholars of Buddhism
have begun to dominate the roster of invited presenters, and
these individuals are almost exclusively Buddhists. At a recent
conference on Buddhism in America, held in Boston in January
1997, one practitioner playfully confided that he wondered if
such occasions as this might be thought of as a ‘Pro Tour for
Buddhologists’,  as he clamored off  to hear Professor  Robert
Thurman deliver a Keynote Address titled ‘Toward American
Buddhism’. In other words, many American Buddhist masters
have come to acknowledge and incorporate the professional
contributions of these American Buddhist scholar-practitioners
into  the  religious  life  of  their  communities,  recognizing  the
unique and vital role they fulfill. Even a casual perusal of the
seminar-retreat  schedule  at  an important  American Buddhist
center like Zen Mountain Monastery, for example, reveals a
more  than  ample  sprinkling  of  scholar-practitioners  as  pre-
senters. Similar results can be found in virtually all the Buddhist
traditions  and  centers  operative  on  the  North  American
continent.
This is a new and emerging phenomenon as well. In 1977, I
attended a well-planned and carefully executed conference at
Syracuse University, devoted to the ambitious theme of ‘The
Flowering  of  Buddhism in  America’.  Despite  the  academic-
sounding titles of many of the presentations, nearly all of the
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papers were prepared by non-academic practitioners. Seventeen
years later, when the Institute of Buddhist Studies in Berkeley,
California sponsored a semester long symposium called ‘Bud-
dhisms in America: An Expanding Frontier’, every single parti-
cipant had impressive academic credentials, and more than two-
thirds  of  the nearly  twenty  presenters  were Buddhist  practi-
tioners. 
Ray Hart concludes in his investigation of religious and theolo-
gical  studies  in  American  higher  education,  published  in  the
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, that the data ‘can-
not be reported in a form that is statistically meaningful’ (Hart
1991, 763). I would argue, instead, that the data in my surveys
are  absolutely  meaningful  in  evaluating  the  productivity  of
Buddhist Studies scholars, and in beginning to demonstrate how
the discipline defines itself. In collating the data in my surveys,
and evaluating the narrative statements submitted, two clear senti-
ments emerged. The first, which was quite obvious, reflected the
number of colleagues who came to the study of Buddhism, and to
academe,  as  a result  of  their  strong  personal  commitment to
Buddhism as a religious tradition; or those who cultivated a com-
mitment to the personal practice of Buddhism as a result of their
academic endeavors. For many in this first group, this has created
a powerful  tension between scholarship and religious  commit-
ment, between Buddhology and personal faith. The second senti-
ment seemed to signal a shift away from Buddhist texts and philo-
sophy  (the  Buddhist  ‘theology’  which  some of  us  have  been
accused of propagating), toward an investigation of Buddhism’s
contextual relationship with culture. Or, as Jos Cabezn puts it,
There is today a call for the increased investigation of alternative semi-
otic forms – oral and vernacular traditions, epigraphy, ritual, patterns
of social and institutional evolution, gender, lay and folk traditions,
arts archaeology and architecture ... The critique is really a call for
greater balance and holism within the field; it is not only a demand
that equal recognition be given to new areas of research, but a call for
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an integrated and mutually interpenetrating research program aimed at
the understanding of Buddhism as a multi-faceted entity.  (Cabezn
1995, 262-263)
Recently,  Jan  Nattier  reviewed  Donald  Lopez’s  fine  volume
entitled  Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under
Colonialism. To be sure, Nattier is correct when she outlines
some of the issues still lacking in the volume: a consideration of
the difference in outlook and methodology between specialists in
Tibetan Buddhism and those of Chinese Buddhism, variations in
the training and perspective between Buddhist Studies scholars
trained in Religious  Studies  departments  and those who were
trained in Area Studies Programs, those who have had a personal
dialogue with a Buddhist community and those not so involved,
and a consideration of the ‘rifts’  in North American Buddhist
Studies  (Nattier  1997,  484).  Yet,  after praising  Lopez for his
frankness and willingness, as an American Buddhologist, to dis-
cuss his own encounter with Buddhism, she concludes by saying,
If there are difficulties here, they are not with the keen and self-
critical eye with which Lopez reflects on his own experience as a stu-
dent of Buddhism but with the degree to which he generalizes from
that experience to characterize prevailing attitudes in the Buddhist
Studies field at large. (Nattier 1997, 480)
Whether these generalizations are correct or not remains to be
seen.  At  least  the  question  has  now  moved  beyond  Father
Lamotte’s concern with being hrtique.
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MONEY: THE GLOBAL POWER OF AN ILLUSION. A BUDDHIST
PERSPECTIVE
Karl-Heinz Brodbeck
Translated from German by 
Ilse Maria Bruckner and Roger Gathman
Abstract
The global power of money cannot be overlooked. Neverthe-
less, economic sciences explain the phenomenon of money only
insufficiently. The illusions that are inherent to money cannot
be accounted for within the framework of Western ideas of sub-
stance. In contrast to that, Buddhist logic explains illusions as
circular structures without any separate identity. This is system-
atically elaborated by means of the concept of money. At the
same time it is shown how the three poisons (‘greed, anger, igno-
rance’) can be reconstructed in the greed for money, in com-
petition,  and in the belief  in notional values of money as an
economic reality. Interdependence, the heart of Buddhist philo-
sophy, over and again asserts itself against egoistic dissociation
and rivalry. From a subjective perspective, this process is equi-
valent to the practice of compassion, the fundament of Buddhist
business ethics.
Introduction
In Buddhist ethics, priority is given to the qualities of non-vio-
lence and compassion: ‘All those who suffer in the world do so
because of their desire for their own happiness. All those happy
in the world are so because of their desire for the happiness of
others.’1 In this,  it  directly opposes  the prevailing economic
1 ntideva 1996, 99.
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ideology, whose central idea was expressed by Adam Smith as
follows:  ‘It  is  not  from the benevolence of the butcher,  the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their
humanity  but  to  their  self-love’2.  The  Buddhist  critique  of
egoism, however, is not derived from a moral norm, but from
the insight  that wrong thought causes suffering. In so far as
Buddhism deals with deluded forms of thought, it is a critical
philosophy. Buddha is described as teaching ‘with differentia-
tion, he does not teach here in a one-sided way’3. Consequently,
the  Buddhist  teaching  is  described  as  ‘the  discriminative,
differentiating,  analytical  or  critical  teaching’4 (vibhajjavda).
‘Criticism is the very essence of Buddha’s teaching’5. ‘Buddhism
is criticism’6. 
We can apply this teaching to some of the recent literature
that  focuses  on  consumerism,  ecological  problems,  women’s
and children’s rights, general questions of justice, etc., under
the rubric of economics.7 The critical potential offered by Bud-
dhist tradition, and most of all by the Madhyamaka philosophy,
has not been much in evidence in these discussions. Yet, it is the
central subject of Madhyamaka philosophy to show the imman-
ent  untenability  of  existing  forms of  thought  –  not  from a
perspective of  nihilism,  of  which  Ngrjuna has  often  been
accused, but from the realization that erroneous thought is the
2 Smith 1976, 26f. 
3Nynaponika Thera / Bhikkhu Bodhi (transl.), 1999, Vol. 5, p. 260
(=Aguttara Nikya 10.94, PTS, Vol. V, 190).
4 Nynatiloka / Nynaponika. 1984, Vol. 5, 133, note 119 (commen-
tary on the quotation above; original text in German). Annotation by
the translator: In the English selected edition based on the complete
translation into German it says: ‘a discriminative, differentiating doc-
trine’, see Nynaponika Thera / Bhikkhu Bodhi (transl.), 1999, p. 314,
n. 63.
5Murti 1980, 8. 
6Hakamaya 1997, 56. 
7 Schumacher 1965; Payutto 1994; Harvey 2000.
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cause of all suffering and an obstacle on the way to liberation.
Even so, the attempt to sustain a systematic and pertinent cri-
tique of modern economic science, and especially of the theory
of money, performed in the tradition of Nland, say, has been
very limited up to the present day.8 In the following I will draft
the outline of how such a critique could be formulated. For
this, I will need to sketch out some of the fundamental concepts
of Buddhist psychology and of Madhyamaka logic in order to
develop them so that they can be applied to the problems of the
theory of money and, by extension, to the reality perceived in
global capitalism. Some considerations about the responsibility
of Engaged Buddhism will conclude this essay.
The Three Poisons
According to the Buddhist idea, human action is governed by a
defiled motivation. These defilements may be subsumed in the
concept of the three poisons: greed, hatred, and delusion (Pli:
lobha, dosa, moha; Sanskrit: lobha, dvea, moha). These three
poisons  constitute the process  wherein the ego constructs its
domain to defend the illusion of the thought of ‘I’. In fact, the
human personality  is  interlinked in various  ways  with other
human and living beings, with nature and with mental phenom-
ena.  In this  interdependency,  an independent  ‘acting  human
entity’ is illusory. It is generated through the grasping of trans-
ient objects (greed) and the defending of the objects grasped
(hatred) on the basis of an illusory idea of the self (delusion).
In Buddhist practice, we come to realize the illusoriness of
this process. Two core methods to achieve this can be identi-
fied: first, the careful analysis of conscious processes, which are
permeated with illusory thoughts; and secondly, the develop-
ment of compassion as a remedy against the three poisons. The
8Alexandrin 1993; Loy 1991; Brodbeck 2001, 2002, 2006.
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practice of compassion is not a superficial moral rule here, but
instead is based on the insight into that state of interdependence
and, at the same time, into the emptiness of all phenomena,
which have no immanent substance, no ego, and no nature of
self  (svabhva). Consequently,  the  practice of  compassion is
nothing but the highest form of Buddhist knowledge, that in-
sight into the emptiness (nyat) of all phenomena which is
transformed into action. This means that, in Buddhism, ethics
cannot be separated from epistemology. 
Instead, compassionate ethical action is a way of embedding a
cognitive practice in one’s everyday environment, based on the
realization  of the interdependence of  all  phenomena,  whose
emptiness,  in  turn,  serves  to  substantiate  and justify  ethical
action. That is why there is no ‘value-neutral’ theory of human
action.  Each and every cognition of social processes  hides  a
moral judgment, and so every theory that appears to be ‘value-
neutral’ is, in truth, an implicit ethics.
Indeed, the core diagnosis in the Buddha’s teaching is that all
frustration and all suffering are rooted in knowledge that has
been diverted from its object. Nevertheless, in everyday reality
the truth about this repressed knowledge of the concept of a
substantial ‘I’, becomes apparent:  it is an illusion that cannot
withstand the test of experience. In the end it is wrong thinking
that is responsible for the suffering in the world. The public
sphere of communication is contaminated by concepts that are
proven to be delusions by the fact that, by holding on to them,
people expose themselves again and again to the most varied
forms of undesirable situations. 
So we don’t have the simple option of drawing a moral doc-
trine from the spirit of Buddha’s teaching to place it alongside
economic practice in order to tame the economy. The nature of
social and economic actions is created by forms of thought and
as  a  result  of  a  motivation  which  all  prove  to  be  illusory.
Economic  practice  will  always  be  shaped  and  governed  by
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forms of thought which have suffering as their consequence,
unless  it  takes  the mutual interdependency  of all  social  and
natural phenomena as its foundation. 
Madhyamaka Logic
Admittedly, so far this general diagnosis remains a mere asser-
tion unless we systematically and rationally explain it on the
basis of its subject: economics. Thus, in the present text, I will
select one central subject – namely money and connected phe-
nomena – to test validity of the Buddhist critique. To do so, I
will discuss those forms of thought where the science of eco-
nomics describes money and the markets. If Buddhist analysis is
factually veridical, an assumption that has never been doubted
by the tradition, we ought to see this work out in practice. For
this,  substantial  support  is  provided  by  Buddhist  logic  and
Madhyamaka’s critique of knowledge.
Madhyamaka logic is peculiar in that it is, at the same time,
an ontological  critique.  Ontology  is  about  the  definition  of
being: what is the meaning of words like ‘really’ or ‘it is’? The
general critique of Madhyamaka philosophy is that this ontolo-
gical definition gives us an illusion of ‘being a self’ (svabhva):
in everyday life, objects are interpreted in such a way as if they
had a cause, a being, a core or a mainstay in themselves. In this
context, Madhyamaka dialectics has the demystifying function
of demonstrating that this implicit assumption about the nature
of objects is an illusion. The Madhyamaka critique operates to
uncover this illusion in all of its various manifestations. 
The specific logic of this form of thought, however, has been
heatedly discussed by the different  Buddhist schools  already.
Yet, it would go beyond the scope of this essay to consider in
any detail the special features and different opinions brought
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into  play  by  Indian9,  Tibetan10,  Chinese11 and  recently  also
Japanese12 Buddhism.
A safe approach that will help us avoid the detour into scho-
lastic disputations is to prove the Madhyamaka form of thought
by means of a special object. At the same time, the substantial
difference between Buddhist and traditional European logic can
be demonstrated here. I will develop this more systematically
about the subject of money. To do this, I will have recourse to a
figure of speech that appears in Ngrjuna’s Vigrahavyvarta.
The passage runs: ‘Supposing somebody said: the son is to be
produced by the father, and that father is to be produced by
that very son, tell me who is to be produced by whom.’13
Ngrjuna uses this example as a model for all forms of logic-
al reasoning,  where a definition (prama)  gains its meaning
only by the defined (prameya), and vice versa. A cause cannot
be thought without an effect,  a reason not  without a conse-
quence,  etc.  Everyday  thinking  is  entangled  in such circular
forms of thought and has a permanent tendency to reify the
poles of a relation (like father-son). One cannot think a father
without thinking a ‘child’, and vice versa. 
However, this is not merely about forms of thought, but also
about experienced reality: The delusive forms of thought are at
the same time what we refer to as ‘reality’. If  social facts are
considered,  another  factor  becomes  relevant  here:  (delusive)
forms of thought are what generate nothing less  than social
reality, or, as Buddhist tradition would call it, the ‘karmic vi-
sion’. Indeed, the reason for all human suffering, not least in
9 Ruegg 1981; Della Santina 1986; Wood 1994.
10 Hopkins 1983; Pettit 1999; Williams 2000.
11 Cheng 1991; King 1991.
12 Hubbard and Swanson 1997. 
13 Ngrjuna 1998, 123. Cf. ‘A father is not a son, a son is not a fath-
er. Neither exists except in correlation with the other. Nor are they
simultaneous.’ Ngrjuna: nyatsapti 13, in: Lindtner 1997, 99. Cf.
to this circular logic: Brodbeck 2002a.
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the field of economy, is  that this  illusion,  based as  it  is  on
karmic vision, is not understood in its true nature.
Economic Explanations of Money
In  modern  capitalism,  economic  processes  are  transacted
through the market and by means of money. Here it is useful to
investigate more closely how these processes are explained by
different  economic theories. To do so, I will  proceed in the
same way that the Madhyamikas demonstrate the logical falla-
cies of contemporary systems of thought: it is proven that the
claimed positions are unthinkable and are bound to get entan-
gled in contradictions, exactly because they are formulated on
the untenable foundation of substance metaphysics, the fiction
of a self (tman) of persons or objects. 
At a first glance, one might think that, as the result of this,
there is a certain closeness of Buddhism and the economic the-
ory prevailing today (neoclassical economics) because the latter
is definitely a rational theory. It describes human action as the
result of rational decisions. ‘Human action is purposeful beha-
viour.’14 At a first glance, this understanding seems to corres-
pond with the Buddhist teaching which is expressed as follows
in the first verse of the Dharmapada [Pli: Dhammapada]: ‘Phe-
nomena are preceded by the mind, ruled by the mind.’ Also in
the Abhidharma [Pli:  Abhidhamma], in its explanation of de-
pendent origination, consciousness (vijna) precedes the mani-
fested action in different situations.15 But this superficial simi-
larity does not smooth away the fundamental differences. Ac-
cording to Buddhist understanding, thinking and consciousness
14Mises 1966, 11.
15Of the twelve factors of dependent origination (prattyasamutpda),
vijna (consciousness) is  the third factor,  followed by  nma-rpa,
existence in a body, that forms the basis of all kinds of experience and
action connected with it.
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are always conditioned, but not in terms of an entity existing in
itself  as claimed by economists,  who in this are the heirs  of
Cartesian philosophy. The latter define action as individual, as
the  causal  activity  of  an  ego:  ‘It  is  beyond  doubt  that  the
practice of considering fellow men as beings who think and act
as I, the Ego, do has turned out well’.16
Accordingly, the Ego, the entity of the acting human, is pre-
supposed as an axiom. This entity corresponds to the liberal fic-
tion that society has come into existence by a social contract, in
which rational, but also egoist individuals agree on a property
order to the advantage of all parties. This contract theory has
been much criticized; I mention this only because it corresponds
to a concept which, in theory of economy, Schumpeter calls
‘methodological individualism’17. The starting point of the an-
alysis in modern economics is an entity (consumer, firm) that
makes  decisions  independently of  all  others.  Contact  among
people only exists in the form of exchange. Markets create soci-
ety by way of exchange processes. According to a well-known
simile, money serves only as a sort of lubricant: money ‘is none
of the wheels of trade: It is the oil which renders the motion of
the wheels more smooth and easy.’18 Exchange becomes neces-
sary by the division of labour which is axiomatically introduced
as a precondition. Another thesis claims that money is only an
indicator of the exchange value of goods. Exchange value itself
is  interpreted differently by various schools.  Originally, gold
was attributed a permanent intrinsic value that was intended to
express the value of goods. 
As the discussion of economics developed, however, it became
apparent that these original premises couldn’t be maintained.
16 Mises 1966, 24. The German wording of the original text differs
somewhat: ‘Das Ich ist die Einheit des handelnden Menschen. Es ist
fraglos  gegeben und  kann durch kein  Denken aufgelst  werden.’
Mises, 1940, 34.
17 Schumpeter 1908, 88: ‘methodologischer Individualismus’.
18 Hume 1826, 317.
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On one hand, the gold standard has long been gone; on the
other hand, the value of gold obviously depends on the amount
available, as for instance its decline in price after the discovery
of  the  gold  sources  in  South  America  in  the  15th  and  16th
centuries, which resulted in a general inflation. Presently, the
more ambitious approaches explain money essentially by two
more theories: (1) by the thesis that money is only a (special)
commodity  which was generated by  an evolutionary process
from isolated  barter  to  general  exchange.  Accordingly,  real
money  must  always  derive  its  value  from  some  metal
(metalism).  (2)  From  an  alternative  perspective,  money  is
regarded as an indicator standardised by the state (nominalism).
The first one of these theses, developed by Carl Menger, is a
mere  exchange theory.  Here,  the argument is as follows: the
division of labour is at the same time a division of needs. Every-
one has many needs, but produces only a few products, in con-
trast to peasant cultures that were, essentially, self-supporting.
Consequently, everyone has to barter his products against other
products that satisfy his needs. Here, however, an insurmount-
able problem exists: Whoever has grown a certain sort of vege-
tables  and is  in need of shoes  will  have to find a bartering
partner  who,  symmetrically,  has  produced shoes  and needs
exactly this sort of vegetables. For many products, the probabil-
ity that this will coincide is close to zero. Yet, Menger solves
this problem by the following consideration: by and by, people
discovered that  barter  could  also be made  indirectly  and so
become a general exchange economy. At first,  a vegetable is
bartered against  salt,  for example,  which in comparison is  a
widely needed good, and then barters this salt against shoes.
Carl Menger recognises the incentive for this in the egoism of
the  economic  man:  by  indirect  exchange,  a  speculative  ex-
change profit can be gained in addition, namely by the ‘exploit-
ation of existing opportunities of exchange’19. 
19 Menger 1892. 
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Motivated in this way egoism, stirred up by the ‘difficulties of
exchange’, automatically produces goods that are exchanged in
the evolving process of trade; and finally, a special good is left:
money.
This  explanation  of  money  has  been  varied several  times,
even in the form of computer simulations in virtual societies,
consisting of rational egoists competing with each other. But
none  of  these  explanations  can  be  reconstructed  rationally.
They fail  by their own preconditions:  the ‘difficulties of  ex-
change’  can only  emerge and be solved ‘in  an evolutionary
process’,  and ‘opportunities of exchange’ can only develop if
the thing,  ‘exchange society’,  is already a precondition.  But,
according to Menger’s own statement, this exchange society is
not at all able to exist without any money, exactly because of
the  insurmountable  difficulties  of  finding  bartering  partners.
This brings up the question of how, in a thing called ‘exchange
society’, there could possibly develop a process that would gen-
erate money first if, without any money, such an exchange soci-
ety cannot exist. Obviously, this argument runs into a vicious
circle.20
A second  group  of  theories  was  developed  that  may  be
summed up in the formula of Georg Friedrich Knapp: ‘Money
is a creation of the legal system’.21 Here, no attempt is made to
explain how money arose from barter, but the state order of
exchange is taken as its basis. I will let the objection pass that
now the explanation is merely shifted and one would have to
find arguments to explain how, then, states, and in these states
markets as well,  have come into existence. This ‘nominalistic
theory of money’, which is also presupposed by the well-known
20 This is also true for the nave idea that money is an ‘invention’,
which also presumes the very thing for which money is said to have
been invented: exchange society. More about this problem in Brod-
beck 2009a.
21 Knapp 1921, 1.
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economist  John  Maynard  Keynes  and  his  monetary  critic
Milton Friedman, seems to have solved the problem: Money is
simply put into validity by an institution of the state, and today
by the central banks. 
This explanation does not fall in the same circle as Menger’s
evolutionary explanation of money, but it is caught up in anoth-
er. There have always been, and still are, stages of development
and countries where citizens refuse to use the money printed by
the state because of inflations or for other reasons. This money
does not only lose its value, it also loses its function. In a global
economy there is also the fact that money must also be meas-
ured against  foreign currencies: there is no country that could
decree its currency to be valid in other countries. As is shown
by the deterioration of the US dollar in recent times, this can
result in a gradual undermining of the validity of money, first in
foreign countries but then also at home. There is no state that
could decree the continuing validity of money. Thus the ‘money
theory of the state’ falls into a vicious circle again: it presup-
poses  something  which would have to be brought  about by
money first, namely its general recognition.
The Reason for the Failure of the Explanation of
Money
What is the logical problem here? Apparently, money is of  a
completely different nature than the nature presupposed by trad-
itional theories of economy. They proceed on the assumption of
an idea of substance that exists in three forms: (1) An inherent
money value, represented by gold, is presumed; (2) an entity
‘exchange society’,  consisting of egoist  individuals generating
money as an evolutionary process, is presumed; (3) a state is
postulated  as  a power which can decree  values  and control
them. These three explanations fail in the fact that monetary
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values cannot be determined as a substance, nor can they be
reduced  to  other  substantial  entities  (egoist  individuals,
exchange society,  and the state).  All  explanations  of money
show a peculiar circularity. Money is only recognized if it has a
value; and it only has a value if it is generally and widely used.
This means that money does not have any value substance. This
value only appears as a transitory fiction in a circular process. 
From here  it  follows  that  money  cannot  be  ‘derived’  or
‘explained’ from causes because money, as a fiction, is  empty.
Its meaning is its illusoriness and ignorance cannot be substanti-
ated.  An illusion can only be identified; then it will disappear
or, at least, will lose its hold on thought and action. To use a
well-known example from the Cittamtra school:  if  it is dis-
covered that  the perception  of a snake was only an illusion
because it was the erroneous perception of a rope, the hold of
this illusion over the mind and the fear connected with it will
disappear. What is peculiar, however, about the value of money
and the hopes and fears connected with it lies in the fact that
this value is reproduced as a collective illusion. Yet, this illusion
still has its basis in the thought of individuals. As inflations or
stock market crashes show, the illusion of monetary value can
disappear overnight:  prices  go down,  paper  money  loses  its
value,  machines  or  houses  that  have just  been  assets  in  the
books suddenly lose their value in a crisis and their values are
recognized as an illusion even by everyday consciousness. This
means that money does not even have a permanent value in a
conventional sense. The value of money is merely created by a
transitory trust in an illusion. We think and calculate in terms
of an illusion; even in the smallest details of our everyday life
we trust in an entity that, in itself, is without any substance. 
At this point  the logical structure can easily be recognized
that was demonstrated by Ngrjuna with the father and son
example. Money can have a value only if all the market parti-
cipants believe in this value. They will,  in turn, believe in it
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because they attribute an illusory value to money.22 In short,
money and monetary value form a circle of  delusion. To an
entity we have ascribed a self-nature when it does not really
have one; rather, it is created in a process of delusion. 
And how does this actually happen in practice? It is brought
about simply by the fact that we accept money in exchange for
performances or products (which means that we believe in its
value) and take its unit as a basis for our calculations. This cog-
nitive calculus points to the fact that money is based on a men-
tal process or, in other words, on a delusion of thought. We
handle our relationships with other people by calculating their
performances or products in terms of the fictional monetary
unit and relate them to it. People are interdependent in produ-
cing, but this interdependence is not consciously realized be-
cause it is conveyed by monetary calculation. Thus, calculating
in money becomes an illusory foundation of more and more
social interactions. 
The socialisation (Vergesellschaftung) generated by people’s
thinking is that by which human relationships and compassion
for others are superimposed on and shaped by a fundamental
delusion,  which consists in calculating in terms of money. In
monetary calculation,  the poison of  ignorance takes  a social
form.
Money itself shows us clearly that it lacks a nature of its own:
it is always taken only transitorily and can fulfil  its function
only if it is spent again. When in the old times Buddhist philo-
sophers wanted to explain in how far the world of appearances
is a delusion, they used complicated examples of magicians, of
eye diseases or a fata morgana: ‘Karma is not born from condi-
tions and by no means from non-conditions, for karma-forma-
22 Marx 1967, 63: ‘For instance, one man is king only because other
men stand in the relation of subject to him. They, on the contrary,
imagine that they are subjects because he is king.’
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tions are like an illusion, a city of gandharvas, and a mirage.’23
Today in our economy we merely have to read one of the lead-
ing business journals to observe the reach of failed illusions in
the stock markets, futures contracts, or on the real estate mar-
kets. We can experience how monetary values are an illusory,
instable  basis  upon which  people  plan  and coordinate  their
actions, which has disastrous consequences again and again.
The attempt to explain economic phenomena using Madhya-
maka’s logic is not an approach  from outside,  or a criticism
from an external perspective. Though such a procedure is quite
common in science, it does not comply with Ngrjuna’s meth-
od. He proves the untenability of a form of thought – measured
by its own claim – in its own categories. I would like to sketch
this briefly with respect to the methodological guiding principle
of economics: modern economics follow a declared physicalism.
The ideal of explaining human action (individually or in large
groups) by calculable ‘mechanisms’ is absolutely adapted to the
physics paradigm. The success of natural sciences rests on their
ability  to  provide  valid  predictions.  Economists  emulate  this
ideal: ‘The ultimate goal of a positive science is the develop-
ment of a “theory” or “hypothesis” that yields valid and mean-
ingful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet
observed.’24 If human action could in fact be understood reduct-
ively by ‘mechanisms’, human liberty and creativity would re-
main an unexplained mystery, but it should actually be possible
to predict the course of the economy. However, a glimpse at
literature reveals that economists have failed miserably to do so,
measured by  their  own ideal of  being able to provide fore-
casts.25
In fact, the social function of the predictions of economic sci-
ences is completely different from predicting incidents. Econo-
23Ngrjuna: nyatsapti 36, in: Lindtner 1997, 107.
24 Friedman 1953, 7. 
25Brodbeck 2002b. 
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mists are, in actual fact, expressing a hidden morality when they
constantly repeat the erroneous thought that markets have an
autonomous, self-like nature, which allows them to be subject
to mathematical explanation and policy recommendations. The
function of economics in the social process is that, on the basis
of its own delusion, actions are again and again programmed to
be egoistic. Formulated in the jargon of economists, behaviour
must be steered by ‘incentives’. Here, the claim is that humans
are, at least genetically, programmed to be egoists, and only by
external force (laws, taxes, interest rates or prices) is it possible
to  steer  them according  to  certain  political  objectives.  But
recommendations that are given on the basis of wrong thoughts
must  permanently  reproduce  suffering.  That such  thoughts,
even measured by their own claim, are invalid, is daily shown in
the fate of the ever renewed predictions about stock markets,
interest rates, exchange rates, or other sorts of prices. On the
day after, or in the following week or year, the old prediction
(which, as a rule, will have proven to have been erroneous) will
have long been forgotten, replaced by a new one in its turn. By
this, even a neutral observer should begin to see that, obviously,
this  is  not  an actual  science,  which  it  claims  to be,  but  an
erroneous form of thinking.  At  the base of this error is  the
ignorance of the illusory, circular nature of money.
The Monetary Form of the Three Poisons
The illusion of money directly controls all market participants.
The market is the social site in which acts of exchange are per-
formed. But only those possessing money can enter this loca-
tion; and only who can perform (unskilled labour, for example)
or who possesses a commodity that is in demand will be able to
gain  possession  of  money.  Gained  with  hard  struggles,  the
money will be spent for daily needs. This means that the rela-
tionship among the mass of people is transacted by a process
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whereby the transient  possession of money alternates  with a
state of lack, leading to striving for money again. No matter
which material form money may take – gold, paper money, or a
figure on a computer screen –, it is a limited amount. The con-
veyance of all the processes of labour division happens in such a
way  that,  by  calculating  in  the  fictional  abstraction  of  the
monetary unit, people become possessors of money only imper-
manently.  Thus, after having made their purchases, they must
strive for money again if they still want to be part of the game.
In these processes, the striving for the acquisition or increase of
money becomes the central motivation of acting on markets. 
What is shown by the striving for money and for  still more
money is greed, one of the three root poisons besides the poison
of  ignorance, the deception about monetary values. In ancient
times, the greed for money was already regarded to be a typical
example of greed in general.  Plato, for instance,  divides  the
human soul in three parts. He states of the third of these parts
that ‘[…] our calling it the money-loving […] part’ is justified.26
Without doubt Buddhist psychology, as formulated in the Abhi-
dharma, recognizes manifold, differentiated forms, in each of
which  the  illusion  of  the  ego  is  reproduced  by  greed  and
grasping. But when we generalize to the entire plutocracy on
our planet, the  greed for money becomes the primary form of
wrong motivation and threatens  to superimpose itself  on all
other forms.
Now the third of the three poisons can be easily identified in
its specific appearance in economy as well. Every sum of money
grasped by an ego becomes its  property.  In a monetary eco-
nomy, the defence of ego territories takes the form of demarca-
tion of property rights, which at the same time is institutional-
ised by a legal system and the power of the state. Property in
monetary  wealth  excludes  the  other people  who  are  also
striving for money. The greed for money, so to speak, encoun-
26 Plato: Republic, Book IX (581a), transl. by Paul Shorey.
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ters itself on the markets; it meets itself in a fellow being who
has turned into an aggressive competitor. Money is no longer
sought after in an abstract form, but competitors turn against
each other to expand their ego territory, within or without the
relevant, accepted legal or moral rules. Competition even har-
bours the tendency to set aside impinging moral limits in the
long run, having monetary calculation and the greed for money
as its ignorant basis and motivation. 
Consequently, we can identify the three poisons not only in
terms of the individual, psychological concept of the Buddhist
practice of training the mind. It becomes apparent that ignor-
ance has taken a social form. This social form of ignorance is at
the same time institutionalised. Calculation in money has pro-
foundly changed human subjectivity in the two or three millen-
nia in which money has been used. In reality, what is called
‘ratio’ in modern times is mainly calculating thought. All facts
are subjugated to a calculus, estimation, and valuation. Hobbes
expresses this attitude very clearly: ‘By ratiocination, I mean
computation.’27 Also the sources of mathematics can easily be
recognized in monetary calculation.28 Even in natural sciences
this programme turns out to function. But it functions in a very
one-sided way. If nature is merely perceived from the perspect-
ive of numbers, we can’t form a picture of the interdependence
of all natural phenomena and, what is more, we come to adopt
a position outside of nature. This position of ‘I think = I calcu-
late’, so I am (by myself, separated from everything else), which
was especially developed by Descartes, is the form in which the
money using or monetary subject itself reflects itself in its ignor-
ance.  Modern  nature  perception  is  based  on  this  Cartesian
standpoint.29
27 Hobbes 1962, Part I, Chapter 1,  2.
28 Cf. Leonardo 2003. 
29 Brodbeck 2009, 146 sqq and 220 sqq; 2009a, part 5.
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The consequences  of  this attitude become more and more
obvious:  admittedly,  we do succeed in submitting  more and
more elements of natural processes to the control of calculation
and thus, finally, to economic exploitation, but only at the price
of a systematic blindness towards the interdependence that gov-
erns natural processes (of which, in ecology, we become con-
scious again). In the meantime, the exploitation of nature under
the abstract measure of monetary calculation has advanced so
far as to claim ever more parts or elements of nature as private
property (patent  rights  on genetic material,  forms of nature,
living beings, etc.). One may say that the ecological problems
that we presently have to face are the karmic consequences of
the ignorant perception of nature, which in turn is rooted in the
calculating thought that stands for the totality of cognition in
the monetary subject.
In general, private property, as an abstract concept, is simply
the reverse of abstract monetary property. Societies without a
dominating monetary calculation always have concrete relation-
ships and dependencies of people and objects.  It is monetary
calculation only that measures everything by the same standards
and calculates it  in a fictional unit.  In fact,  however,  this  is
another illusion – or, to say it less politely, the ignorance inher-
ent in monetary calculation is plain narrow-mindedness. A per-
son who, for example, is the owner of a company will still be
dependent on various factors: surrounding nature, the legal sys-
tem that protects his property (with police power, if necessary),
connectedness with society by infrastructure, qualified employ-
ees, raw materials, etc. By the assessment in money (= balance
sheet), an artificial cut is made by which business processes and
their control are subjugated to an ‘ego centre’ which organises
its acts in a fictional unit (money).
A very early institutionalised form of the greed for money is
interest. The demand for interest simply conceals the greed for
more money. The interconnectedness of people by markets and
Money: The Global Power of an Illusion             137
monetary calculation is used and also presumed; while at the
same time it is abused, when the connectivity of the division of
labour succeeds in creating hoarded up money or lends money
out for the purpose of demanding  more money  than the lent
amount from the debtors. In ancient times, this form of interhu-
man exchange was morally banned in general.  Buddha  even
regarded the mere taking of money as a danger and forbid the
Sagha to do so. In Islam, the taking of interest is prohibited,
but  not  exchange;  in Judaism,  the taking  of  interest  among
‘brothers’ is forbidden, but allowed to take from strangers. In
Christianity,  a  strict  prohibition  of  usury  or  the  taking  of
interest  was  valid  for  almost  two thousand  years;  but  first
Calvinism and later also Catholicism adapted to the advancing
capitalism and permitted the taking of interest.
The Reality of Economic Illusion: 
the Suffering of the Many
Today, the institutionalised  greed for money  has  become so
widespread that ignorance has taken on a planetary dimension.
Globally, financial markets dominate almost every other spheres
of  life.  Companies  increasingly  submit  to  shareholders’
interests. The simple maximization of profits has been pushed
into the background by the  performance of securities (assets).
Money itself  has assumed an almost  unlimited abundance of
forms: in addition to the actual money of the central banks and
besides bonds and securities,  many forms of derivatives  have
come into existence.  In response to this,  central banks  have
recently been compelled to abandon the definition and control
of a ‘money supply’ to a large extent.
The results stemming from this form of socialisation gener-
ated by money are no secret. The interdependence of humans
and nature on this planet is not being transformed by discourse,
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sensible planning, the balancing of needs and the possibilities to
satisfy them into some tangible action, governed by compassion.
On  the  contrary:  global  relations  are  mainly  based  on  the
abstract weighing of monetary values which at the same time
compete with each other as national currencies and repeatedly
trigger off exchange rate turbulences. All property claims, how-
ever, are measured in monetary values and defended against
each other in economic competition. In these processes, the ego
can take many forms that are social as well, which extends to
nationalism or collective egoism. Consequently, economic com-
petition is increasingly fought out as a competition of states and
armed forces.
For most people, the consequences are devastating. Here are
just a few references: The global  distribution of monetary in-
come is extremely unequal, and this gap is ever growing wider.
‘An analysis of long-term trends in world income distribution
(between countries) shows that the distance between the richest
and poorest country was about 3 to 1 in 1820, 11 to 1 in 1913,
35 to 1 in 1950, 44 to 1 in 1973 and 72 to 1 in 1992.’30 The
gap is  also  widening  within  the  developed  countries:  ‘The
wealthiest nation on Earth has the widest gap between rich and
poor of any industrialized nation.’31 If it is not countries but
persons, the picture is still darker: ‘The richest 5 percent of the
world’s people have incomes 114 times those of the poorest 5
percent.’32 Of the 2.2 billion children worldwide, one billion
lives in poverty. According to information provided by UNICEF,
27,000 children starve each day; and there is a deadly shortage
of  the  most  fundamental  necessity,  clean  drinking  water:
‘Access to water for life is a basic human need and a funda-
mental human right. Yet in our increasingly prosperous world,
more than 1 billion people are denied the right to clean water
30 Human Development Report 1999, 38. 
31 The Corporate Planet. 1997.
32 World distribution. 2007.
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and 2.6 billion people lack access to adequate sanitation. These
headline numbers capture only one dimension of the problem.
Every year some 1.8 million children die as a result of diarrhoea
and other diseases caused by unclean water and poor sanita-
tion.’33
At the same time, however, there are now sufficient technolo-
gical,  agricultural  and  economic  means  to  end  this  global
misery.  According  to UNO, worldwide foodstuff  production
could feed 12 billion people. While 2.4 billion people have to
live on less than 1.25 US dollar per day,34 worldwide 1.34 bil-
lion US dollar were spent on armament in 2008 for one year (of
which the U.S.A. alone spent 550 billion). This amount would
be sufficient to more than double the income of two thirds of
the world population. Even a small proportion of it would be
enough to provide clean drinking water, sufficient education
and primary health care for everyone all over the world. For
this  calculation, luxury consumption was not  considered,  for
example 105 billion US dollar spent in Europe alone for alco-
holic beverages, 50 billion for cigarettes, or 17 billion for per-
fume in Europe and the U.S.A.35
This shows clearly that it is not a shortage of resources that
generates  global  poverty,  which  increasingly  leads  to  wide-
spread poverty in the developed countries, too. The suffering
on this planet is conditioned by the specific organisation of our
society, based as it is on illusory forms of thought, and gives a
special, ‘modern’ form to the three poisons of greed, hatred and
ignorance. People experience the reality created by themselves
by these illusory forms of thought on the basis of monetary cal-
33 Human Development Report 2006, V. 
34 ‘By the new measurements (recalibrated at $ 1.25 a day, KHB) 1.4
billion people are living in extreme poverty – more than one-quarter
of the population of developing countries.’ Worldbank, Poverty data:
A supplement to World Development indicators 2008, 1.
35 Source:  http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Facts.asp  (26
November 2007). 
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culation as an alien force. They give a fictive nature of ‘self’ to
the deceptive form of their interdependence by way of the mar-
kets in the manifold forms of monetary competition. They bow
down before something they are creating themselves as a global
delusion; and, in the atomised form taken by their ego-process,
in the deceptive shape of monetary calculation, repeated by bil-
lions of people, they are driven into illusory ideas and poisoned
motivations, ranging from everyday aggression to hatred in its
national or religious shape which, at present, takes its toll in 14
wars all over the world.36
The Buddhist diagnosis that the actions of humans are based
on ignorance (Pli:  avijj, Sanskrit:  avidy), and that from this
ignorance, becoming manifest in the three poisons, unwhole-
some actions will follow, becomes breathtakingly visible if it is
applied to economic processes. What is feared as a global, prac-
tical constraint, or as an alien force, is created by people them-
selves. What is more, they create this on the basis of wrong
thinking.  Delusion as a global process reproduces  itself  with
fatal consequences. Ignorant thought, which – as it is said in the
already mentioned first verse of the Dharmapada – is followed
by suffering ‘like the wheel that follows the foot of the ox’, is
not a product of an individual. The Buddha’s teaching would be
misunderstood if we took ignorance to be the product of an
‘ego’. Rather the ego itself is interdependently produced as an
ignorant  process,  for  which  the  forms  of  thought play  an
important role. 
The Challenges of Engaged Buddhism 
The great  teachers of  Nland and those traditions  that fol-
lowed them saw it as their most noble task to expose and criti-
cize contemporary systems of thought as processes of ignorance.
36 SIPRI 2008.
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Whereas, in the first five centuries in India, these were many
other  philosophical  systems,  scholastic  interpretations  of  the
Abhidharma or extreme assertions within the Buddhist schools,
in  modern  times  the  forms  of  thought  have  multiplied.  Of
these, the most important system of thought, which provides
the basis of the reproduction of the deceptive views of economy
and society and is communicated in schools, universities and
(most of) the media, is modern economics. A Buddhist econo-
mics, schooled in Buddhist logic and the Madhyamaka, faces
the  challenge  to  realize  anew,  with  respect  to  the  ignorant
forms of thought of present times, what Ngrjuna, Candra-
krti, Asaga, Dignga, Dharmakrti and others achieved in their
own  times  with  respect  to  the  then  prevailing  systems  of
thought. 
Thus,  to  my way of  understanding  it,  Engaged Buddhism
faces two challenges which, however, arise from one common
realization: on one hand the task of the critique of forms of
thought which necessarily result in suffering (because they are
based on the illusion of an I and a substantial self); on the other
hand the practice of compassion by which interdependence is
immediately  experienced and raised into the individual  con-
sciousness as a practical task. 
In the spirit of the second issue, many initiatives have already
developed from Engaged Buddhism:37 Buddhists engage them-
selves  in  social  movements,  in  the  peace  movement,  for
women’s and children’s rights, they support the ecology move-
ment, etc. Yet, these are mostly more distant effects of a basic-
ally ignorant  attitude in economy.  If  this ignorance is  to be
identified in its core, Engaged Buddhism faces the great chal-
lenge of uncovering the roots of this ignorance. Here, Buddhists
must not shrink from criticising the dominant sciences – with
clarity as to the subject,  but  always benevolently  and mildly
with respect to persons. 
37 Cf. Queen and King 1996; 2005; http://www.buddhanetz.org.
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From  the  realization  of  the  emptiness  of  all  phenomena
because of their interdependence, all  those forms of thought
may be critically identified in as much as they all introduce a
substance as their means of justification. In economy, this is the
thesis of homo oeconomicus, which proceeds on the assumption
of independent egos and from which the market is construed,
whereby this egoism is ideologically justified as ‘rational action’.
Here as well, the form of deception can be identified that is
based on the assumption of independent entities that are wor-
shipped as ‘the monetary value’ or  ‘the market’.  Economists
who claim that the laws of the market are quasi natural laws
tend to assume a totalitarian attitude. Obeisance towards the
market  is demanded,  as in Friedrich A.  von Hayek with his
claim that it is ‘the function of prices to tell people what they
should do.’38 It is prices that are put in a position to tell us what
to do. It is not sensible and compassionate women and men
who harmonize their decisions and actions, but an anonymous
mechanism is placed in this position, which will be used by few
to their own advantage – with the already mentioned result of
extreme global inequality and poverty. 
It is really the abstract, ignorant form of money which rules
the  world  markets  and,  as  stated  by  economists,  mankind
should blindly follow its command. Compassion is even stig-
matised as a severe vice by the market purists. Ayn Rand speaks
of ‘the virtue of selfishness’39. Market processes would only be
hindered from efficiently exerting their function by ‘the persist-
ence  of  instinctual  feelings  of  altruism  and  solidarity’40.
Through egoist interests and without consulting anyone, a nat-
ural law is expected to be revealed, a thought which is among
the core principles of classical economics and political theory:
‘[…] the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and
38 Hayek 1996, 272. 
39 Rand 1964.
40 Hayek 1989, 64. 
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consequently the laws of God’41. Here it becomes also obvious
that Buddhism has to formulate its criticism as a non-theistic
religion, at least in an ontological sense. All ideas of this kind
reveal themselves to be, by their internal contradictions, mis-
takes in reasoning. There is no individual substance of an I, nor
is there any ‘super-subject’ hidden behind the object that could
endow them with a substantial validity. Furthermore, compas-
sion  and altruism are a  highly  rational  attitude  of Buddhist
analysis and practice that is to be trained by cognition and med-
itation practice, but certainly not an ‘instinctual feeling’ of an
earlier stage of the development of mankind, as it is for Hayek. 
A typical feature of modern sciences that can be observed for
the markets and for money is the tendency to regard human life
and the mind, or spirit, as a mere object that is ruled by practic-
al constraints; this characteristic can also be observed in almost
any science that concerns itself with human beings or with the
human body.  Psychology  reduces  anything  happening in the
mind  to  neurological  processes;  neurosciences  reduce  their
explanations to a biological, chemical, and physical basis; and
biology reduces life to chemical components. At an early stage
of  their  development  already,  economy  and  sociology  have
reduced mental processes to class relations, market processes or
the interaction of egoist decisions. The traditional models of the
economy express themselves in terms of mechanics and render
homage to a pronounced mathematical physicalism.42 Already
the  method of these sciences of man is, in its  logical form, a
privation of compassion: the fellow creature is an object of sci-
entific manipulation by  incentives, but not a living being with
emotions and a mind. In all these attempts to analyse human
mind in its mechanical causes, an ideological imposition is con-
cealed, wherein the pressure imposed by the markets or states
on people  is  taken  to  be  ‘natural’.  In  this  context  it  is  of
41 Burke 1999, 81. 
42 Vgl. Mirowski 1989; Brodbeck 2009.
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particular importance to reveal the manifold misjudgements and
wrong  conclusions  that  make  up  this  fundamental  attitude
towards human thought and action. This task emphasises again
the central insight of Buddhist tradition, namely that into our
unwillingness to take responsibility for our own actions, and
that  the reductionist  replacement of them by social,  psycho-
logical, neurological or genetic mechanisms fundamentally ob-
scures the possibilities of the human mind. 
That  is  why Engaged Buddhism has  not  only  the  task of
advocating and practicing compassion with other women, men,
and other  living  beings  and a  protective  way  of  relating  to
nature, but also will  unfold its power only when the  mental
reasons for the condition of our planet are seen and the forms
of thought at their root are scrutinized. One must not be dis-
couraged by the fact that, indeed, a science that has been awar-
ded Nobel prizes will be put to the test. Rather, the argumentat-
ive power of the tradition of Nland may be taken as a per-
manent example and inspiration for the making of such ana-
lyses.
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ECONOMICS AND ZEN. THE RELIGIOUS QUEST FOR
SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND ITS MEANING
IN OUR MODERN TIMES
Silja Graupe1
Abstract
The economic principles of utility and rationality are among the
most  pervasive ideals  dominating  our  modern everyday  life.
They even threaten to reduce the world’s spiritual traditions to
more or less useful ‘goods’ competing against each other in the
‘market  of  religions’.  My  paper  redefines  this  relationship
between economics and spirituality in a radically different way.
In the light of the Japanese Buddhist philosophy of Nishitani
Keiji it shows that Buddhist spirituality is not to blindly accept
the ideals of economics as its pre-given foundation. Rather, it is
to confront us with the existential question why we have come
to believe in those ideals in the first place. Entering into the
spiritual path thus is to self-reflectively step back into the hid-
den ground beneath our very own feet, i.e. to critically elucid-
ate the hidden foundations of our modern obsession with utility
and rationality. It is to explore into the ‘abyss’ which lies hid-
den at  the ground of  our  economic  lives,  with the  aim,  in
Nishitani’s words, ‘of delving into the ground of human exist-
ence and, at the same time, searching anew for the wellsprings
of reality.’
1 Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Alanus Univer-
sity of Art and Social Sciences, Germany. The research for this article
was generously funded by Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Germany.
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Introduction
In the 1950s and 60s, sociologists like Peter Berger propounded
the theory that modernization inevitably led to secularization.
The history of the last thirty years, however, has not been kind
to this prediction. Even Berger himself, in 1998, called his own
thesis a ‘big mistake’ (Berger 1998). Instead of religion silently
retreating into the private spheres of our lives, it has returned
to take up space once again on the social and political agenda.
Thus, questions about what role it should play in our contem-
porary  societies  have  regained  their  pertinence.  My  paper
attempts  to  present  one tentative answer  to  these  questions
from the perspective of Zen Buddhism, as expounded by Japan-
ese philosophers of the Kyto School.2 My choice here is by no
means arbitrary. When Japan opened up its economic system to
the West, with all the technological and political consequences
that this entailed, the Kyto School philosophers wanted Zen to
confront the newly arising reality head on. Rather than escaping
from the often painful process of modernization and retreating
into the security of monastic life, they sought to transpose the
living and enlightened experience of Zen into the present. Spe-
cifically, they set out to critically and creatively examine the
sources that lie at the root of modernity as well as the conflicts
it  created:  Western  philosophy,  science  and  technology.
Through this project, the Kyto School philosophers aimed to
2 The Kyto School was founded by NISHIDA Kitar in the beginning of
the last century. Nishida was born in Unoke, Japan on May 19, 1870.
After  studying  Western philosophy  at  Tokyo  University,  teaching
German and engaging in intense Zen meditation practice,  Nishida
received the appointment of assistant professor in Ethics at the Imperi-
al University of Kyto in 1910. In the same year, he published his first
work, ‘Study of the Good’. In 1913, Nishida became a professor of the
history of religion,  and,  in 1914, of  the history of philosophy at
Kyto. Among his successors have been TANABE Hajime, NISHITANI Keiji,
ABE Masao and HISIMATSU Shinichi.
Economics and Zen                           151
develop Zen into a true stronghold of free thinking in the midst
of modernity  by pulling  out  its  creative potential  and juxta-
posing it to the context of massive changes in the lifestyles of
the Japanese population. My paper is conceived not as a history
of the Kyto School, but as a continuation, in their spirit, of
examining our modernity from the perspective of the sacred. In
particular, I will use Zen to look at one of the most important
sources of our modernity: economics. Using a Zen influenced
religious interpretive framework, I will examine the meaning of
religion in our globalized world of free market  competition,
and the  meaning  of  economics  in  our  resurgently  religious
world.
The Economics of Religion
Commonly,  we put  economics  and religion  in two separate
intellectual compartments,  thinking  of them as two different
subject  matters,  concerned with  two distinct  spheres  in  our
lives. The former is about the outer world of production and
commerce, the latter is about the inner world of meditation,
ritual and the soul, and never the twain shall meet. The extent
to which Zen practice today has become, both in the East and
in the West, solely a path of individual spiritual development
might be seen as a possible confirmation of this tendency; but it
is a tendency that has been severely criticized by Kyto school
philosophers as mere escapism (Hisamatsu 1990). On the other
hand, many economists would surely agree with this common
sense perception.  However,  even  within  their  field  one sees
signs of an incipient transformation in the way the object of the
study of economics is conceived: traditionally, economics sys-
tematically reflected  in various  methodological  ways  upon a
specific sphere of our lives, that is upon the world of trade and
markets. But today it has increasingly come to be defined as a
certain subjective mode of looking upon the entire world. As a
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single conceptual  framework,  it  proposes  to give us a more
certain and permanent control over  every aspect of our lives.
What clearly distinguishes economics as a discipline, thus, is not
its subject matter any longer but its approach (Becker 1976, 5).
This  approach,  coined  by  terms  such  as  ‘rational  choice’,
‘utility’  or  ‘profit  maximization’,  is  ‘to  analyze  an  almost
endlessly  varied  set  of  problems,  including  the  evolution  of
language …, church attendance ..., capital punishment …, the
legal system …, the extinction of animals …, and the incidence
of  suicide’.  And  as  this  list  continuously  expands  so  as  to
include ‘fertility, education, the uses of crime, marriage, social
interactions,  and other  “sociological”,  “legal”,  and “political
problems”’  (Becker  1976,  8-9),  it  seems  only  natural  to
incorporate religious issues into it also. Our religious feelings,
our being part of a religious community, even our belief in eter-
nal life have come to be understood as dependent variables of
utility  maximizing  functions  (Iannaccone  1990).  Even if  we
were ‘suicide bombers killing in the name of God’, economists
would still quite confidently tell us that we are acting rationally
within  the  framework  of  their  approach  (Weber  and Coy,
2004). 
The view that all human beings behave as prescribed by the
economic approach is certainly not a problem of interest to sci-
entific theory only, for it also says something about our  daily
mentality, reflecting a fundamental change in our common atti-
tudes toward religion. In contemporary liberal democracies, we
assume the right to freely choose our religion according to our
individual preferences; so, given that economics is about prefer-
ences, shouldn’t we buy into the economist’s belief that we go
about it in the same ‘rational’ manner as we chose a car? To my
understanding,  a fundamental  tendency  of  our  modern  lives
becomes visible  here.  This  is  the tendency  of  the economic
sphere to expand inwardly into the depth of ourselves, so as to
shape all aspects of our lives, including those of our innermost
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religious experiences. As more of our daily life is embedded in
the economic sphere, more of our thinking takes on an eco-
nomic cast. Mostly unnoticed by us, we grow accustomed to
constantly creating new data by applying computational proce-
dures to all aspects of life. However, there is a danger hidden in
this procedure, insofar as its total claim makes us blind toward
other sources of creativity. Specifically, it appears to inhibit our
creative capabilities  along a vertical axis.  This  is to say, that
framework in which it is possible to make fundamental criti-
cisms of our present point of view and our whole notion of
preferences.  It seeks to close off the vertical search for new
ways of looking at the world, to radically change perspectives.
Said differently, while economics, conceived in terms of our
everyday habitus or, in other words, as an exercise of prudential
reason, permits us to permanently reconsider and re-evaluate
everything outside us, it tacitly makes itself into a pre-given law
that speaks from within us. We let it shape us from the depth of
ourselves, far below the radar  of our  attention.  Given these
circumstances, economics is logically consistent to answer the
question, ‘What is religion?’ by considering it to be no more
than just another object for maximizing our utility,  i.e.,  cal-
culating our advantage. However, I argue that, from the per-
spective  of  Zen,  there  is  yet  a  deeper  meaning  of  religion
waiting to be explored. 
Religion as a Critical Path of Transformation
So, what is religion from a Zen perspective? To begin with, Zen
surely denies that an answer to this question can possibly be
given within the framework of the economic approach:
To say that we need religion, for example, for the sake of social
order, or human welfare, or public morals is a mistake, or at least a
confusion of priorities.  Religion must not be considered from the
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viewpoint of utility, any more than life should. A religion concerned
primarily with its own utility bears witness to its own degeneration.
One can ask about the utility of things like eating for the natural life,
or of things like learning and the arts of culture. In fact, in such
matters the question of utility should be of constant concern. Our
ordinary mode of being is restricted to these levels of natural or
cultural life.  But it is  in breaking through that ordinary mode of
being and overturning it from the ground up … that religion becomes
something we need – a must for life (Nishitani 1983, 2, my em-
phasis).
While it will take me the rest of my paper to unpack the full
meaning of this passage, in this section I  want to draw our
attention to two distinguishable, yet interrelated facts: First, to
Zen Buddhism’s call for a fundamental transformation of our
everyday economic mentality; and, second, to its demand for a
critical  rethinking  of economics  as  a science. Taking  up the
former issue first,  we can say that, for Zen, religion cannot
become an object of our utility calculations. It is nonobjectifi-
able  (Nishida  1999,  245).  Neither  is  it  simply  a  subjective
mentality determining how we confront the world. For Zen, re-
ligion does  neither  lie  simply without nor  simply within us.
Rather, it is a transformative power, which by means of opening
up our own inner background transforms both our subjective
mentality and our objective grasp of the environment (Nishitani
2004b,  126).  Religion  operates  to  change  and  deepen  our
awareness. It occurs ‘when the mode of looking at and thinking
about everything  in terms of how it  relates  to us is broken
through, where the mode of our living that puts ourselves at the
center of everything is overturned’ (Nishitani 1983, 2-3).
For Zen, religion is an ‘essential conversion of our existence,
of ourselves’  (Nishitani  2004b,  126). It is a practice of self-
emptying that effects a transition from everyday consciousness
to satori (enlightenment); a transition that in turn requires prac-
tice  or  cultivation.  We are,  by  means  of  seated  meditation
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(zazen), walking meditation (kinhin), or a material art such as
aikido, karate, or kendo, to ‘still the ordinary mind in order to
access  what  lies  beneath  it,  … to  allow that  which  resides
beneath the chatter of ordinary consciousness to surface in the
quiet stillness of the moment’ (Carter 2001, 149). This emphas-
is on practice and cultivation often leads to the assumption that
Zen completely negates all  theoretical reflection. Proclaiming
that thinking in all its forms is nothing but a reality distorting
set of inferences, non-thinking in a negative sense is referred to
as both the goal and the means of spiritual enlightenment. In
contrast to this approach, the Kyto-School philosophers em-
phasize a different meaning of Zen practice: it does not mean
refraining from thinking but rather the radical transformation
of it. It is to still our ordinary mind by making our thoughts
clearer. We are to develop methodological procedures that open
up higher  viewpoints,  which  include  our  previously  limited
knowledge in much richer and broader contexts. Usually, we
think of the economy as a sum of things and events outside us.
It  seems to  have to  do only  with  markets,  institutions  and
goods. Thus we pay no attention to our own conscious medi-
ating operations, but exclusively to the contents that become
known through these operations. This holds true both in our
everyday  life  and economic  scientific  practice.  Zen,  on  the
contrary, relentlessly points us to the maxim that we should
know our own knowing. Thus, we gain mastery of those mediat-
ing operations by which common sense and scientific meanings
become known. We have to creatively ‘operate on the opera-
tions’,  so as to gain control  over,  and ultimately  break free
from, the conceptual systems that hold us captive. Using a Zen
expression, we have to turn the light to what is directly under-
foot (Nishitani 1983,  4). This cannot be achieved by simply
‘stripping off’ our daily modes of knowing by escaping into a
separate religious sphere – with its assumption that there is a
separate religious sphere. We are not to negate our own identities
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as  we  live  and act  in  modern  market  economies,  but  self-
consciously  appropriate those identities. In Japanese, the term
‘appropriation’  (jikaku)  literally  translates  as  ‘transformation
into  the self’  (Nishitani 1991,  102n).  Zen, according  to the
Kyto school, is the fundamental method of the self-reflective
thinker, the one who ceases to take for granted the seemingly
unproblematic  and questions  the  formerly  unquestioned.  As
such, it is not only a simple criticism of anything that we know
but  a  critical  self-discovery  of  the  conscious  operations  by
which we know (Krebs 1977, 4-17).
How do we ‘turn the light upon what is directly underfoot’ in
economics? I understand this as a becoming aware of the way
economics  shapes  the  various  objectifications  of  our  human
experience prior to our understanding of them as expressions of
our experience. This is to say that we can appropriate the ways
in which ‘science and scientific technique have permeated every
phase of man’s personal and social life’ (Krebs, 24). However,
our  project  cannot  begin  with  accepting  the  definition  and
method of economics as we find it being taught at university
courses around the world, which simply codifies a preconceived
idea of human activity that includes such signifiers as the ‘self’,
the ‘market’,  ‘self-advantage,’  etc. Rather,  we seek to funda-
mentally  transform its  methodology.  Usually  economics  ana-
lyzes human beings as predictable and calculable objects within
the framework of economic language and logic. From a Zen
perspective this approach is insufficient, insofar as it does not
pay attention to the observer nor to the methods he is applying.
What we need is to introduce another and more fundamental
level of  meaningfulness:  We are to gradually gain an under-
standing of how and why we use economic concepts by focusing
on a  methodological  critique of economics’  existing  ways  of
knowing, as well as the categories and concepts that are associ-
ated with them. 
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It becomes obvious here that, for Zen, religion cannot pos-
sibly be an object to be controlled within the framework of
rational preferences or utility maximization. It is, rather, a self-
conscious activity by which we challenge and transform all ways
of  knowing,  including  the economic one.  It  is  a process  by
which we learn how to transform not only the  what of our
knowledge but also the how of our knowing. Economists, as we
have seen above, claim to be able to encompass more and new
data by applying their methodological tools to ever new objects
of inquiry, taken from daily life,  or from various disciplines
(psychology, history, sociology, etc.). Here, the conceptual sys-
tem in which this extension of the economic model is justified
goes unquestioned. There is no room of critically investigating
or  transcending its fixed horizon because this  horizon never
becomes a proper focus of attention. For Zen, religion frees us
from this trap by showing us how to exercise our  creativity
along a vertical axis. It guides us to understand the relativity of
fixed and pre-given conceptual systems, to become aware of
their limitations and, eventually, to transcend those limitations.
Religion thus becomes understood as a dynamic force by which
we self-consciously select our existential stance and the corres-
ponding horizon, critically transcending the limitations of the
knowledge system that  formerly  held us  captive.  Moving us
beyond the boundaries of a given system of knowledge, it opens
up further horizons of possibilities so that gradually new ways
of knowing begin to be identified and defined. As such, religion
makes  possible  the  discovery  of  life  style  possibilities  and
variations  that  are  occluded  by  the  conceptual  systems
prescribed by economics. 
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Self-Knowledge in Zen and Economics
Zen demands that  the religious attitude  fundamentally  ques-
tions  the basic premises of economics, in order to become the
‘foundational base of science’ (Nishida 1999, 244). But how can
religion achieve this? By guiding us down the rigorous path of
attaining  self-knowledge in the light of Zen. As a Zen master
once remarked, Zen shares with many philosophical and reli-
gious traditions the goal of ‘knowing thyself’ (Kasulis 1981, 1).
However, it is not interested in any conceptual grasp of the self.
This is to say that Zen practice shifts our focus from asking
what the self is in any abstract manner to asking how we know
of ourselves, thus introducing an  existential dimension to our
questioning. This opens up a new mode of reflection within the
realm of economics. Since its origin as a scientific discipline in
the 18th century, economics has assumed that it can proceed
with models that reflect the ‘true nature’ of man. As its claims
began to determine our social space, its image of man surely
influenced what we have come to think about ourselves. How-
ever, economics has always been concerned solely with a con-
ceptual understanding of ‘economic man’. It invented various
God’s Eye frame of references in order to observe this theoret-
ical creature from a distant and presumably disinterested vant-
age point  (Brodbeck 2009).  As  economists  we are  implicitly
trained to present ourselves as outside spectators sitting in judg-
ment over other humans, so as to predict and advise on con-
trolling their behavior. Because we thus make ourselves into
‘nothing’, treating the whole world as a fixed totality of extern-
al objects only, we expect to find answers to the question of the
true nature of the self outside our own selves. For Zen, on the
contrary,  ‘the  self  is  never  some kind  of  substantial  object,
something over against us that we can find’ (Stambaugh 1999,
2). It is not something to be known, but the knowing activity
itself. And this knowing activity ‘takes place of itself before any
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conscious thought’ (Carter 1997, 107). The answer to the ques-
tion, ‘Who am I?’ thus cannot be found in some reified concept
outside ourselves, but only in the way we fundamentally are
(Abe 2004, 67). Abe illustrates this point by retelling a story of
the Lin-chi Lu. A very handsome young man looks into a mirror
every morning,  smiling  at  his  image. One morning,  he mis-
takenly looked at the wrong side of the mirror. Suddenly, he
found that his face was not reflected in the mirror any more. In
his surprise he believes his head to be lost.  After desperately
searching for his head, he comes to realize that his head had
always been with him. What he had searched for was the very
thing that had been doing the searching. Abe comments: 
The point of this story is that that which is sought is simply that
which is seeking … Our real head … is by no means something to be
sought for in front of us, but is something that always exists for each
of us here and now. Being at the center of one’s searching, it can
never be objectified (66).
To inquire into the nature of man ‘is simply the discovery of
something  within  the  self’  (Nishida  in:  Carter  2001,  166).
Strictly speaking, it is not a ‘something’ in the sense of an enti-
ty, but a process: the process of our own knowing. And because
this  process  always  takes  place prior  to  what  is  objectively
known, one of its parameters must remain unknown, which is
at  the  same  time  a  not-yet-known,  or  a  yet-to-be-explored.
Therefore, our quest for self-knowledge does not lead to the
discovery of something, but of no-thingness, mu: 
We call  this  thing  mu or ‘nothing’  because it  is  not  something
objective. It is called ‘nothing’ not because … our heads are missing,
but because our heads are now functioning as the living heads. As
such they are nonobjectifiable (Abe 2004, 66).
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When economists try to grasp human nature conceptually, they
are  overlooking  the  fact  that  a  basic  experience  –  Nishida
would call it pure experience – underlies their very act; accord-
ingly, they cannot encompass or represent pure experience by
scientific reasoning because it provides the already given back-
ground of such reasoning. They would fall, technically, into an
infinite regress. Reasoning cannot at the same time create an
object upon which it reasons and be that object; at no moment
can reasoning be wholly made known itself to itself (Nishida
2005,  188).  We can speak of  such experience as a field of
nothingness (jap. mu no basho), which ‘is the given-in-intuition
prior to the analysis and expression of objectification’ (Carter
1997, 32). 
One might, at this stage of our discussion, point out that this
insight of Zen does not add much new to the (Western) philo-
sophy of  science. However, once we take a closer  look,  we
encounter a great split between the East and the West – and
thus  between Zen and Economics  –,  in regard to  the  ‘true
nature’ of this field of nothingness (Carter 2001, 152). Gener-
ally speaking, both scientists and philosophers of the West have
so far maintained a foundationalist approach to this field. This
is to say that they think of it as an ‘unshakeable foundation’, a
substratum pre-given to all our understanding (von Mises 1949,
230). As an  a priori it is never to be made knowable. Lying
utterly ‘beyond’ us, we are to accept it as correctly representing
an independent and unchanging reality (Taylor 1995, chapt. 1).
Within economics, Ludwig von Mises has expressed this point
most clearly: 
The characteristic feature of a priori knowledge is that we cannot
think of the truth of its negation or of something that would be in
variance with it. What the a priori expresses is necessarily implied in
every proposition concerning the issue in question. It is implied in
all our thinking and acting. (…) The a priori categories are the men-
tal equipment by dint of which man is able to think and experience
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and  thus  acquire  knowledge.  Their  truth or  validity  cannot  be
proved or refuted as can those of a posteriori propositions, because
they are precisely the instrument that enables us to distinguish what
is true from what is not (von Mises 2006, 15).
Expressed differently, within economics we perceive of the field
of nothingness as  something, albeit something which we ulti-
mately cannot know. The meditative traditions of the East, and
with them Zen, consider such foundational approaches as prob-
lematic to say the least, for they contain no basis on which to
inquire into the ground or the possibility of the occurrence of
the a priori itself (Nishitani 2004b, 112). The latter is simply
accepted as unquestionable truth:
Present-day science does not feel the need to concern itself with the
limits of its own standpoint. … Science thus seems to regard its own
scientific  standpoint  as  a  position  of  unquestionable  truth  from
which it can assert itself in all directions. Hence the air of absolute-
ness that always accompanies scientific knowledge (Nishitani 1983,
78).
Again, I consider this not as a problem of science only, but also
of our common awareness. As long as we remain stuck in con-
ceptual reasoning, we do not allow ourselves to inquire into the
place out of which all its arguments arise. As a consequence of
this, our knowing activity becomes severely limited behind our
back, so to speak. We implicitly assume that ‘it is quite super-
erogatory to waste time upon controversies concerning the a
priori’ because ‘nobody denies or could deny that no human
reasoning and no human search for knowledge could dispense
with what these a priori concepts, categories and propositions
tell us’ (von Mises 2006, 16). Thus we overlook the fact that
there is something entirely unscientific lurking underfoot, some-
thing we ultimately only believe in. ‘The nihility lying beneath
the self is obscured’ (Stambaugh 1999, 102). 
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Over against this, Zen emphasizes that we must go back even
to the point before the world came to exist, plunging ourselves
headlong into the very midst of nothingness. Using another Zen
expression, we are to become a ‘single Great Doubt,’ in which
not only everything known but also the givenness of the a priori
of our own knowing is called into question (Stambaugh 1999,
102). In this process we question the grounds of the common,
the taken for granted, turning our attention to what, from our
present standpoint, we do not yet know. We are to confront
ourselves  with  the  uncomfortable  and unfamiliar  within us,
even if  we may have been  taught  to think  of this  as being
entirely unreasonable and unintelligible. 
Where ratio is pushed to its true extreme, the ‘irrational’ shows up.
Where meaning is pushed to the extreme, ‘meaninglessness’ shows
up. And yet what thus appears as paradox, irrationality, or meaning-
lessness, is truly absolute reality. It is the living vitality of ‘life’ itself.
To say here that life as such is meaningless is to say that life is truly
living itself. It is, in other words, a point where life transcends all
meaning, albeit a point where all meaning is able to be constituted as
‘meaning’ only in relationship to that point (Nishitani 1984, 180).
Science is right in proposing that we cannot know anything
about the foundations of our conceptual knowledge as long as
we remain trapped inside such knowledge. However, it goes
utterly wrong when believing that, having pointed to the limit
of our knowledge, we have finished with the topic of knowing.
Once we push our intellect against its own limitations, retracing
its steps and putting itself back to where it has not yet even start-
ed its work, a deeper form of awareness will bubble up (Suzuki
2004, 90). We will come to understand that what we formerly
accepted as the pre-given and inexplicable foundations of our
knowledge is in truth nothing but an incapability of thinking
otherwise. It is seen through as a limitation we unconsciously
created in shaping our self-concept in the past, but that we can
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modify or even abandon in the moment we truly become aware
of it. Thus, our self-knowledge turns from the created to the
creative. It moves through a trajectory taking it from a limited
perspective to a broader and more inclusive one and, as such,
traverses ever deeper realms of inner awareness. 
Religious Method as Conversion
So far, we have talked about becoming the great doubt in the
abstract. But how is the true self of ours to emerge, and what
effect will it have, in a society totally embedded in the rules and
assumptions of economics, as the modern world seems to be? In
this section I suggest a rudimentary for a method by which we
can fruitfully explore these questions. It is important to notice
that I employ the word ‘method’ here in a sense entirely differ-
ent  from its  common scientific  meaning.  The  latter  usually
names an orderly procedure that is established in order to carry
out certain tasks in a systematic, efficient way. It means follow-
ing a set of pre-given rules to solve a problem (Flanagan 1997,
262). For example, economic textbooks usually teach us how to
provide solutions by learning a specific set of rules (especially
mathematical ones)  without explaining why such rules  work.
‘Method’ in its religious sense, however, takes on an entirely
different meaning:
Method … refers not only to the operations required to carry out a
project and the orientation that normatively directs these operations,
but also to you the operator who performs the operations … The
method is intended to guide you toward an ever-expanding aware-
ness of your own knowing, choosing and loving and of how you
operate in and through these operations to achieve certain goals.
(Flanagan 1997, 262)3
3 Flanagan here refers to ‘method’ as being expounded by Bernard J.
F.  Lonergan.  See Lonergan’s  Method of Theology (1973) for more
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‘Method’ is an exercise in realizing what we truly are, as well as
what we could become as economic agents. As we will see, it is
not  to  reject  or  negate  any  particular  objectified  economic
expression about human beings, but to open them up, to deep-
en and enrich them. 
Let us start with taking a look at mainstream economics, that
is, positive and objective economics. In an important sense, this
field of economics is characterized by a strange disengagement
from our human nature. This is so because mainstream econom-
ics makes us look at things  only and, thus, look away from
ourselves. And ‘to look away from one’s self is always to see
things merely as objects, that is, as “external” things outside the
“internal” self’  (Nishitani  1960,  29). Our knowledge is con-
sidered to be purely objective and, as such, to deal with things
and relationships  between things  only.  We perceive the eco-
nomy as a second nature, existing in and for itself, completely
independent of our ways of knowing it. It is governed by ‘blind
and ineluctable forces  of  nature’  operating  independently  of
human will (Mirowski 1989, 220). Thus, we come to think of
our economic lives as being ‘governed according to strict laws,
like those of nature’ (Menger 1968, VIII). They appear to be
determined by  outer  forces utterly  beyond our  control.  We
could say that we are making ourselves, by the power of our
conceptual  grasp,  into  ‘nothing’.  Rather  than  thinking  of
ourselves as self-determining agents, we believe ourselves to be
subjected to an ‘invisible hand’, which externally imposes mech-
anical  patterns  of  behavior  upon us.  Borrowing a metaphor
from classical economics, we are moved not by ourselves but by
the will  of  a ‘Great Mechanic’,  that is by God. Adam Smith
expresses this by comparing ourselves to cogs in a machine:
detail. In fact, I consider Lonergan’s work to be a possible starting
point  for  comparative studies  between Buddhism and Christianity.
However, this topic would take us far astray from the themes of this
paper. 
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The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for
which it  was made,  the  pointing  of  the  hour.  All  their  various
motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this effect. If they
were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could
not do it better. Yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to
them, but to the watchmaker, and we know that they are put into
motion by a spring, which intends the effect it produces as little as
they do (Smith 2000, 126).
Even though it has abandoned the idea of God, the modern
objective economic worldview still considers us to be governed
by outside forces beyond our control, that is, by the pure mech-
anisms  of  the  market  (Brodbeck  2000).  As  Schumpeter
explains: ‘Mankind is not free to choose. ... Things economic
and social move by their own momentum and the ensuing situ-
ations compel individuals and groups to behave in certain ways’
(Schumpeter 1976, 129). What we can do, at best, is to make
such momentum work for us. Comparing the ‘law of value’ to
the  law of  gravity,  LÄon Walras,  an influential  19th century
French economist, suggests: 
Any value in exchange, once established, partakes of the character of
a natural phenomenon, natural in its origins, natural in its manifesta-
tions and natural in essence. (...) This does not mean that we have
no control over prices. Because gravity is a natural phenomenon and
obeys natural laws, it does not follow that all we can do is to watch
it operate. We can either resist it or give it free rein, whichever we
please, but we cannot change its essence or its laws. It is said we can-
not command nature except by obeying her. This also applies to
value (Walras 1969, 69). 
Within such worldview,  our  role  as  active  human beings  is
stripped away from us. If anything at all, we are no more than
‘atoms’ or ‘molecules of the social system’ (Samuelson 1972, 3).
From a Zen perspective, we are to treat such expressions seri-
ously without falling into the trap of taking them as being com-
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plete representations of ourselves. True, those expressions make
us aware of an important part of our modern self-perception –
that  is  of  our  impotence  and  powerlessness  as  we  feel
dominated by the anonymous powers of the market economy –
but in and for themselves they nevertheless prove to be utterly
inadequate. The question we have to face here is: Even if we
were to accept the objectivity of the laws of the economy, ‘on
what horizon are these laws encountered and on what dimen-
sion are they received?’ (Nishitani 1983, 79). Once we begin to
focus  on  this  question,  we  find  that  it  cannot  possibly  be
answered within an objective framework. The reason is this: we
cannot demand that objective knowledge turns itself inside out,
so that the knower becomes an object to be known itself, as this
would negate the very definition of objectivity, which is that the
knower has to remain disinterested in, and thus apart from, its
object. Often we conclude from this logical state of affairs that
it is utterly impossible to further inquire into the givenness of
the laws underlying our economic existence. It is not for our
human knowledge to grasp, says Adam Smith, that ‘which in
reality is the wisdom of God’ (Smith 2000, 126). Thus, we stop
our fundamental questioning before it has even started, claim-
ing, as mainstream economics does,  that  we simply ‘have to
research  the  law  of  social  cooperation  as  the  physicist
researches  the laws of mechanics’ – and nothing  more (von
Mises  1940,  2, my emphasis).  We insist  on building  all  our
knowledge upon this law while regarding all questions about its
own ‘truth’  as  ultimately  unanswerable.  Said differently,  we
simply  believe in it in the sense of a personal conviction. Pre-
cisely at this point Zen finds science ‘to be no longer scientific’
(Nishitani 2004b, 116). And rather than hastily turning away
from this finding, it wants us to directly look into this ‘abyssal’
and ‘bottomless’ dimension of science (Nishitani 2004b, 122).
We are to penetrate to the point where ‘the essence of science is
questioned on the same dimension as the essence of human
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existence,  and in which the fundamental  attitude  of  science
itself is taken up as an existential problem’ (Nishitani 2004b,
116). Expressed differently, we are to turn  inwardly so as to
open up a deeper field of awareness; a field in which we can
pose the question of  how and why we came to believe in the
objective worldview of economics in the first place; we have to
pay attention to our own subjective consciousness. One way to
do so is to carefully examine the various expressions and objec-
tifications of this consciousness as they have been formulated by
subjective economic theories as they have been developed, for
example, by the Austrian school of economics. As we will see,
this is far from the end of the matter, because in the light of
Zen we will find that we cannot possibly identify ourselves with
any of these objectifications and expressions. Rather, we are to
discover ourselves by transcending all categories that we use to
describe particular, objectified selves: 
It is not a transcendence aimed at a self that lies somewhere beyond
the boundaries  of the particular  self,  but a  ‘transcending in the
depths of the self’ to a more profound and adequate level that both
grounds the particular self and expresses itself in the particular self
(Wargo 2005, 180). 
Within economics, various categories have been constructed by
which we are supposed  to understand ourselves  in terms of
some form of economic common sense. Without being able to
go into them in any detail here4, I feel safe to suggest that they
can all be understood as certain objectifications of an individual
self, or ego. This is to say that once we accept them as appropri-
ate descriptions, we come to perceive ourselves as independent
and self-interested beings. We think of ourselves as being fully
autonomous, capable of sustaining ourselves without the help of
others (Nishitani 2004a, 17). While from an objective perspec-
4 I have done so in: Graupe 2007, 81-95.
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tive we sought the ‘ultimate foundation’ of our behavior outside
us in the market, here we find ourselves searching for it intern-
ally.  By  means  of  psychological  methods,  for  example,
economists expect us to find ‘that certain acts of consciousness
are performed with a feeling of necessity’. Every one of us  is
supposed to ‘hear the voice of the law clearly speaking within
him- or herself’ (Wieser 1929, 17, my emphasis). By means of
introspection, we shall find a fundamental anthropological con-
stant governing us from the depth of ourselves. For example,
economics have thought of this constant to persist in either the
working of our rational intellect or in our unalterable desires,
preferences and the insatiable greed for more; that is in our pas-
sions, which already Hume referred to as an ‘original existence’
(Hume 1888, 415). Thus we come to think of ourselves as stat-
ic substances, intellectual or emotive selves, which simply have
certain properties by default, none of which are the result of
any existential act (Wargo 2005, 159).
Economists  usually  emphasize  that  there  is  no  benefit  to
inquiring into the ultimate principle by which our individual
nature is controlled. Because they ‘govern us in all we do, in all
we say, in all we think (,) every effort we can make to throw off
our subjection, will  serve but to demonstrate and confirm it’
(Bentham 1970, chapt. I, sect. I). Ultimately, we can do nothing
but obey: 
The  laws  of  the  universe  about  which  physics,  biology  and
praxeology (i.e. subjective economics – SG) provide knowledge are
independent of the human will, they are  primary ontological facts
rigidly restricting man’s power to act. ... With regard to the laws of
the universe  any doubt of their suitableness is supererogatory and
vain. They are what they are and take care of themselves (von Mises
1949, 755-756, my emphasis).
Thus a part of our ego is turned into an ‘unshakeable founda-
tion’, which is to ground all we can know both about ourselves
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and the world exterior to us. While Zen would surely agree that
this expresses an important characteristic of our modern obses-
sion with individuality, it nevertheless sees through this obses-
sion itself as an abstraction, a truncated version of our true self.
This is because it fails to account for the real character of our
self-consciousness,  which  is  not  something  to  be  known  or
objectified but the one who is, as well, ‘doing the knowing’.
Zen wants us to truly know ourselves by further inquiring into
the ‘ultimate given’ within us. We are to search into the true
ground out of which all objectified self-knowledge arises, rather
than simply supposing such ground to exist. 
Once we really give ourselves to this task, we might find that
we are incapable of expressing this ground under the sign of the
individualistic methodology. We cannot grasp at any substratum
upon which we could securely ground our ego. At least this is
the lesson the history of economic thought could teach us if we
read it critically. That history is replete with economists who
have tried to pinpoint an ultimate reality within our individual
consciousness as the ground of all certainty. However, invari-
ably, another economist would query this, showing that doubt-
ing at this ontological level was indeed possible. In this sequence
of assertion and falsification, the trend was for one economist
or a school to insist on some vital, defining feature of the self,
and its successor to show that the account was insufficient and
incomplete in as much as it could not account for all we can,
and in fact  do know about ourselves.  Even when taking  all
efforts of economics together, there is still no final answer to
our fundamental quest, ‘What on earth is this man who is him-
self,  among  other  abilities,  endowed  with  the  capability  to
inquire in so scientific a way into the mechanisms of nature, the
mechanisms of society, and human consciousness? To this ques-
tion, the sciences  are unable to provide an answer’ (Nishitani
2004b, 132).
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Despite  of  this  inability,  subjective economics  nevertheless
insists on the existence of an ultimate law in our depth, tacitly
controlling our experience beyond our control (Friedman 1953,
40). It seems as if 
our consciousness works unconsciously and cannot give an account
of why the facts arise in it and disappear again; there exists some-
thing below the barrier of our consciousness, on which it depends,
but that we do not rule and that appears as extrinsic and foreign to
us as does physical nature (Wieser 1929, 18).
What  becomes  visible  here  is  the  reductionist  tendency  to
explain man solely in terms of a material process of the world. 
A confusion has arisen and still prevails today, in virtue of which
those sciences all too often mistake man himself for a mechanism.
These sciences in turn have led man to make the same mistake about
himself, and in this way have played a role in dissolving the substan-
tial form of “man”, in annihilating the essence of man (Nishitani
2004b, 132).
This annihilation might, of course, give us a surprise. Hasn’t
our culture taught us that we are autonomous and independent
human beings?  However,  once  we  truly  penetrate  into  the
depth of the self, we necessarily must come to terms with what
Zen calls the Great Doubt, and what the school of  Kyto has
proposed  as  the  central  pattern  of  religious  thought:  the
thought that the self, in its very essence, is empty. We doubt,
here, not only the existence of some ultimate law governing our
economic lives from without (in which we follow the path of
certain unorthodox economists before), but also that such law
could possibly rule us from within (which, beyond the purview
of most economists,  translates us into the realm of religion).
This is because we simply cannot point to any substance upon
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which it can be grounded – neither in our intellect, nor in our
emotions, nor in our will. 
In nihility  both things and the subject  return to their  respective
essential modes of being, to their very own home-ground where they
are what they originally are. But at the same time, their ‘existence’
itself then turns into a single great question mark. It becomes some-
thing of which we know neither whence it comes nor whither it
goes, something essentially incomprehensible und unnameable. Each
and every thing, no matter how well acquainted the self may be with
it, remains at bottom, in its essential mode of being, an unknown.
Even should the self itself, as subject, seek to return to its home-
ground, to its very existence as such, it becomes something nameless
and hard to pin down. This is what I meant when, speaking of the
Great Doubt, I said that the self becomes a realization of doubt
(Nishitani 1983, 111).
Of course, in our daily life we hastily attempt to turn away
from such fundamental doubt. Also, the mainstream of econom-
ics has refrained from further inquiry into this, which seems to
stand outside the boundaries of the paradigm both of prefer-
ences and of mechanical models. In both cases, we simply keep
on believing that ‘the I is the unity of the acting person. It is giv-
en  without  question  and  cannot  be  dissolved  through  any
thought’ (von Mises 1940, 34). We insist that our quest for self-
knowledge must conclude on the subjective levels (White 1984,
chapt. 6). 
For Zen, however, the Great Doubt is not the end but the
starting point for discovering our true self, that is the ‘non-ego’
or ‘formless self’. Yet, we have to carefully note what Zen wants
us to detect here. Many intellectual traditions have blamed eco-
nomics for giving us a false account of human nature. Thus they
have attempted to find new and better explanations that could
be substituted for ‘economic man’. In contrast to this, Zen does
not  propose  some account of human nature with which we
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could replace homo oeconomicus; but instead, Zen proposes the
project of  penetrating into its very depth. We are to plunge
ourselves  headlong into  the Great  Doubt,  so  as  to self-con-
sciously become economic man and existentially converse with
it: 
The non-man-centered nature of Buddhism … do(es) not imply, as is
often mistakenly suggested, any denial of the significance of indi-
vidualized human existence. In fact,  it is precisely the other way
round: the very act of transcending man-centeredness  is  possible
only to a human being who is fully self-conscious (Abe 2004, 150).
Metaphorically speaking, to encounter the Great Doubt is like
‘the brandishing of a religious sword of death and a demand to
annihilate one’s self’ (Nishitani 2004b, 120). While this might
sound utterly nihilistic and pessimistic, actually the reverse is
the case: ‘the sword that kills is here at the same time a sword
that gives life’ (Nishitani 2004b, 120). This is to say that our
quest, which takes shape immanent to economic man, is what
allows us to suddenly break through the limitations of the self
assumptions  under  which  our  awareness  formerly  operated.
From below or beneath our individual ego there will  arise a
deeper form of reality, ‘wherein the self is in itself at the point
that it has stepped over itself’  (Nishitani 1983, 68). We will
‘drop’ our ego so that it gives way to a ‘self-expressive, creative
subject’;  a  subject  that  ‘knows itself’  clearly  and distinctly”’
(Hisamatsu in: Stambaugh 1999, 156). 
Outlook 
Let me, at this point of our discussion, suggest that for Zen to
develop into a true stronghold of free thinking in our time, it
will have to put itself to the task of bearing yet clearer witness
to that ‘deeper reality’ we just encountered. We are in ‘need for
a more elemental mode of reflection’ (Nishitani 1983, 69). Cer-
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tainly, this need confronts us with a demanding task. Herewith,
I propose a preliminary sketch of a path forward along which
Zen might guide us in what seems like the most secular region
of the life world: that dealing with production and commerce. I
will limit myself to making four points. 
Firstly, we should, in the light of Zen, inquire more deeply
into the economic meaning of the ‘unconscious’.  As we have
seen, economists have thought of the unconscious as something
extrinsic and foreign to us. It is ‘seen as “other” - alien, un-
knowable, even threatening’ (Stambaugh 1999, 96). In contrast
to this, Zen agrees with some innovative schools of psychology
and psychiatry that ‘there is not such thing as The Unconscious;
there are quite simply facets of awareness that go  unnoticed.
These  facets  are  not  hidden  in  some  receptacle  that  is  in
principle  unavailable to  us.  If  we can defocus  our  selective
attention, they are available’ (Stambaugh 1999, 93). Thus, Zen
does not treat the unconscious as a problem beyond our under-
standing, but as a provisional parameter of the awareness we
bring to bear on our egotistic consciousness. Being provisional,
it can be overcome by further deepening and broadening our
awareness. 
Secondly,  in  order  for  such  deepening  or  broadening  to
occur, we should carefully note that some economists have fur-
ther inquired into the true a priori of our individual conscious-
ness, despite their insistence on human beings’ general incapab-
ility of doing so. Although their position has generally led to a
retreat from this area of focus, we can use their work to find in
the unconscious both an a posteriori ‘personal unconscious’ and
an  a priori ‘impersonal conscious’.  The true  a priori for eco-
nomics does not seem to lie within each of us individually but
within a ‘collective unconscious’. The ‘voice of the law’ that we
think of as clearly speaking from within ourselves tacitly arises
out of a field of common experience. It speaks to everyone in
the same voice. Beyond both our objective grasp of the world
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and the subjective grasp of ourselves lies ‘the fund of experi-
ences that are the common possession of all who practice eco-
nomy. There are experiences that every theorist finds within
himself without having to resort to special scientific procedures’
(Wieser in: von Mises 2006, 78). The expressions by which we
have to come to think of ourselves and the world around us are
what they are, ‘because they are the terms in which others think
and the terms in which all of us act. This correspondence is
grasped intuitively or introspectively’ (von Mises 2006, chapt.
1.7). Expressed differently, we are always in ordinary, everyday
experience,  commonly  living  and acting  together  in modern
market societies,  prior to our minds beginning their dissecting
business. Only out of our living experiences  within the socio-
cultural context of market economies do we continually form
our  truncated  and  abstract  understandings  about these  ex-
periences. Metaphorically speaking we could say: 
Just as a fist can only form out of the neutral basis of an open hand,
the grasping of ego can only assert itself out of non-ego, out of non-
grasping  awareness.  Without  this  neutral  nongrasping ground to
arise from and return to, ego’s activity could not occur. This neutral
ground is what is known in Buddhism as egolessness, open nondual
awareness,  the  ground against  which the  figure of ego’s grasping
stands out (Welwood and Wilber in: Stambaugh 1999, 93).
Thirdly, Zen will have to find ways of expressing the ‘true real-
ity’ of such nongrasping awareness without assuming it to be a
substratum in and for itself. This, at least, is the trap in which,
apparently,  many  scientists  have  fallen,  who have  explicitly
thought that this world lies entirely ‘beyond’ our egos (Graupe
2006,  78-99).  Thus,  evolutionary economists  such as  Hayek
have  considered  our  individuality  as  being  unconsciously
shaped against the background of given market institutions. We
appear to be dominated by unconscious action and blind adher-
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ence to the social institutions of competitive markets that work
from deeply within us. There is, says Hayek,
the necessity (…) of the individual submitting itself to the anonym-
ous and seemingly irrational forces of society – a submission which
must include not only the acceptance of rules of behavior as valid
without examining what depends in the particular instance on their
being observed but also a readiness to adjust himself to changes
which may profoundly affect his fortunes and opportunities and the
causes of  which may be altogether unintelligible  to him (Hayek
1980, 24, my emphasis).
Insofar as Zen philosophers speak about ‘the surrender of intel-
lect to something greater and stronger than the self’ (Abe 2004,
94), we have to be careful not to misunderstand them to be
talking about conformism, however it is presented. This is to
say that we are to point  out  that  Zen ultimately  rejects the
whole idea of a substance, of an unchanging substratum under-
lying all our experience. For the Kyto School philosophers, an
account of the ‘world of history’ such as Hayek’s is nothing
more but a denial ‘of our personal Self, from the depth of our-
selves’. It penetrates us demonically and deceives us under the
mask of truth (Nishida 1958, 223). This is because it does not
allow for any ‘formation’ or ‘creation’. There is no movement
‘from the formed toward the forming’ (176). 
In order to make this point at least somewhat clearer, let me,
fourthly and finally, refer to what I consider the most funda-
mental difference in the methodological procedures of Zen and
economics. Explicitly or implicitly, economics so far has taken
it to be entirely impossible ‘to think of change without implying
the concept of  substratum that, while it  changes,  remains in
some regard and sense constant in the succession of various
states’. And it has concluded from this that for our theory of
human knowledge ‘there is certainly something that it cannot
help considering as permanent’ (von Mises 2006, 1). Thus, it
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makes us, both in theory and practice, to think of ourselves as
being ultimately controlled by some forces over which we do
not have power in turn. Because what lies underfoot appears as
already created by the past, we conceive of the present as if it
were already been decided upon. It is precisely this standpoint
that Zen wants us to existentially controvert in  all its facets.
‘Dare we conceive of a mode of being that is neither subjective
nor substantial? However difficult it may be to think in such
terms,  we  must’  (Nishitani  1983,  112).  Once  we  stop  to
conceptually think of the world upon the basis of something
given, we are free to act within it so as to become creative parts
of  the creative,  self-determining  world  (Nishida  1958,  230).
The  emptiness Zen  talks  about  is,  in  a  final account,  not
something to look at. We are to plunge ourselves right into it.
We are to change from observers to movers, from victims to
creators,  so as  to become both  creatus and  creatans (Carter
2001, 46). 
Instead of staying in the world and looking back at its beginning, we
must leap back at once and spot where atman stood when the world
had not yet been created. That is, we must go back even to the point
the world came to exist, and plunge ourselves into the very midst of
nothingness (Suzuki 2004, 86).
Zen does not stop short at the point of view that our lives have
been determined by the historical formation of market institu-
tions once and for all. The true  formless self of Zen ‘realizes
itself in wondrous, free activity, but does not remain confined
to history. It is free to go in and out of history, now actualising
itself,  now  retreating  to  the  root-source’  (Stambaugh 1999,
142). Our selves are determined, this is true, but it is ourselves,
together with all sentient beings, who are doing the determin-
ing. Thus we find the foundationalist approach of economics, in
all its variations, to be in error as such. This approach is, in a
final account, nothing but an illusion, a truncated abstraction of
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the nonobjectifiable and dynamic world we continually create
while we are created by it. However, from a Zen perspective we
will not be able to ‘convert’ other people to this point of view,
nor  can  we  argue  them into  changing  their  foundationalist
assumptions. We can only invite them to join us in our quest for
self-knowledge. 
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RATIONAL ARGUMENTATION IN EARLY BUDDHISM
Guang Xing
Abstract
In this article I will put forward several arguments to show that
Buddhism,  and  especially  Early  Buddhism,  has  a  rational
approach as its basis. My arguments will be backed up by rele-
vant passages from the Pli scriptures, citing the Buddha’s words.
In particular I will argue that the teachings of Early Buddhism
are founded on the Buddha’s  own experience,  and that  the
Buddha  is  a  teacher  who has  directly  known  and seen  the
Dhamma [Sanskrit:  Dharma]  himself.  It  is  recommended  to
investigate a teacher personally before placing one’s trust and
confidence in him. In general, one should find out the truth
oneself  and then unravel  what  is  false and what  is  true,  as
knowledge is better than faith. 
Faith is only considered useful in the first step, but the aim is to
raise wisdom in order to dispel ignorance, the root cause of suf-
fering. There is even an utterly rational approach to concepts
like nirva or karma [Pli: nibbna, kamma].
Introduction
Buddhism is considered to be rational for various reasons, for
example  by  some  early  scholars  such  as  Vidhushekhara
Bhattacharya and Nathmal Tatia because the Buddha based his
teaching on strong grounds of reason and by other  scholars
such as Louis de La VallÄe-Poussin because it was non-mystical,
while still  others consider Buddhism to be rational since it is
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non-metaphysical.1 In fact, Buddhism, particularly Early Bud-
dhism, is rational indeed because its teachings are entirely based
on the Buddha’s enlightenment, or, in other words, on his own
experience, but neither on revelation nor on the teacher’s omni-
science. Therefore, Early Buddhism is both non-mystical and
non-metaphysical and even the concept of nirva is explained
as the cessation of suffering, nothing beyond that. Reason is
considered to be useful only for organizing knowledge but not
as a means of obtaining knowledge. This is clearly stated in the
Sangrava  Sutta of  the  Majjhima  Nikya.  When a  Brahmin
student asked the Buddha what kind of teacher he was, he said:
1) There are some recluses and brahmins who are traditionalists,
who on the basis of oral tradition claim [to teach] the fundamentals
of the holy life after having reached the consummation and perfec-
tion of direct knowledge here and now; such are the brahmins of the
Three Vedas. 2) There are some recluses and brahmins who, entirely
on the basis of mere faith, claim [to teach] the fundamentals of the
holy life after having reached the consummation and perfection of
direct knowledge; such are the reasoners and investigators. 3) There
are some recluses and Brahmins who, having directly known the
Dhamma for themselves among things not heard before, claim [to
teach] the fundamentals of the holy life after having reached the
consummation and perfection of direct knowledge.2
1 See Jayatilleke 2004, 402 with fn.  1, where Jayatilleke refers to
authors and sources as follows: Louis de La VallÄe Poussin, The Way
to Nirvana: Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism as a Discipline of Salva-
tion.  London:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1917,  30  ff.;  Vidhu-
shekhara Bhattacharya, The Basic Conception of Buddhism. Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, 1934, 9 ff.; Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan,  Indian
Philosophy,  London:  George Allen & Unwin,  1941,  Vol.  1,  359;
Arthur Berriedale  Keith,  Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 14; Nathmal Tatia,  Studies in Jaina
Philosophy. Varanasi: P.V. Research Institute, 1951, 7; J.G. Jennings
(ed., trans.),  The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha: A Collection of
Historical Texts. London: Oxford University Press, 1947, xxiv.
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After having said this, the Buddha told the Brahmin student that
he was a teacher of the third group. In other words, the Buddha
is a teacher who has directly known, seen and experienced the
Dhamma himself  and so distinguishes himself from the other
two groups of teachers. The first group of teachers were the tra-
ditionalists  who based their  teachings  on revelation,  so they
relied on faith in the Supreme Being for knowledge, while the
second group of teachers were the reasoners and investigators
who based their  teachings on logic and inference for know-
ledge.
Although reasoning and logic or inference are also used in
Early Buddhism, they are used for organizing knowledge and
presenting  ideas,  but  not  as  a means of gaining  knowledge.
Therefore the well-known Klma Sutta lists ten ways of know-
ing as unsatisfactory which include these two ways. They are as
follows:
So in this case, Klmas, 1) don't go by reports, 2) by hearsay, 3) by
traditions, 4) by scripture (the authority of religious texts), 5) by
logical conjecture, 6) by inference, 7) by considering reasons, 8) by
agreement through pondering views, 9) by probability, or 10) by the
thought, ‘This contemplative is our teacher.’3
These  means  of  knowing  are  not  considered  to  be  totally
wrong, but unsatisfactory because they may lead one to truth as
well as to falseness.
So in this chapter we will discuss rational thinking in Early
Buddhism by relying on the Pli Nikyas and the Chinese ga-
2 amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 820 (= MN 100, PTS II 211). The
numbers have been added by me.
3 AN 3.65 [Thai: 3.66], PTS I 188. The rendering is based on Thanis-
saro  Bhikkhu’s translation  of  the  Klma Sutta (Thanissaro
1994/2010) with changes referring to translations of the sutta from
Woodward (trans.) 2000, 171; Rahula 1974, 2-3 and Soma Thera’s
web version (Soma 1994/2010).
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mas, which are generally considered by scholars to be the earli-
est  Buddhist  literature.  Also  the  term  ‘Early  Buddhism’  is
applied here in the sense as reflected by Buddhism in these early
scriptures. So I will make use of these materials as my primary
sources of information for investigation although I may occa-
sionally use other sources but only as supporting evidence. 
The Role of Faith in Early Buddhism 
Although Buddhism also speaks of faith, faith only plays a sub-
ordinate role and wisdom is the sole object to obtain in order to
dispel ignorance, the ultimate cause for suffering. Therefore,
faith is neither mentioned in the fundamental teachings of Bud-
dhism such as the noble eightfold path, nor in the threefold
path: precept, concentration and wisdom, and not even among
the seven factors of enlightenment:  mindfulness,  investigation,
energy, joy or rapture, relaxation or tranquillity, concentration,
equanimity. Instead, investigation is there. Accordingly, in or-
der to dispel ignorance one has to understand, and in order to
understand  one  has  to  investigate.  This  is  why  Buddhism
encourages  free  thinking  which  is  the  spirit  of  the  Klma
Sutta. So Jayatilleke says that faith is only considered a first step
towards understanding the Buddha’s teaching.4 Faith in Early
Buddhism means rational  faith because it  is  established  only
after an investigation of the teacher to follow, since pure faith
may lead to truth but it may equally lead to falseness. In the
Cank Sutta of the  Majjhima Nikya,  the Buddha states  this
clearly: 
There are five things (…) that may turn out in two different ways
here and now. What five? Faith, approval, oral tradition, reasoned
cognition, and reflective acceptance of a view. These five things may
4 Jayatilleke 2004, 396. The Bhaddli Sutta of the Majjhima Nikya
(MN 65, PTS I 444) states this clearly.
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turn out in two different ways here and now. Now, something may
be fully accepted out of faith, yet it may be empty, hollow, and false;
but something else may not be fully accepted out of faith, it may be
factual, true, and unmistaken.5
As such, Early Buddhism encourages people to investigate the
Buddha so that ultimate faith is placed in him. The Vmasaka
Sutta of the Majjhima Nikya states that a disciple should inves-
tigate the Buddha in order to gain confidence in him,6 which he
should do through his own eyes and ears in the following ways:
whether the Buddha (1) has defiled states, or (2) mixed states,
or (3) wholesome states of mind cognized by the eyes and ears;
if he has acquired the wholesome states of mind, whether he
has acquired it (4) for a long time or for a short and temporary
period, or (5) for fame and profit, or (6) whether he is restrained
by or without fear. So this is a sixfold step recommended by the
Buddha to investigate the teacher in whom you will place your
trust and confidence. The Sutta does not stop here, but asks the
disciple to investigate further whether these are just reports or
seen  and  heard  by  a  disciple  himself  personally  from  the
Buddha. It is only after such a thorough investigation and after
the disciple has seen and heard it through direct knowledge that
the disciple places confidence in the Teacher. So such a kind of
faith, supported by reason and rooted in vision,  is firm and
called rational faith. When the Brahmin householders of Sl
village came to see the Buddha, the latter just enquired whether
they had found a teacher agreeable to them in whom they had
acquired faith supported by reasons.7 So this is true not only for
monks but for lay people as well. 
This kind of rational attitude of mind is also discussed in the
Brahmajla Sutta when the Buddha advises his disciples that
they should neither be angry and upset nor jubilant and joyful
5amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 780 (= MN 95, PTS II 170).
6MN 47, PTS I 317-320; amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 415-418.
7MN 60: Apaaka Sutta, PTS I 401.
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when others either criticize or praise the Buddha, the Dhamma
or the Sagha respectively. But they should investigate and find
out the truth and then unravel what is false and what is true.
The Buddha said: ‘For if you were to become angry or upset in
such a situation, you would only be creating an obstacle for
yourselves. If you were to become angry or upset when others
speak in dispraise of us, would you be able to recognize wheth-
er their statements are rightly or wrongly spoken?’8 So a ration-
al attitude of mind is healthy for the development of oneself
and others. 
Buddhism encourages rational faith supported by reason and
rooted in vision because faith sometimes may lead to affection,
attachment and even to hatred. Therefore Vakkali, who had a
strong faith as reported in the Aguttara Nikya,9 expressed his
wish to see the Buddha in person when he was in terminal ill-
ness.  On this  occasion  the  Buddha  uttered  the  well-known
statement: ‘Enough, Vakkali, why do you want to see this foul
body? One who sees the Dhamma sees me; one who sees me
sees the Dhamma. For in seeing the Dhamma, Vakkali, one sees
me; and in seeing me, one sees the Dhamma.’10 The Dhamma
here implies the teaching, the truth, the reality of phenomena.
So in the Aguttara Nikya it is said that there are five draw-
backs when one has an attachment to another  person,11 and
eventually even hatred may arise out of affection for a person.12
Therefore, although starting with faith, one has to transcend
faith and see truth by oneself because, as discussed above, faith
may turn out to be true or false. It is only when one sees it with
one’s own eyes and knows it personally that one can find out
what truth is. 
8 Bodhi (trans.) 2007, 55-56 (= DN 1, PTS I 2-3).
9 In the Etadaggavagga of the Aguttara Nikya (AN 1.24, PTS I 24),
Vakkali is said to be the highest of those who had faith.
10 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 939 (= SN 22.87: Vakkali Sutta, PTS III 120).
11 AN 5.250, PTS III 270.
12 AN 4.200, PTS II 213.
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Buddhism always stresses that knowledge is better than faith.
The  Nigaha Ntaputta Sutta of the  Sayutta Nikya states
this  explicitly.  Here  I  just  reproduce  the  dialogues  between
Nigaha Ntaputta and Citta, the Buddha’s lay disciple accord-
ing to Jayatilleke who has beautifully summarized it.13
Nigaha Ntaputta: Do you believe in the statement of the recluse
Gotama that there is a jhnic state in which there is no discursive
or reflective thought and there is a cessation of discursive thought
and reflection? 
Citta: I do not accept this as a belief. 
Nigaha Ntaputta: See what an honest, straightforward and up-
right person the householder Citta is ….
Citta: What do you think? Which is better – knowledge or belief? 
Nigaha Ntaputta: Surely, knowledge is better than belief. 
Citta: (I can attain up to the fourth jhna) … … Knowing and seeing
thus,  why should I accept this on the grounds of faith in any
recluse or Brahmin, that there is a trance in which there is no dis-
cursive or reflective thought … .
So what is emphasized here is knowing and seeing, not believ-
ing. Rahula puts it aptly: ‘The expressions used everywhere in
Buddhist texts referring to persons who realized truth are: “The
dustless and stainless eye of truth (…) has arisen.” “He has seen
truth, has attained truth, has known truth, has penetrated into
truth, has crossed over doubt, is without wavering.” “Thus with
right wisdom he sees it as it is (…).” With reference to his own
enlightenment the Buddha said: “The eye was born, knowledge
was born, wisdom was born, science was born, light was born.”
It is always seeing through knowledge or wisdom (…), and not
believing through faith.’14
13 Jayatilleke 2004, 398 (cf. SN 41.8, PTS IV 297-300). 
14 Rahula 1974, 9.
190 Guang Xing
The Omniscience of the Buddha
Many people  misunderstand the  Buddhist  concept  of  omni-
science thinking that the Buddha must claim to know every-
thing in the physical world. The ascetic Vacchagotta approaches
the  Buddha  and enquires  about  precisely  the  scope  of  the
Buddha’s knowledge as reported in the Tevijjavacchagotta Sutta
of the Majjhima Nikya.
Venerable sir, I have heard this: ‘The recluse Gotama claims to be
omniscient [sabbau] and all-seeing [sabbadassv], to have com-
plete knowledge and vision thus: “Whether I am walking or stand-
ing or sleeping or awake, knowledge and vision are continuously
and uninterruptedly present to me.”’ Venerable sir, do those who
speak thus say what has been said by the Blessed One, and not mis-
represent him with what is contrary to fact?15
Then the Buddha categorically  says:  ‘Vaccha, those who say
thus do not say what has been said by me, but misrepresent me
with what is untrue and contrary to fact.’16 A similar claim is
also found in the Kaakatthala Sutta of the Majjhima Nikya,
where the Buddha says: ‘There is no recluse or brahmin who
knows all, who sees all,  simultaneously; that is not possible’,
when King Pasenadi enquires about him.17 This statement also
includes the Buddha himself.  So here it is quite clear that the
15 amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 587 (=  MN 71,  PTS I 482). It
seems that this kind of omniscience was claimed by other ascetic teach-
ers  of  the  Buddha’s  time  such  as  the  leader  of  the  Jainas.  The
Cadukkhakkhandha  Sutta of  the  Majjhima  Nikya reports  that
Nigaha Ntaputta claimed omniscience and all-seeing and complete
knowledge thus: ‘Whether  I am walking  or  standing or  asleep or
awake, knowledge and vision are continuously and uninterruptedly
present in me.’ (trans. amoli / Bodhi 1995, 187-188 = MN 14,
PTS I 92-93).
16 amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 587-588. (= MN 71, PTS I 482).
17amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 735 (= MN 90, PTS II 127).
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Buddha has never claimed to have such kind of omniscience
regarding the physical world.
The Buddhist term for omniscience is know-all (sabbau),
which means that the Buddha knows all  about the world of
experience. The Buddha in fact never claims to know the phys-
ical world in its entirety. According to the Kakrma Sutta of
the Aguttara Nikya, the Buddha says:
Monks, whatever in the world with its gods, Mras and Brahmas,
among the progeny consisting of recluses and Brahmins, gods and
men – whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought
after and pondered over by the mind – all that do I know. Monks,
whatever in the world … … by the mind – that I have fully under-
stood; all that is known to the Tathgata, but the Tathgata has not
taken his stand upon it.18
The same passage with the same idea is also found in the Loka
Sutta of the Aguttara Nikya and the Itivuttaka and also in the
Chinese translation of the Madhyama gama.19 So what is ‘all’
in the word ‘knowing-all’? The  Sabba Sutta of the Sayutta
Nikya informs us that ‘The eye and forms, the ear and sounds,
the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile
objects and the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the
all’.20 The Buddha declares that ‘without directly knowing and
fully  understanding  the  all,  without  developing  dispassion
towards it and abandoning it,  one is incapable of destroying
suffering’.21 A detailed description of it is found in the Paham-
parijnana Sutta of the Sayutta Nikya as follows:
18Nanananda (trans.) 1997, 8 (= AN 4.24, PTS II 25).
19 AN 4.23, PTS II 23; It 112; CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 645, b9-c13.
20 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1140 (= SN 35.23, PTS IV 15). 
21 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1141 (= SN 35.26, PTS IV 17).
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Without directly knowing and fully understanding the eye, without
developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable
of destroying suffering.
Without directly knowing and fully understanding forms … eye-
consciousness … eye-contact … and whatever feeling arises with
eye-contact as condition … without developing dispassion towards it
and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering.
Without directly knowing and fully understanding the ear … the
mind … and whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition
… without developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one
is incapable of destroying suffering.
This, bhikkhus, is the all without directly knowing and fully understand-
ing which … one is incapable of destroying suffering.22
So it is clear that the Buddha declares that he knows all about
our  world of  experience  and that  without  knowing this  he
would not be released from suffering. Hence, knowing-all and
seeing-all mean that the Buddha has known and seen into the
real nature of experience and phenomena, and it is because of
this that the Buddha is called the Tathgata. So the Loka Sutta
says, ‘From the night he fully awakened, monks, until the night
he attains final Nibbna, in this interval, whatever he speaks,
talks of, and expounds, all that is just so, not otherwise; there-
fore is he called Tathgata.’23
Here we can see that what the Buddha claims to know thor-
oughly is the world of experience which we ordinary people
attach to and desire for. So it is nothing irrational.
The Concept of nirvÄÅa
Some people misunderstand the Buddhist  concept of  nirva
and interpret  it  as  some kind of  transcendental  experience,
while others interpret it as a kind of annihilation. As for the lat-
22 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1141-1142 (= SN 35.26, PTS IV 17).
23 Bodhi (trans.) 2005, 421 (= AN 4.23, PTS II 23).
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ter, the Buddha himself already rejected it as misrepresenting
him. The  Alagaddpama Sutta of the  Majjhima Nikya states
clearly that the Buddha says:
As I am not, as I do not proclaim, so I have been baselessly vainly,
falsely, and wrongly misrepresented by some recluses and Brahmins
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is one who leads astray; he teaches the
annihilation,  the  destruction,  the  extermination,  of  an  existing
being.’ Bhikkhus, both formerly and now what I teach is suffering
and the cessation of suffering.24
Thus the charge of annihilation is not appropriate. Just as Pro-
fessor Karunadasa says, ‘What is extinguished, what is annihil-
ated when Nibbna is won is suffering. It is not the extinction
of life, nor the annihilation of the individual. Nor is it the an-
nihilation of an independently existing self-entity, for Buddhism
does not recognize such an entity either to be annihilated or
perpetuated in eternity. What is brought to an end is not a self-
entity but the false belief in such an entity, i.e., the ego illusion
and all that it entails and implies.’25
So here it is clear that the Buddha himself rejected the accusa-
tion  of his  preaching  a doctrine of annihilation.  Then what
about the transcendental interpretation of the concept of  nir-
va? Professor Karunadasa has written an excellence paper on
this issue: ‘Nibbanic Experience: A Non-Transcendental Inter-
pretation’.26 I will summarise his argument as follows: 
24 amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 234 (= MN 22, PTS I 140). Its
counterpart is  found in  the Chinese translation of the  Madhyama
gama, Stra No. 200 and the Ekottara gama, Stra No. 43.5. The
well-known statement is also found in the Sayutta Nikya 22.86 (=
PTS III 119; trans. Bodhi 2000, 938). This idea is also found in other
places in the canon such as the Sayutta Nikya 12.15 (= PTS II 17;
trans. Bodhi 2000, 544).
25 Karunadasa 1994, 55.
26 Karunadasa 1994.
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In  the  Buddhist  scriptures,  the  nibbanic  experience  is  de-
scribed as accompanied by a higher knowledge, or the realiza-
tion of Nibbna is itself  defined as the attainment of know-
ledge. This knowledge in Nibbanic experience is described by a
number of terms:  pa (wisdom),  pari (accurate or exact
knowledge),  a (gnosis),  abhi (higher  knowledge)  and
vipassan (insight).27 ‘Is it the knowledge of metaphysical reality
or is it a true vision into the nature of the phenomenal reality?’
Professor  Karunadasa  says,  ‘The  answer  to  this  question  is
provided by the definition of knowledge as yathbhta-a,28
i.e. knowledge of things as they truly are.’29 This is referred to
in section three above as the all, which is the phenomena, the
totality of our experience.
Some people may argue that the concept of  nirva is des-
cribed in the canonical passages as transcending the world; so
they  come to  the  conclusion  that  nirva  is  transcendental.
Here we must understand the Buddhist concept of world to be
transcended. The Lokantagamana Sutta of the Sayutta Nik-
ya says, ‘That in the world by which one is the perceiver of the
world, a conceiver of the world – this is called the world in the
Noble One’s  discipline.’30 The  Lokyatika Sutta of the  Ag-
uttara Nikya says, ‘Brhmans, these five strands of sense-desire
are called the world in the code of  the Ariyan.  What five?
Shapes, cognized by the eye, longed for, alluring, pleasurable,
lovely, bound up with passion and desire; sounds, cognized by
the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue, contacts, cog-
nized  by the touch,  longed for,  alluring,  pleasurable,  lovely,
bound up with passion and desire.’31 So the world the Buddhists
wish to transcend is not the objective world, but a psychological
27 See e.g. MN 2, PTS I 10; SN 22.22, PTS III 26; DN 33, PTS III 230.
28 SN 47.4, PTS V 144; Paisambhidmagga, PTS II 63.
29 Personal communication from Prof. Karunadasa.
30 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1190 (= SN 35.116, PTS IV 95). The counter-
part  of  this  sutta is  also  found in  the  Chinese  translation of  the
Sayukta gama (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 56, c12-p. 57, a15).
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one which is perceived and experienced by our senses. Profes-
sor  Karunadasa says, ‘This  does not mean that  the objective
existence of the world is rejected. It is only for practical pur-
poses, to be more precise, in the interests of soteriology that the
term world is given a psychological interpretation.’32 So it is
said in the Samiddhilokapah Sutta of the Sayutta Nikya, 
Where  there  is  eye,  Samiddhi,  where  there  is  form,  eye-
consciousness,  things  to  be  recognized by  the  eye-consciousness,
there the world exists or the description of the world. 
… … 
Where there is no ear … no mind, no mental phenomena, no mind-
consciousness, no things to be recognized by the mind-conscious-
ness,  there the world does  not exist  nor  any description of the
world.33
Therefore the Buddha says, ‘It is, friend, in just this fathom long
body endowed with apperception and mind that I make known
the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world
and the path leading to cessation of the world.’34 So the attain-
ment of Nibbna is described as ‘the destruction of lust,  the
31 Hare (trans.), PTS IV 289 (= AN 9.38, PTS IV 428). A similar pas-
sage is also found in the Palokadhamma Sutta of the Sayutta Nikya
(SN 35.84, PTS IV 53) as follows: ‘Whatever is subject to disintegra-
tion, nanda, is called the world in the Noble One’s Discipline. And
what is subject to disintegration? The eye, nanda, is subject to disin-
tegration, forms … eye-consciousness … eye-contact … whatever feel-
ing arises with eye-contact as condition … that too is subject to disin-
tegration. The ear is subject to disintegration … The mind is subject to
disintegration … Whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condi-
tion … that too is subject to disintegration. Whatever is subject to dis-
integration, nanda, is called the world in the Noble One’s Discip-
line.’ (trans. Bodhi, 2000, 1163).
32 Karunadasa 1994, 58.
33 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1153 (= SN 35.68, PTS IV 39-40).
34 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 157 (= SN 2.26: Rohitassa Sutta, PTS I 62).
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destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion’.35 ‘The Noble
Truth of the Cessation of Suffering is this: It is the complete ces-
sation of that very craving, giving it up, relinquishing it, liberat-
ing oneself  from it,  and detaching oneself  from it.’36 So the
attainment  of  Nibbna  is  not  transcendence  of  the  physical
world but of the world of experience. 
Some people may ask,  ‘What about  the  Buddha  when he
attains the final nirva?’ This question has been asked so many
times and the Buddha himself has given a good answer. The
attainment of the final nirva is compared to a fire gone out so
that one cannot enquire to which direction the fire has gone.37
So too, Vaccha, the Tathgata has abandoned that material form by
which one describing the Tathgata might describe him; he has cut it
off at the root, made it like a palm-stump, done away with it so that
it is no longer subject to future arising. The Tathgata is liberated
from reckoning in terms of material form, Vaccha, he is profound,
immeasurable, hard to fathom like the ocean.38
Therefore, to try to locate the Tathgata in a post-mortem posi-
tion is like trying to locate an extinguished fire. In both cases
the questions are equally meaningless and equally unwarranted.
So a transcendental interpretation of the concept  of  nirva
cannot find support in canonical literature. This is because the
Buddha is  interested only in the solution to the problem of
35 Bodhi (trans.) 2000, 1294 (= SN 38.1, PTS IV 251). The same is
also found in the Chinese translation of the Ekottara gama, CBETA,
T02, no. 99, p. 126, b2-7.
36 Bodhi (trans., 2000), 1844 (= SN 56.11, PTS V 421). The same is
also found in the Chinese translation of the Ekottara gama, CBETA,
T02, no. 125, p. 619, a15-17, as well as in the Sayutta Nikya (SN
2.29,  PTS I  64);  the Chinese  translation of the  Sayukta gama,
CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 264, b4-17; CBETA, T02, no. 100, p. 459,
b20-c3.
37 MN 72: Aggivacchagotta Sutta, PTS I 487-488.
38amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 593 (= MN 72, PTS I 487-488).
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suffering. This is supported by the well known saying: just as
the great ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, even so this
doctrine and discipline has but one taste, the taste of deliver-
ance.39 After  enlightenment,  the  Buddha  told  his  disciples,
‘Walk, monks, on tour for the blessing of the many folk, for the
happiness of many folk out of compassion for the world, for the
welfare, the blessing, the happiness of devas and men. Let not
two (of you) go by one way.’40
The Concept of Karma and Rebirth 
Some  people  may  argue  that  the  concept  of  karma  [Pli:
kamma] and rebirth is not rational since they cannot be com-
pletely verified. Those who say so miss the point in Buddhist
ethics.  The emphasis  of  the Buddhist  concept of  karma and
rebirth is on human behaviour guided and led by mind rather
than metaphysics  or  ritual  performance.  Just  as  the  Buddha
said, ‘Monks,  I  declare that volition or  intention is  kamma.
Having  intended  one  performs  action  by  body,  speech  and
mind.’41
As Howard Parsons says, ‘Gautama breaks with his prede-
cessors in interpreting what they took to be a blind and inevit-
able karma as a structure of human habit and hence a problem
for the human will. He understood the concept of karma as a
39 Hare (trans.), PTS IV 139 (= AN 8.19, PTS IV 203). This idea is
also found in many other places in the canon such as the Vinaya (Cv
IX, 1, 4, PTS II 239), the Udna (5.5, PTS 56), the Chinese translation
of the Ekottara gama 42.4 (CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 753, a28-b1);
the  Chinese  translation  of  the  Madhyama  gama,  Stra No.  35
(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 476, c10-15).
40 Horner (trans.), PTS IV 28 (= Vin I 21, Mv I, 11, 1). The same idea
is also found in the Sayutta Nikya (SN 4.5, PTS I 105-106; trans.
Bodhi 2000, 198);  the Chinese translation of the  Sayukta gama,
CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 288, a29-b18.
41 AN 6.63, PTS III 415.
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moral and interpreted it as the universal order of justice. As
conditioned genesis, karma can be discerned, understood, and
controlled.’42
So what is emphasized in the Buddhist concept of karma is
intention functioning as the motive force that determines qual-
ity and thus the karmic effects which are manifested through
verbal and bodily actions. The Dhammapada says that the mind
governs  all  of  our  behaviour  and whatever  we  experience,
either happiness or suffering, will follow our mind, just like the
shadow which never leaves.43
Some people may think that the concept of karma in Bud-
dhism is so rigid that in whatever way a person creates karma,
that is how it is experienced. According to the Lonaphala Sutta
of the Aguttara Nikya, this is not a correct understanding.44
In the same sutta the Buddha explains that a trifling evil deed
done by an individual may take him to hell if he is undeveloped
in bodily conduct, undeveloped in virtue, undeveloped in mind,
undeveloped in discernment: restricted, small-hearted, dwelling
with suffering. But a similar trifling evil deed done by another
individual may be experienced here and now, and for the most
part  barely  appears  for  a moment only.  This  is  because the
individual is developed in bodily conduct, developed in virtue,
developed  in  mind,  developed  in  discernment:  unrestricted,
large-hearted,  dwelling  with the immeasurable.  This  rational
explanation of the complicated concept of karma is similar to
the modern day law that  the repeated offender  is  punished
42 Parsons 1951, 9.
43 Dhp, verses No. 1-2. The same idea is also found in the Ummagga
Sutta of the Aguttara Nikya (AN 4.186, PTS II 177; trans. Wood-
ward, PTS II 185): ‘The world is led by mind. By mind it is drawn
along. When mind has arisen, it goes under its sway.’ It is also found
in the Sayutta Nikya (SN 1.62, PTS I 39; trans. Bodhi 2000, 130),
and  in  the  Chinese  translation  of  the  Sayukta  gama,  Stra
No.1009.
44 AN 3.101, PTS I 249-250.
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heavily  while an occasional  offender  with good character  is
punished lightly. 
Even if one does not believe in rebirth or the other world, the
concept of karma is still meaningful. The Chinese version of the
Klma Stra states that the Klmas are perplexed with regard
to precisely karma and rebirth; so the Buddha advises them to
observe the five precepts and do the ten wholesome deeds.45
Then the Buddha states four alternatives: if one keeps them, if
there is  the other  world,  one will  be reborn  in a heavenly
abode; even if there is no other world, one will still be praised
by the wise for one’s good conduct. If one performs only good
deeds, no bad deeds, then there is no suffering and one will lead
a life without dispute with the world but full of compassion. 
Conclusion 
After an analysis of  the seemingly mystical and metaphysical
concepts  in Buddhism, we may come to the conclusion that
Early Buddhism is rational because it places emphasis on know-
ing  and seeing  rather  than belief.  Just  like  a physician,  the
Buddha wanted to cure the illness of  suffering so that he is
practical  and  direct.  Therefore,  in  the  Mahtahsankhaya
Sutta of  the  Majjhima  Nikya the  Buddha  says,  ‘Good,
bhikkhus. So you have been guided by me with this Dhamma,
which is  visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting
inspection, onward leading, to be experienced by the wise for
themselves.’46
45 CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 438, b13-p. 439, c22. The same idea is also
found in the Apaaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikya, MN 60, PTS I
403-404.
46amoli / Bodhi (trans.) 1995, 358 (= MN 38, PTS I 265).
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LIVING IN SECLUSION AND FACING FEAR –
THE EKOTTARIKA-GAMA COUNTERPART TO
THE BHAYABHERAVA-SUTTA*
Anlayo
Succo secessus bibito
et succo tranquillitatis gustato
terroris et peccati expers fit
jucundum religionis succum bibens.1
Abstract
The present paper provides an annotated translation of a dis-
course from the  Chinese Ekottarika-gama  that  parallels  the
Bhayabherava-sutta  of  the  Majjhima-nikya.  Central  themes
taken up in the two discourses are the difficulties of dwelling in
seclusion and how to face the arising of fear.
Introduction
Judging from the picture that emerges from a perusal of the
early discourses, dwelling in seclusion appears to have been a
highly esteemed practice in the thought-world of  early Bud-
* I am indebted to Rod Bucknell, Ken Su and Giuliana Martini for
comments on a draft of this paper.
1 Dhp 205, rendered into Latin by Fausbll 1855/1974, 37; for an
English translation see the end of the article.
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dhism. 2 The theme of a secluded way of life is a recurrent topic
in  the  Sutta-nipÄta,  where  especially  the  KhaggavisÄÅa-sutta
stands out for its poetic portrayal of the beauty of a solitary
lifestyle.3
The same topic is, however, also prominent elsewhere in the
Pli Nikyas. Thus according to the MahÄsuÇÇata-sutta and its
Chinese  and Tibetan parallels,  for  example,  one of the rare
occasions when the Buddha admonished his personal attendant
nanda was related to the need of avoiding excessive socializ-
ing.   The  different  versions  of  this  discourse agree that  the
Buddha warned against foregoing seclusion for the sake of com-
pany, as this will prevent the development of concentration and
the attainment of liberation.4 In the same vein, according to the
2 The actual practice of seclusion comes up in a circumstantial descrip-
tion in the  MahÄsakuludÄyi-sutta  and its parallel, which report that
some of the Buddha’s disciples would join the community only once a
fortnight: MN 77 MN II 8,28: “there are disciples of mine who are
forest dwellers ... they join the community [only] every half-month”,
santi kho pana me ... sÄvakÄ ÄraÇÇakÄ (Be: ÄraÇÇikÄ) ... te anvaddha-
mÄsaÉ  (Se:  anvaÑÑhaÖ)  saÉghamajjhe (Ce and  Se:  saÜghaÖ) osaranti.
M 207 at T I 783a16: “some disciples of mine might join the com-
munity [only] once every half-month”, 或我弟子過半月一入衆; for a
full translation of M 207 cf. Anlayo 2009a.
3 Sn 35-75, with a Gndhr counterpart in Salomon 2000, 105-112,
and another parallel in the MahÄvastu, Senart 1882, 357,18 - 359,15;
cf. also the DivyÄvadÄna in Cowell 1886: 294,13. On the significance
of  the expression  khaggavisÄÅa cf.  Jones  1949/1973,  250 note  1;
Edgerton 1953/1998, 202 s.v. khaÑga-viáÄÅa; Jayawickrama 1977, 22-
23; Norman 1996/2001; Schmithausen 1999, 233 note 13; Salomon
2000, 10-14; Wright 2001, 3-5 and Caillat 2003, 38.
4 According to MN 122 at MN III 110,24, attaining the happiness of
deeper concentration and temporary or perpetual liberation is only
possible for a monk who, instead of socializing, “dwells alone and
withdrawn from company”,  eko gaÅasmÄ vàpakaââho viharati.  M
191 at T I 738a28 describes such a monk as one who, instead of
delighting in company, “always delights in staying alone in remote
areas”, 常樂獨住遠離處者 .  The Tibetan version in Skilling 1994,
196,12 similarly  speaks of  a  monk who,  instead of  delighting  in
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eight thoughts of a great man, recorded in a discourse in the
Aguttara-nikya  and  a  range  of  parallels,  the  Buddha’s
teaching is for one who dwells in seclusion, not for one who
delights in company.5
A discourse in the  Sayutta-nikya, together with counter-
parts  in the two main  Sayukta-gama  collections  extant  in
Chinese, presents joining the monastic community as an option
for those who do not find solace in seclusion.6 This conveys
company, “dwells alone apart from company”, tshogs las gcig pu logs
shig na gnas pa.
5 AN 8.30 at AN IV 229,1: “this Dharma is for one who is secluded,
this  Dharma  is  not  for  one  who  takes  pleasure  in  socializing”,
pavivittassya dhammo, nya dhammo sagaikrmassa. M 74
at T I 540c24: “the path [manifests] from being secluded, not by
delighting in congregation, not by staying in congregation, [the path]
is not attained by those who associate with congregations”, 道從遠離,
非樂聚會, 非住聚會, 非合聚會得. T 46 at T I 835c17: “the path of the
Dharma is [to stay] in hidden away areas, delight in company is not
the path”, 道法隱處, 樂眾非道. E 42.6 at T II 754a21: “this Dharma
is reached by one who properly dwells in seclusion, it is not reached
by one who stays among the crowds”, 此法應閑居者之所行, 非在憒閙
之所行. A similarly emphatic statement can be found in AN 8.53 at
AN IV 280,26 (cf. also Vin II 259,3), according to which whatever
leads to seclusion instead of company should categorically be con-
sidered as  the  teaching  and discipline taught by the  Buddha,  ime
dhamm ... pavivekya savattanti no sagaikya ... ekasena ...
dhreyysi: ‘eso dhammo, eso vinayo eta satthu ssanan’ti. Hudson
1976, 103 sums up: “only by solitude ... can one truly approach the
Dhamma in its immediacy”; cf. also Anlayo 2009b on various aspects
of seclusion, viveka.
6 SN 6.13 at SN I 154,15: “resort to remote lodgings, move towards
freedom from the  fetters;  [but]  if  one  does  not  find  satisfaction
therein,  [then]  dwell  in  the  community,  protected  and  mindful”,
sevetha  pantni  sensanni  (Se:  sayansanni),  careyya  sayojana-
vippamokkh (Ce: sayojana), sa ce rati ndhigacchaye (Be, Ce and
Se: ndhigaccheyya) tattha, saghe (Be: saghe) vase rakkhitatto satim
(Be and Ce:  satm). S 1191 at T II 322c24: “practice approaching
remote lodgings, eradicate and discard all defilements; [but] if one
does  not  delight  in  forest  dwellings,  [then]  join  the  community,
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almost the impression as if living in the monastic community is
considered  something  of  a  second-rate  alternative.  Though
community life was certainly valued in early Buddhist thought,
nevertheless, as a verse in the  Sutta-nipta  proclaims, to train
oneself in [dwelling in] seclusion is [reckoned] supreme among
noble ones.7
Several discourses report that the Buddha himself still went
on solitary retreats, which on occasion apparently lasted for a
period of two or even three months.8 According to the Udum-
barika-(shanda)-sutta and its parallels, a secluded life style is
in fact characteristic of all those who have reached awakening.9
protecting oneself”, 習近邊床座, 斷除諸煩惱, 若不樂空閑, 入衆自攝護
(adopting the variant床 instead of 林). S2 104 at TII 411a11: “being
endowed with application to [dwelling] in quiet places one should
eradicate the fetters and bondages; [but] if one is not able to delight
and rejoice therein, one should return to stay amidst the community”,
處靜有敷具, 應斷於結縛, 若不能愛樂, 還應住僧中. On the gradual
transition from a wandering life spent mainly in forests and seclusion
to  a  more  settled  and  urban  life  style  during  the  subsequent
development of the Buddhist monastic community cf. Dutt 1962, 53-
57;  Olivelle 1974, 37-38; Holt  1981/1999, 30-32; and Panabokke
1993,  17-41.  Nevertheless,  the forest  life  apparently remained an
important factor throughout Buddhist history, thus Ray 1994, 251-
292  highlights  the  importance  of  the  forest  life  for  the  early
Mahyna, while Carrithers 1983 offers an account of the revival of
the forest life in modern day Theravda. Durt 1991, 6 relates “the
tendency of Indian monks to settle in urban monasteries more than in
forests”  to  the  circumstance  that  “the  development  of  Indian
Buddhism  was  connected with  the  expansion  of  an  urban  and
mercantile civilization”.
7 Sn 822: viveka yeva sikkhetha, etad ariynam uttama.
8 SN 54.11 at SN V 325,19 reports that the Buddha went on a retreat
for three months (for other references to the Buddha retiring for a
period of similar duration cf. SN 45.12 at SN V 13,8 and Vin III
230,3),  whereas  the parallel  S 807 at T II 207a9 speaks of  two
months. The Saghabhedavastu in Gnoli 1978, 204,4 also records an
occasion when the Buddha went on a retreat for three months.
9 DN 25 at DN III 54,11 (Be, Ce and Se have the title  Udumbarika-
sutta,  whereas  Ee reads  Udumbarika-shanda-sutta)  D 8  at  T  I
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The discourses indicate that the Buddha not only enjoyed being
by himself, but also practiced seclusion as a way of setting an
example for others. The role of the Buddha in this respect is
highlighted in the Bhayabherava-sutta and its Ekottarika-gama
parallel, in which the theme of seclusion and the example set by
the Buddha form a recurrent theme.10
The Bhayabherava-sutta, found as the fourth discourse in the
Majjhima-nikya,11 has as its counterpart the first discourse in
the  thirty-first  chapter  of  the  Ekottarika-gama.12 The
Ekottarika-gama extant in Chinese appears to be the result of a
translation  undertaken  during  the  period  384-385  of  the
present era by Zhu Fonian (竺佛念 ), based on what probably
was a Prakrit original of so far undetermined school affiliation
transmitted by Dharmanandin.13 Besides this complete parallel
in Chinese translation, sections of a version of this discourse
have also been preserved in the form of Sanskrit fragments.14
49a20; T 11 at T I 225c18; M 104 at T I 595a24.
10MN 4 at MN I 23,34 explains that the two reasons for the Buddha’s
dwelling in seclusion are: “seeing a pleasant abiding here and now for
myself  and  out  of  compassion  for  later  generations”,  attano  ca
dihadhammasukhavihra  sampassamno  pacchima  ca  janata
anukampamno (cf. also the similar statement in AN 2.3.9 at AN I
60,ult.). E 31.1 at T II 666c24: “dwelling in secluded places [provides
a suitable] way of living for myself and at the same time [serves] to
deliver incalculable [numbers of] sentient beings”, 又自遊閑居之處, 兼
度衆生不可稱計.
11 MN 4 at MN I 16,14 to 24,9.
12 E 31.1 at T II 665b17 to T II 667a3, sections of which have
already been translated by Bareau 1963, 37-39 and 68.
13 For a more detailed discussion of the somewhat complex issue of the
translators and school affiliation of this collection cf. Anlayo 2009c;
on the language of the original Waldschmidt 1980, 137 comments that
the  Ekottarika-gama was translated “from some Middle  Indic or
mixed dialect of Prakrit with Sanskrit elements”.
14 SHT I 164c+g in Waldschmidt 1965, 93 (identified by Schlingloff
1967, 421); SHT IV 32 folio 33-41 in Sander 1980, 130-34; SHT IV
165 folio 15-16 in Sander 1980, 190f; SHT IV 500 folio 4 in Sander
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Translation15
On the Higher [Mind]16
1. [I] heard like this. At one time the Buddha was staying at
Svatth in Jeta’s Grove, the park [given by] Anthapiika.
2.  At  that  time,  the  Brahmin  Jussoi  approached  the
Blessed One, exchanged greetings and sat down to one side.
Then the Brahmin Jussoi said to the Blessed One: “To stay
in secluded dwellings, caves and [solitary] places [can] be very
unpleasant, going by oneself to stay alone and apply the mind is
very difficult.”17
The Blessed One said: “It is like this, Brahmin, as you said,
[to stay in] secluded dwellings, caves and [solitary] places [can]
1980, 222; and SHT IX 2401 in Bechert 2004, 195. A reference to
the present discourse as the (bhaya)[bh]airavaparyÄye can be found in
SHT I 36 A2 in Waldschmidt 1965, 27 and in SHT IV 36 V2 in
Sander 1980, 259. 
15 For ease of comparison I adopt the paragraph numbering used in the
English translation of the Bhayabherava-sutta in amoli 1995/2005,
102-7. For the same reason, I employ Pli terminology (except for
anglicized terms like ‘Dharma’ or ‘Nirvana’), without thereby intend-
ing to take a position on the original  language of  the  Ekottarika-
Ägama.
16 The summary verse at T II 673c11 refers to E 31.1 as “higher”, 增
上, which I take to be an abbreviation of 增上之心, the “higher mind”
(equivalent to adhicitta), mentioned in E 31.1 at T II 666b21, hence
my reconstruction of the title  as “On the Higher [Mind]”.  MN 4
instead has the title “Discourse on Fear and Dread”,  Bhayabherava-
sutta.
17 In MN 4 at MN I 16,20 the Brahmin first takes up the topic of the
Buddha’s role in regard to his disciples and only after that turns to the
difficulties of dwelling in seclusion. MN 4 also does not mention caves
and differs in so far as at MN I 16,ult. the Brahmin concludes that
“one would think the forests will rob a monk, who has not attained
concentration, of his mind”,  haranti maÅÅe mano vanÄni samÄdhiÇ
alabhamÄnassa bhikkhuno.
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be very unpleasant, going by oneself to stay alone and apply the
mind is very difficult. 
3. Thus in the past, at the time when I had not yet completed
the path to Buddhahood and was still practising as a bodhisat-
tva, I regularly reflected like this: ‘To stay in secluded dwell-
ings,18 caves and [solitary] places [can] be very unpleasant, going
by oneself to stay alone and apply the mind is very difficult’.”
The Brahmin said to the Buddha: “Suppose there are sons of
good family, who out of firm faith leave the household life to
train in the path, [among them] the recluse Gotama at present
acts as a superior leader, being of much benefit by giving these
types of beginners encouragement and guidance.”
The Blessed One said: “It is like this, Brahmin, as you said,
for whatever sons of good family, who out of firm faith leave
the household life to train in the path, I act as a superior leader,
being  of  much  benefit  by  giving  these  types  of  beginners
encouragement and guidance [665c], since on seeing me they all
arouse a sense of discomfiture and [thereon] approach secluded
dwellings,  caves  and  [solitary]  places  amidst  mountains  or
marshes.19
4. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I then had the
following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins whose bodily
conduct is impure and who withdraw to secluded dwellings and
solitary places with impure bodily conduct, their efforts are in
vain, their practice is not genuine, [they will experience] fear as
well as evil and unwholesome states.20 But I now withdraw into
18 Adopting the variant 居 instead of 靜, in accordance with the two
earlier instances of this phrase.
19 The second part of this passage, beginning with “since on seeing
me ...”,  is without a counterpart in MN 4. The point this passage
makes appears to be the arousing of savega in the disciples on seeing
the example set by the Buddha; on savega cf. also Coomaraswamy
1943.
20 MN 4 at MN I 17,14 only mentions the manifestation of unwhole-
some fear and dread as a consequence of withdrawing into seclusion
210 Anlayo
secluded dwellings and [solitary] places with a bodily conduct
that is not impure. To withdraw into secluded and quiet places
with any impure bodily conduct is not found in me. Thus my
bodily conduct is pure now. For arahants who have purity of
bodily conduct and who delight  in secluded dwellings, caves
and [solitary]  places,  I  act as  a supreme leader.’21 Like this,
Brahmin,  seeing  in  myself  such purity  of  bodily  conduct,  I
delight  in  living  in  secluded dwelling  places,  [experiencing]
increasing joy.
5-7. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I then had
the  following  reflection:  ‘Any  recluses  or  Brahmins,  whose
mental conduct is impure,22 or whose livelihood is impure, and
who withdraw into secluded dwellings and solitary places, even
though they practice like this, yet [their practice] is not genuine,
[as] they are filled with all  [kinds]  of  evil  and unwholesome
with impure bodily conduct, without referring to the vanity of such
efforts and the lack of genuineness of such practice.
21 Instead of highlighting the Buddha’s role as a leader among arahants
of pure bodily conduct, MN 4 at MN I 17,17 points out that the Bud-
dha is one among noble ones of pure bodily conduct (who withdraw
into seclusion), ye hi vo ariy parisuddhakyakammant ... tesam
aha aatamo (Be and Se: aataro).
22 While in the present passage E 31.1 at T II 665c11 only mentions
mental conduct, its subsequent exposition also covers verbal conduct
(the counterpart to the present passage in MN 4 at  MN I 17,23
already  refers  to  impurity  of  verbal  conduct,  aparisuddhavac-
kammanta).  Such irregularities are a common feature of  Ekottarika-
gama discourses, evident right away in the next line of E 31.1 at T
II 665c12,  where the earlier  mentioned fear as  a  consequence of
resorting to seclusion with impure conduct is no longer found (though
fear would be implicit in the general reference to “evil and unwhole-
some states”). Zrcher 1991, 288 explains that in early translations in
general “there is a strong tendency to avoid the monotonous effect
of  ...  verbatim repetition  ...  by  introducing  a  certain  amount  of
diversification and irregularity”,  as a result of which “in the same
translated scripture we often find various alternative forms and longer
or shorter versions of the same clich”.
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states. That is not found in me. Thus my bodily, verbal and
mental  conduct,  as  well  as  my  livelihood,  are  pure  now.
Whatever recluses or Brahmins,23 who have bodily, verbal and
mental purity, as well as purity of livelihood, they delight in
staying in seclusion and in dwelling  with purity in [solitary]
places. That is the case with me. Thus I now have purity of bod-
ily, verbal and mental conduct, as well as purity of livelihood.
For whatever arahants that have bodily, verbal and mental pur-
ity, as well as purity of livelihood, and who delight in staying in
seclusion and in quiet places, I act as a superior leader.’ Like
this, Brahmin, given that I have bodily, verbal and mental pur-
ity, as well as purity of livelihood, when staying in seclusion and
in quiet places I [experience] increasing joy.
14.24 At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I then had
the following reflection: ‘[Some] so-called recluses or Brahmins
are much affected by fear and dread. [When] they stay in seclu-
sion and in quiet places, at that time they then [experience] fear
and dread, evil and unwholesome states. But I now am never
affected by fear when staying  in solitary seclusion and quiet
places.’ [Whereas some] so-called recluses or Brahmins have a
mind [filled with] fear and dread [when] staying in secluded and
quiet places,25 in me that is not found. Thus I now never have
fear and dread. I  enjoy staying in secluded and quiet places.
Whatever fear and dread [may arise] in the mind while staying
23Adopting a variant that adds 諸 before 有.
24 MN 4 at MN I 17,32 ( 8-12 in amoli 1995/2005, 103) lists
mental obstructions corresponding to the five hindrances as causes for
the arising of fear when withdrawing into seclusion, with abhijjhlu
kmesu tibbasrga as first, uddhata avpasantacitta (Ce: avupasanta)
as fourth and kakh vecikicch (Be and Se: vicikicch) as fifth, thus not
employing the standard terms used in enumerations of the five hin-
drances. These five mental obstructions are without a counterpart in
E 31.1. Next MN 4 at MN I 19,3 ( 13 in  amoli 1995/2005,
103) refers to self-praise, mentioned in E 31.1 at T II 665c28 after
fear ( 14). 
25 Adopting the variant 者 instead of謂.
212 Anlayo
in secluded dwellings,  that  is not  found in me.26 Thus I  am
already free from such suffering and misery,27 no longer being
affected in the same way [as those recluses and Brahmins]. Like
this, Brahmin, having seen this benefit of being without fear, I
[experience] increasing joy.
13.  Any  recluses  or  Brahmins  who  denigrate  others  and
[unduly] exalt  themselves,  even though they stay in secluded
dwellings and [solitary] places, yet they have impure percep-
tions.28 But I, Brahmin, do not denigrate others [666a], nor do I
[unduly] exalt myself. Any [undue] self-exaltation or denigra-
tion of others is not  found in me. Thus, because I  am now
without arrogance, I act as a superior leader for noble beings
who are without arrogance. Having seen this benefit, I [experi-
ence] increasing joy.
15. Any recluses [and Brahmins], who seek for material bene-
fits, cannot bring themselves to rest.29 But I now am without
any seeking for material benefits. Thus I am one without seek-
ing now, who is contented on his own.30 For those who are
contented on their own, I act as a superior leader. Having seen
this benefit, I [experience] increasing joy.
26Adopting a variant that adds 有 after 我. 
27Adopting the variant 已 instead of 以.
28MN 4 at MN I 19,5 does not refer to impure perceptions, instead of
which it mentions – as is the case throughout its exposition – the prob-
lem of unwholesome fear and dread.
29 MN 4 at MN I 19,21 does not draw out the repercussions of being
desirous of material gains (or of honour and fame, also mentioned in
MN 4). The commentary on the present passage, Ps I 117,5, records
an entertaining story of a monk who went to stay in a cemetery so as
to become known as an undertaker of ascetic practices and thereby
acquire material gains (dwelling in a cemetery, described in detail in
Vism 76,15, occurs in different listings of ascetic practices, for surveys
of such listings cf. Bapat 1937, Dantinne 1991, 24-30 and Ray 1994,
293-323). After it had become dark, a ruminating ox so frightened
him that he spent the whole night without getting any rest, a tale thus
illustrating the theme of lack of rest also mentioned in E 31.1. 
30Adopting the variant自 instead of 同.
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16. Any recluses or Brahmins, whose minds are lazy, will not
be energetic [when] frequenting secluded and quiet places. That
is not found in me. Thus I now have a mind full of vigour.
Therefore among noble ones who are not  lazy, who have a
mind full of vigour, I act as a superior leader. Having seen this
benefit in myself, I [experience] increasing joy.
17. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I moreover
had the following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins who are
often forgetful and who dwell in secluded places,31 even though
they practice like this, yet, they will be possessed of evil and
unwholesome states.  But  I  now am free  from forgetfulness.
Again, Brahmin, to be one who is forgetful, that is not found in
me.  For  those noble ones  who are not  forgetful,  I  act as a
superior leader.’ Having now seen this benefit, I [experience]
increasing joy when staying in secluded dwelling places.
18. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva], I moreover
had the following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins whose
mind is scattered and not concentrated, they will then be pos-
sessed of evil and unwholesome states and take part in evil prac-
tices. But my mind now is totally free from being scattered, [I]
am constantly with a one-pointed mind.  Any scattered mind
and lack of concentration is not found in me. Thus I have con-
stantly a one-pointed mind. For noble ones with unified and
concentrated mind, I act as a superior leader.’ Having now seen
this benefit,32 if I dwell in secluded quiet places I [experience]
increasing joy.
19. At the time [when I was still a bodhisattva] I moreover
had the following reflection: ‘Any recluses or Brahmins who are
ignorant and dull, like a herd of sheep,33 those men will then be
possessed of evil and unwholesome states. That is not found in
31MN 4 at MN I 20,1 mentions being “forgetful”, muhassati, and
“without clear comprehension”, asampajna. 
32Adopting a variant that adds 義 after 此.
33The comparison with a herd of sheep is not found in MN 4.
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me.  I  now am constantly  endowed with wisdom,  I  have no
ignorance. Staying in secluded dwellings and being  endowed
with conduct like this, that is found in me. I now have accom-
plished wisdom. For those noble beings who have accomplished
wisdom, I act as a superior leader.’ Having now seen this bene-
fit, if I stay in secluded dwellings I [experience] increasing joy.
20. While I was staying in secluded dwellings,34 if the branch
of a tree broke, [or] a bird or an animal ran by, at that time I
had the following thought: ‘This is [what causes] great fear in a
forest’ [666b]. Then again I had the following thought: ‘If fear
comes, I should seek a means to prevent it coming again.’
If fear and dread came while I was walking, then at that time
I did not sit or lie down, determining to discard that fear and
dread,  and [only]  afterwards sitting  down. Suppose fear and
dread came when I was standing, then at that time I did not
walk or sit down, determining to discard that fear and dread,
and [only] afterwards sitting down. If fear and dread came at
the time when I was sitting, [then] I did not walk, determining
to discard that fear and dread, and [only] afterwards walking.35
If fear and dread came when I was lying down, then at that time
I did not walk or even sit up, determining to discard that fear
and dread,36 and [only] afterwards sitting up.37
34 MN 4 at MN I 20,27 speaks of going on purpose to cetiyas on aus-
picious nights (on which cf. Dietz 1997) in order to experience fear.
According to von Simson 1995, 172, “the powers of nature and the
sacredness of place and time are as unimportant in the Buddhist doc-
trine as are the year myths and fertility rites”. Thus this specification
in MN 4 strikes an unfamiliar note (though it needs to be kept in mind
that it refers to the Buddha’s pre-awakening experiences). In contrast,
the presentation in E 31.1 at T II 666a28 is quite straightforward
and suffices for the continuity of the discourse, in that the arising of
fear caused by the noise of animals may happen at any secluded place,
without needing to seek for it on specific nights at specific places.
35 Adopting the varian 行 instead of 坐.
36 Adopting a variant without 使.
37Adopting the variant坐 instead of臥.
Living in Seclusion and Facing Fear              215
21. Brahmin, you should know: Whatever recluses and Brah-
mins who throughout day and night do not understand the path
of the Dharma, I now declare that those men are thoroughly
deluded.38 But I,  Brahmin, throughout day and night  under-
stand the path of the Dharma, having an energetic mind that is
not deceived.
22-23. With a mind that is not scattered, with a constantly
one-pointed mind, free from perceptions of sensual desire, with
[directed] awareness  and [continuous]  observation,  remaining
with mindfulness and rapture,39 being happy,40 I dwelled in the
first  absorption.  This,  Brahmin,  is reckoned the first  [higher
state of] mind that for me constitutes a condition of happiness
here and now.41
24. Discarding [directed] awareness and [continuous] obser-
vation, with internal joy and rapture, with a one-pointed mind
that is free from [directed] awareness and observation, concen-
trated, mindful and rapturous,42 I dwelled in the second absorp-
tion. This,  Brahmin, is reckoned the second [higher state of]
mind that leads to obtaining happiness here and now. 
38 MN 4 at MN I 21,20 instead speaks of recluses and Brahmins who
mistake night for day and day for night (cf. also SHT IV 32 folio 37
V2  in  Sander  1980, 131),  for  a  discussion  of  this  difference  cf.
Anlayo 2005, 2-3. 
39 Adopting the variant 待 instead of 持.
40 MN 4 at MN I 21,35 qualifies the happiness and rapture experi-
enced with the first absorption as “born of seclusion”, vivekaja.
41 This specification, which relates the development of absorption to
the recurrent theme of dwelling in joy (as a result of withdrawing into
seclusion), is without a counterpart in MN 4. A recurrent reference in
the Sanskrit fragments to sparavihra suggests that the Sanskrit ver-
sion had a specification similar to E 31.1, cf. SHT IV 165 folio 15
V8 and R1 in Sander  1980, 190 and SHT IX 2401 Vd in Bechert
2004, 195.
42 MN 4 at MN I 21,ult. qualifies the second absorption as a mental
condition of “inner confidence/serenity”, ajjhatta sampasda.
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25.  Seeing  and knowing within myself  the absence of any
desirous attention,  aware of bodily pleasure, as is wished by
noble ones,43 guarding mindfulness and happiness, I dwelled in
the  third  absorption.  This,  Brahmin,  is  reckoned  the  third
[higher state of] mind [that leads to obtaining happiness here
and now]. 
26.  Again,  having  left  behind  pleasure  and  pain,  being
without any delight or sadness, free from pleasure and pain,
guarding  mindfulness  and  purity,  I  dwelled  in  the  fourth
absorption. This is reckoned, Brahmin, the fourth higher [state
of] mind, with awareness and knowledge proceeding on their
own in accordance with the mind.44
27. Then, while staying in a secluded dwelling and being in
the possession of these four higher [states of] mind, with this
concentrated mind, flawlessly pure,  free from fettering influ-
ences, having obtained fearlessness, I cognised my former lives
during countless aeons. At that time I recollected my former
lives: One birth, two births, three births, four births, five births,
ten births, twenty births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, a
hundred births, a thousand births, aeons of arising and dissolu-
tion, in all  their details,  [recollecting that]: ‘I  formerly arose
there, with such a given name, such a family name, partaking of
food like this, experiencing pleasure and pain like this, passing
away from there I was reborn here, dying here I was reborn
there’  – from beginning to end I completely understood the
causes and conditions.45
28. Brahmin, you should know that during the first period of
the night I attained this first [higher]  knowledge [666c], dis-
43 According to MN 4 at MN I 22,4, noble ones describe this state as a
dwelling in happiness with mindfulness and equanimity.
44 This sentence is without a counterpart in MN 4.
45 A reference to causes and conditions is not found in MN 4. Accord-
ing to the Saghabhedavastu, Gnoli 1977, 118,11, the pre-awakening
knowledge of recollecting his past lives indeed stimulated the future
Buddha’s investigation of the causes underlying the process of rebirth.
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carding ignorance and no longer [being subject] to obscuration,
with  a mind that  delights  in dwelling  in seclusion  and that
knows and is aware on its own.46
29. Again, relying on this concentrated mind, with its flaw-
lessness and freedom from fettering influences, a mind that is
rightly concentrated and has obtained fearlessness, [I] moreover
came to know the arising and passing away of beings. With the
divine eye I moreover saw beings of various types being born
and passing away, of pleasant or unpleasant appearance, with
good or bad destinies, good-looking or ugly, in accordance with
their wholesome or evil conduct, I thoroughly knew them all in
detail [thus]: Whatever living beings have undertaken evil bod-
ily, verbal or mental conduct, have slandered noble ones and
been continuously of wrong view, partaking [in conduct] that
accords with wrong view, with the destruction of the body at
death  they  are reborn  in  hell.  Whatever  living  beings  have
undertaken wholesome bodily, verbal or mental conduct, who
have not slandered noble ones and continuously been of right
view, partaking [in conduct] that accords with right view, with
the destruction of the body at death they are reborn in a higher
heavenly realm. Thus with the divine eye that is flawless and
purified I saw beings of various types being born and passing
away, of pleasant or unpleasant appearance, with good or bad
destinies, being good-looking or ugly, in accordance with their
former conduct, I knew them all thoroughly.
30. Brahmin, you should know that during the middle
period of the night I attained this second [higher] knowledge,
no longer [being subject] to obscuration, with a mind that
delights in secluded dwellings and that knows and is aware on
its own.
31. Again, relying on this concentrated mind, with its flawless
purity and freedom from fettering influences, a state of mind
46 This specification, which relates each of the higher knowledges to
the main theme of joyfully dwelling in seclusion, is without a counter-
part in MN 4.
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that has reached concentration and has obtained fearlessness, I
attained the destruction of the mental influxes. I knew dukkha
as it really is, not falsely.47
32. Then, at that time, when I attained this type of mental
condition, the mind attained liberation from the influx of sen-
suality, from the influx of existence and from the influx of
ignorance.  By  attaining  liberation  I  attained  knowledge  of
liberation, knowing as it really is that: ‘Birth and death have
been destroyed, the holy life has been established, what had to
be done has been done, there will be no more coming to [any]
womb.’
33. This, Brahmin, is reckoned the third [higher] knowledge
that I attained in the last period of the night, no longer [being
subject] to obscuration.
34. How is it, Brahmin, do you have this type of thought:
‘The Tathgata [still] has sensuality, ill-will and ignorance in his
mind? Without  having eradicated these  he stays  in secluded
dwelling places?’ Brahmin, you should not see it like this. Thus
the Tathgata now has discarded all influxes forever, he con-
tinually delights in secluded dwellings and not in the company
of men. Because I have now seen two benefits,48 I delight in
secluded dwellings and [solitary] places. What two? Dwelling in
secluded places [provides a suitable] way of living for myself
47 E 31.1 at T II 666c16: 知此苦如實不虛, whereas MN 4 at MN I
23,14 applies the full scheme of the four noble truths to dukkha and to
the influxes (sava). Nakamura 2000, 211 holds that the lack of a ref-
erence to the four noble truths indicates that their occurrence in MN 4
“must be a later addition”. In view of the centrality in the early teach-
ings of the scheme of the four noble truths this seems less probable (on
the  epithet  “noble”  in  this  context  cf.  Norman  1984,  Norman
1990/1993 and Anlayo 2006). A more plausible explanation would
be to assume that the passage in E 31.1 is an abbreviation of the full
statement and thus has only preserved the first part corresponding to
ida dukkhan’ti yathbhta abbhasi.
48 Adopting a variant that adds 二 after 此.
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and at the same time [serves] to deliver incalculable [numbers
of] sentient beings.”49
35. At that time, the Brahmin Jussoi said to the Buddha:
“Out of compassion for living beings you [are willing to] deliver
them all.”50 The Brahmin Jussoi further said to the Buddha:
“Enough, Blessed One, enough, what has been said suffices, just
as  if  something  crooked had been straightened  up,51 [as  if]
someone who had gone astray had found the [right] path, [as if]
a blind person had obtained eyes,52 as if seeing a light in the
darkness, like this the recluse Gotama has taught the Dharma
with innumerable expedient means [667a]. I now go for refuge
to the Buddha, the Dharma and the community, and from now
on take on myself  to  observe the five precepts  of  no more
killing beings [etc.], having become a lay disciple.”53
At that time the Brahmin Jussoi, having heard what the
Buddha said, was delighted and received it respectfully.
49 See above note 10.
50 A reference to delivering all beings is not found in MN 4.
51Adopting the variant伸 instead of申.
52The image of a blind person regaining eye-sight is not found in MN 4.
53MN 4 at MN I 24,7 also reports that he took refuge, though notably
SHT IV 32 folio 41 R3-4 in Sander 1980, 134 gives the impression as
if the Sanskrit version did not record his taking of refuge (in fact the
editors  ibid.  remark that “damit  endet,  abweichend vom Pli,  wo
Jussoi Laienanhnger wird, das Bhayabhairavastra”). A number of
other  Pli  discourses also report that the Brahmin Jussoi  took
refuge, cf. MN 27 at MN I 184,16; SN 12.47 at SN II 77,1; AN 2.2.7
at AN I 57,15; AN 3.55 at AN I 159,21; AN 3.59 at AN I 168,7; AN
4.184 at AN II 176,5; AN 6.52 at AN III 364,3; AN 7.47 at AN IV
56,18; AN 10.119 at AN V 236,1; AN 10.167 at AN V 251,24; and
AN 10.177 at AN V 273,13. Tsuchida 1991, 77 comments that this
“warns us against using the canonical narratives as ... historical sources
without due critical considerations”. 
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Comparison
From the perspective of the main theme of the Bhayabherava-
sutta and its Ekottarika-gama parallel, a noteworthy difference
can be found in the respective introductory sections.54 Though
the parallel versions agree on the two main points made by the
Brahmin  Jussoi, they  differ on the sequence in which he
presents them. 
According  to  the  Bhayabherava-sutta,  Jussoi  begins  by
referring to the Buddha’s role as a guide for his disciples, after
which the Brahmin takes up the topic of the difficulties when
living  in  seclusion.  On reading  the  Pli  account,  these  two
points appear like two separate ideas.
In  the  Ekottarika-gama  account,  however,  Jussoi  first
turns to the difficulties of living in seclusion and then proceeds
to the Buddha’s role in providing guidance and encouragement
to his disciples. In reply, the Buddha then explains that it is pre-
cisely due to seeing his secluded lifestyle that his disciples get
inspired to resort to secluded dwellings themselves. In this way,
in the Ekottarika-gama version a relationship between the two
statements emerges: The disciples face the difficulties of living
in seclusion because they are inspired by the example set for
them by the Buddha.55
The perspective that the  Ekottarika-gama  version provides
in this way suits the remainder of both discourses well, where
the autobiographical account of the Buddha’s own practice of
seclusion and consequent attainment of absorption and libera-
54 Lack of space does not allow a more detailed study of differences
between the two versions, some of which will be examined in my
forthcoming comparative study of the Majjhima-nikya, scheduled for
publication in 2011.
55 That fear was indeed considered a problem can be deduced from the
kakheyya-sutta  and  its  parallels,  where  absence  of  fear  occurs
among a range of wishes a monk might have, MN 6 at MN I 33,26,
AN 10.71 at AN V 132,17 and M 105 at T I 596a3.
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tion fills out in detail what makes him a guide and inspiration
for his disciples. 
Another difference germane to the same theme occurs in rela-
tion to the contrast made in both versions between recluses or
Brahmins who retire into seclusion without having established
the required level of purity, compared to the Buddha’s way of
dwelling in solitude. While the Bhayabherava-sutta keeps reiter-
ating that lack of purity or the presence of mental defilements
will result in the experience of unwholesome fear and dread,
the  Ekottarika-gama version is less consistent in this respect.
Here the Pli version brings out a central theme with more clar-
ity, namely the fearfulness of seclusion.56
Yet  another  difference  can  be  found  in  relation  to  the
Buddha’s  attainment  of  the  four  absorptions,  which  the
Ekottarika-gama version presents as his experience of happi-
ness here and now, thus linking them more closely to the main
theme of the joy that can result from dwelling in seclusion.57
The same difference recurs in relation to the three higher know-
ledges,  where the  Ekottarika-gama  discourse again makes  a
point of indicating that their attainment comes about in a mind
that has reached fearlessness and that delights in dwelling in
seclusion.58
Keeping in mind the complementary perspectives provided by
the parallel versions in each of these instances helps to get a
clearer grasp of the central message of the discourse. Following
the Ekottarika-gama version’s introductory account, the topic
the Brahmin Jussoi had on his mind would have been the
fearfulness of dwelling in seclusion. The continuity of the dis-
course then reveals the Buddha’s role as a source of guidance
56 To appreciate the significance of this topic, it needs to be kept in
mind that from an ancient Indian perspective – as reflected in early
Buddhist texts – nature is often seen as dangerous and threatening, cf.
Boucher 2008, 54 and Schmithausen 1991, 29 and 1997, 24.
57 See above note 41.
58 See above note 46.
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that inspires his disciples to brave this fearful condition,59 a role
taken up again at the end of both versions, when the Buddha
points out that one of the two reasons for his secluded lifestyle
is to provide an example to be emulated.
Another factor that counters fear – treated in detail in both
versions – is purity of  conduct,60 together with purity of the
mind by overcoming a whole host of mental defilements.61 The
basic point made in this way is that fear often can be a reflec-
tion of the condition of one’s own mind. Where the presence of
defilements or even of misconduct will naturally evoke fear on
any possible occasion, to the degree to which purification has
59 The role of recollecting the Buddha as a source of fearlessness is also
prominent in the  Dhajagga-sutta  and its parallels: SN 11.3 at SN I
219,27; S 980 at T II 254c19; S 981 at T II 255a26; E 24.1 at T
II 615a17; for Sanskrit  parallels cf.  Waldschmidt 1932, 47,  Wald-
schmidt 1959/1967, 379, Sander 1987, 137, SHT VII 1687A in Bech-
ert 1995, 96; Wille 2006, 118; for Tibetan parallels cf. Skilling 1994,
268,7 and 292,1, for parallels found as stra quotations cf. the survey
in Skilling 1997, 403f. Harrison 1992/1993, 218 comments that the
Dhajagga-sutta  shows that “as a specific  remedy against fear when
meditating in wild and solitary places ... the practice of buddhnussati
must have assumed quite early on the nature of an apotropaic tech-
nique”.
60 The importance of a foundation in proper conduct for being able to
dwell in seclusion is highlighted in the Bhaddli-sutta and its parallel,
MN 65 at MN I 440,17 and M 194 at T I 747c6.
61 For a survey of these cf. Weerasinghe 1997, 615f. Though this does
indicate the need for a certain degree of maturity in order to be able to
withdraw into seclusion (cf. also AN 10.99 at AN V 202,4 and Ud 4.1
at Ud 35,18), it is noteworthy that in AN 5.114 at AN III 138,27
already new monks (nava acirapabbajita) are encouraged to withdraw
into seclusion in forests. In fact Vin I 92,22 makes a special allowance
for a newly ordained monk to be exempted from the otherwise oblig-
atory need to live in dependence on a teacher if he finds solace in liv-
ing in seclusion in a remote forest dwelling. Thus the need for some
degree of maturity before withdrawing into seclusion does not appear
to imply that dwelling in seclusion is only meant for the few whose
task has nearly been completed. 
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been undertaken, fear will be less prone to manifest. A mind at
peace within, resting in ethical blamelessness and the removal
of mental defilements, will find joy instead of fear in solitude. 
Besides internal factors, however,  external factors can also
cause the arising of fear. In such a case, both versions recom-
mend facing fear as and when it occurs. The two discourses
make it clear that this requires remaining in whatever posture
one is when fear arises. Thus, instead of reacting to what has
caused the fear, one faces the mental condition of fear itself.
This  brings  into  play  a  key  factor  of  mindfulness  practice
described  in  similar  ways  in  the  Satipahna-sutta of  the
Majjhima-nikya and its Madhyama-gama counterpart, where
the task of mindfulness it to remain aware of the presence of a
defilement or hindrance in the mind.62
By in this way facing fear when it arises and continuing to
purify the mind, the joy of seclusion will eventually culminate
in the intense forms of happiness and bliss to be experienced
through the absorptions and the supreme happiness of libera-
tion. In this way, the  Bhayabherava-sutta  and its  Ekottarika-
gama  parallel  throw into relief  the importance of living in
seclusion and facing fear as essential ingredients of the path to
awakening.
“Having savoured the taste of seclusion,
The taste of [inner] peace,
[One] is free from anxiety and evil,
Savouring the joyful taste of the Dharma.”63
62MN 10 at MN I 60,11 (= DN 22 at DN II 300,10) and M 98 at T I
584a24. Another parallel, E 12.1 at T II 568a9, merely lists the five
hindrances without giving detailed instructions. For a study of these
discourses cf. Kuan 2008.
63 Dhp 205 (cf. also Sn 257):  pavivekarasa ptv (Be:  pitv), rasa
upasamassa ca,  niddaro hoti nipppo,  dhammaptirasa piva  (Ce:
piba),  which  has  a  counterpart  in  Udna(-varga) verse  28.5  in
Bernhard 1965, 355: pravivekarasa jtv, rasa copaamasya vai,
nirjvaro bhavati nippo, dharmaprtirasa piban, trsl. in Hahn 2007,
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101   as “hat er den  Geschmack der Abgeschiedenheit  gekostet und
kennt er den Geschmack der Abgeklrtheit, wird fieberfrei, wer ohne
Bosheit ist, wenn er den Saft der Freude an der Lehre trinkt”. The
Chinese parallels in T 212 at T IV 742c10 and T 213 at T IV 792a25
read: 解知念待味 ,  思惟休息義 ,  無熱無飢想 ,  當服於法味 , trsl. in
Willemen 1978, 125 as “when one has realized the flavour of seclu-
sion, and reflects on the meaningfulness of calmness, when one has no
fever, no notion of hunger, he will drink the flavour of the law”. The
Tibetan parallel in Beckh 1911, 98 or Zongtse 1990, 288 reads: legs
par nyer zhi’i ro dang ni, rab tu dben pa’i ro shes pa, rims nad med cing
sdig  med  la,  chos  la  dga’  ba’i  ro  dag  ’thung;  trsl.  in  Rockhill
1883/1975, 133 as “he (the elect) knows the sweetness  of perfect
peace, the sweetness of solitude; free from disease, without sin, he
drinks the sweetness of delighting in the law” (similarly trsl. in Iyer
1986, 331); while Sparham 1983/1986, 140 renders the same as “tast-
ing the excellent flavour, of peace and complete detachment, plagues
and evil are no more: the taste of liking dharma is imbibed”.
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Abbreviations
AN Aguttara-nikya
Be Burmese edition
Ce Ceylonese edition
CBETA Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association
D Drgha-gama (T 1)
Dhp Dhammapada
DN Dgha-nikya
Ee PTS edition
E Ekottarika-gama (T 125)
M Madhyama-gama (T 26)
MN Majjhima-nikya
Ps Papacasdan
Se Siamese edition
S Sayukta-gama (T 99)
S2 ‘other’ Sayukta-gama (T 100)
SHT Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden
SN Sayutta-nikya
Sn Sutta-nipta
T Taish (CBETA)
Ud Udna
Vin Vinaya
Vism Visuddhimagga
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